SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2874
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant TacticalDankPatriot, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General
of Ridgeway, respectfully moves this Court to enter summary judgment pursuant to
Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Attached hereto is a memorandum of law supporting the
entrance of summary judgment in his favor.
Dated: May 24, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Counsel for Defendant
WHERESPIZZA_YT,
Plaintiff,
v.
TACTICALDANKPATRIOT,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2874
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHERESPIZZA_YT,
Plaintiff,
v.
TACTICALDANKPATRIOT,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
1. The State Senate enacted the Comprehensive Firearms Act (CFA), 7 R.
Stat. § 7301 et seq., as expansive legislation to clarify the “proper foundations and
guidelines for * * * [Ridgeway’s] firearm laws.” Id. The CFA largely restructures
and clarifies the scope of identification requirements for automatic firearms. It also
repeals all previous state laws imposing identification requirements. The CFA is the
only guiding light for firearm identification in Ridgeway, and its deep-rooted
legislative history can neither be understated nor overlooked. Gun crime is at an all-
time high, and both the text and legislative history confirm that the CFA serves
multiple purposes aside from mere identification requirements.
a. In the last two years alone, four firearm manufacturers have made
Ridgeway County their home. So too has gun crime. Solami, Micro, and Stetson are
all firearm manufactures that produce and sell automatic weapons within our
borders. Since the integration of these firearms into the community, crime has
increased—gun crimes, especially. Identification requirements have holistically
proven to be a workable resolution to unrestrained sale of automatic firearms.
Recognizing this, the CFA heavily regulates the possession of automatic weapons,
making it “illegal to own * * * fully automatic [firearms] * * * without possession
of an Advanced Firearms License (AFL).” 7 R. Stat. § 7401. For months now, the
State of Ridgeway has effectively operated under this scheme.
2. In March 2024, Plaintiff was cited $450.00 after he was found in
possession of a Stetson M1-A without an AFL. (Pl. Comp. at ¶ 10). The citation adds
to a growing list of over sixty criminal records of arrests and fines. (Def. Mot. App.
at 1a). Seventeen out of forty-four of the arrests are for a slew of gun crimes,
including possession of government and civilian firearms. Ibid. Plaintiff challenges
this citation out of sixteen other likely contenders, alleging that the CFA does not
speak to “the consequences of [unlawful possession].” (Pl. Comp. at ¶ 13). Even so,
Plaintiff continues to subject himself to a myriad of legal troubles. On May 19th
alone, he was charged with first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm.
In both instances, Plaintiff willingly violated the statute he challenges here.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A party against whom a claim * * * is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought may, at any time * * * move for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Summary judgment is appropriate “when
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). Defendant takes issue with
no portion of the Complaint or any factual matter therein; thus, as a matter of law,
he is unequivocally entitled to summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff contends that the CFA is unconstitutionally vague when it comes to
criminal penalties for possessing a firearm without identification. He also cites
decades of due process jurisprudence which requires the States to make its penal
laws “with sufficient clarity” as to the “consequences of violating a given criminal
[provision].” (Pl. Comp. at ¶ 21) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114
(1979)). For this claim to survive scrutiny, “the alleged vagueness of a criminal
statute must be judged in light of the conduct that is charged to be violative of the
statute.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983).
1. As a general rule of thumb, if a suspect is given “sufficient notice that his
conduct is within the proscription of [a] statute,” his arrest under that provision is
not vulnerable on vagueness grounds. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 369
(1983). In virtually every controversy regarding unconstitutional vagueness, the
Supreme Court has not once suggested that a suspect who receives fair warning of
the unlawfulness of his conduct from a statute “is nonetheless entitled to attack it.”
Id. Indeed, “the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to other
conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit.” Id. This Court should
thus defer to statutory construction in order to determine if there exists fair notice.
a. When interpreting the language of a statute, courts “look first and foremost to
its text.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). To this
point, courts must assume that the legislature says in a statute “what it means” and
means in a statute “what it says there.” Id. If in any statute a phrase is undefined, and
its meaning is misunderstood, courts must assign the phrase its ordinary, natural
meaning. See e.g., Ridgeway Parks Service v. SteKing2008, 1. Rid. 1, 9 (2024);
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). Plaintiff contends that
Subsection 5.1(a) of the CFA is vague because it does not speak to any penalties for
violating its provisions, transgressing the due process rights of suspects who are
subject to arrest under the same. It is then necessary that the statute “be read as a
whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.”
King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
The CFA makes patently clear that it is “illegal to own * * * any [automatic
firearms] without possession of an AFL.” 1 R. Stat. § 7401. The CFA amended the
criminal code to reflect this regulation, making it a charge under Section 5.01 of the
Ridgeway Criminal Code to “possess[] any firearm or ammunition without being a
holder of a valid RFLID.” Rid. Crim. C. § 5.01. Plaintiff was cited under the criminal
code for possession of a Stetson M1-A—an automatic firearm—without RFLID or
AFL identification. To qualify for an AFL, an applicant must, at a minimum, possess
an RFILD and have no criminal history of violent or firearm related felonies. See 7
R. Stat. § 7412. Plaintiff not only lacks an RFLID, but he also has a record of over
sixteen firearm-related offenses on his criminal record; even in a perfect world, he
would not qualify for an AFL. Because an AFL is contingent on the possession of an
RFLID, the CFA’s amendment to Section 5.01 of the criminal code provides
adequate and fair notice of the consequences for possessing an automatic firearm.
b. It is a fundamental tenet of due process that “[n]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.” Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). In the event that a criminal statute “fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden,” the statute is invalid. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
The provisions at issue here make it unlawful to possess an automatic firearm
without an AFL. To effectuate this requirement, the CFA amends the criminal code
to make it a charge to possess any firearm without an RFLID. And in order to acquire
an AFL at all, an applicant must have an RFILD. The CFA leaves no room for
speculation as to consequence. Indeed, if a citizen lacks an RFILD and an AFL, he
is subject to criminal penalties under Section 5.01. Here, Plaintiff merely pivots from
his due diligence in an effort to strike good law. As such, this Court should grant
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the Complaint.
Dated: May 24, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Counsel for Defendant
