Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT UN9150135, (formerly known as nyyple) Plaintiff, v. Tactical_Joe, in his quasi-official capacity as a City of Palmer Police Officer, Defendant. Case No. RSC-CV-3000 RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED Presiding Judge: Hon. Siteowner Plaintiff UN9150135, formerly known as nyyple, by and through counsel, files this response in opposition to Defendant Tactical_Joe’s Rid. Civ. Pro R.12(a)(5) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant’s motion. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS DEMONSTRATING FALSE REPRESENTATIONS BY THE DEFENDANT On June the 2nd, 2024, Plaintiff, having paid bail for a prior arrest, was crossing a road near Sterling Heights, in Palmer, Ridgeway County. Defendant, Corporal Tactical_Joe of the Palmer Police Department was in the midst of a pursuit with his emergency lights and sirens activated. Defendant then swerved around the Plaintiff, causing him to crash his car into a fence. Defendant then turned his vehicle around and drove up to the Plaintiff, then exited his vehicle and took out his conducted electrical weapon and aimed it at the Plaintiff. Defendant (contradictory to the invalid statement made in the Defense’s statement of facts in their motion to dismiss) did not at any point fire the weapon and tase the Plaintiff, suggesting a lack of a flight risk which constitutes the use of the weapon to apprehend the Plaintiff. Contrary to the Defense’s assertions, Plaintiff did not obstruct or interfere with the pursuit, Plaintiff was merely crossing the road and the Defendant’s abrupt maneuver to avoid hitting her is what led to the collision with the fence. This renders the Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiff “intentionally walked in front of his vehicle” inaccurate and misleading, as the Plaintiff was crossing the road even before the Defendant was in her sight. Defense also asserts that the Plaintiff was “trying to flee” when this also, in fact, is completely false. Plaintiff, throughout the entire encounter was completely compliant with the Defendant, and at no moment did she pose a serious flight risk which warranted the use of a taser. Plaintiff stopped and Defendant restrained her arms and placed her in cuffs while he was behind her, not while she was on the floor incapacitated by the taser as the motion to dismiss suggests. Plaintiff was coerced into handcuffs and placed in detention in the Defendant’s vehicle without justification. The only justification the Defendant provided for her detention was “I’m in a purs” and “Yield to an LEO dude” which do not constitute lawful basis or cause for detention. Plaintiff, who had no warrants or BOLO orders was forcibly placed in the back of the Defendant’s police cruiser with the markings “PALMER POLICE”. Plaintiff committed no arrestable crime, or a crime which warranted detention. Defendant’s misrepresentations of the events and justification of the detention are evident. Plaintiff’s actions did not warrant detention, therefore Defendant’s actions constitute false imprisonment and official misconduct, thus justifying denial of the motion and proceeding with legal proceedings pertaining to the matter at hand. II. APPLICABILITY OF LEGAL STANDARDS It is “only the extraordinary cases in which dismissal is proper” for failure to state a claim. See United States v.City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). A court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of the law only if the complaint: (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory; or fails to support a cognizable legal claim. Robertson v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534, (9th Cir. 1984). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and should construe all inferences from them in the non-moving parties favor. See Thompson v Davis, 295 F.3d, 890, 895, (9th Cir. 2002); Baliestri v Palifica Police Department., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can be granted under Rid. Civ. Pro. R. 12(a)(5) and 28(b)(2) but should not be granted unless it appears that beyond unreasonable doubt, that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief, (See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). As aforementioned in Thompson v Davis aswell as Baliestri v Palifica Police Department, the court must accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from the plaintiff’s (non-moving party) favour. Plaintiff’s complaint contains cognizable legal theories and sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss should be denied. III. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiff has properly stated a claim for false imprisonment Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for false imprisonment. However, Defendant's argument is based on a misapplication of the law and an incorrect interpretation of the facts. Under 1 R. Stat. § 3104, false imprisonment occurs when an individual, without legal authority or justification, restrains another person's movement. In their motion to dismiss, the Defendant has actually cited case law which is beneficial for the Plaintiff’s response (woopsie), in Terry v Ohio, 392, U.S 1, 21 (1968), the Supreme Court of the United States held that law enforcement officers must have, specific, articulable facts to justify a detention, while law enforcements are able to “temporarily detain individuals'', they must then justify the detention with specific, articulable facts. In the case at hand, Defendant completely failed to do this, justifying his illegal detention of the Plaintiff with “Yield to an LEO dude”, which is not a crime for which the Plaintiff can be detained for. By definition, Defendant did not, as a law enforcement officer, specify specific or articulable facts to justify the detention of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff, by not being able to justify the detention of the Plaintiff, Defendant’s actions acutely fit the statute alleged against him in the civil complaint, thus, this cause of action brought forth against the Defendant is completely supports a cognizable legal claim. B. Plaintiff’s actions were still unauthorized if we were to assume what the Defendant asserts is correct. Even assuming arguendo Plaintiff's actions could be construed as obstructive, Defendant's detention of the Plaintiff was still unlawful. The subsequent detention of Plaintiff, without any clear and immediate threat or specific and articulable reasons for detention , constitutes an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). One way the Defendant should have dealt with the situation was to cite the Plaintiff, as the statute stipulates instead of illegally detaining her. Defendant’s assertions that Plaintiff’s actions warranted detention is unsupported by facts and meets the standard for false imprisonment. C. Plaintiff has properly stated a claim for Official Misconduct. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for official misconduct, however, under 1 R. Stat. § 3114, official misconduct occurs when a public servant commits an unauthorized act relating to his official functions or refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law. Defendant’s actions, as detailed in the complaint, clearly constitute an unauthorized exercise of his official functions. Defendant detained Plaintiff without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in violation of established legal standards and his training with the LETC (which further underlines the unauthorized nature of his conduct). As previously mentioned, in Terry v Ohio, law enforcement officers must have specific and articulable facts to justify a detention, and Defendant was completely unable to justify a detention, thus deeming his arrest to be without legal cause, and false, constituting false imprisonment, which is an unauthorized exercise of his official duties. Defendants' statements and actions demonstrate a departure from authorized conduct expected of a law enforcement officer. Plaintiff has also, as the Civil Claims Act suggests, explained how the Defendant’s actions caused injury; in this situation, Plaintiff, by his false imprisonment of the Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights protected by Ridgeway’s Article I, Section VI, thus, the Plaintiff has sufficiently also alleged harm through her deprivation of rights. In both causes of action, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all the requirements of the statutes and thus has supported a cognizable legal claim. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims for false imprisonment and official misconduct, supported by factual allegations and applicable legal standards. The Court must allow these claims to proceed to trial. CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS s/___________________________ Singhski, Esq. Ridgeway Bar No.25100 Counsel of Record President, Center for Individual Rights T: (505) 503-4455 E: [email protected] D: singhski

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