SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
EPIDERMISGUPTA69,
Plaintiff,
v.
SQUAREHEADDUDE,
Defendant,
____________________________/
CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 05-2024-RSC-CV-2867
JUDGE: HON. ALEXJCABOT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons that
follow, the Court hereby ORDERS that the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND1
On May 4, 2024, Plaintiff Epidermisgupta69 was crossing the street towards the
Ridgeway Credit Union's building in Sterling Heights, Ridgeway County, Ridgeway, when he
was approached by Defendant SquareheadDude. Using a weapon named "the Rildo," Defendant
struck and caused physical harm to Plaintiff. Following the attack, Defendant fled the scene
without explanation. Plaintiff brought the above action against Defendant on May 17, 2024, for
battery and assault under the Civil Claims Act for the unconsented harmful and offensive attack
and seeks punitive and compensatory damages pursuant to law.
Defendant, acting by the Solicitor General, filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted on May 27, 2024. Defendant claims that he is entitled to
sovereign immunity by reason of his status as Superintendent in the Ridgeway State Police.
1 For the purpose of applying the legal tests below, the facts in the Complaint are presumed to be
truthful and factually accurate.
1
However, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The distinction between private conduct
and state action turns on substance, not labels. In his attack, Defendant performed no actual or
apparent duty of his office and exercised no State-delegated authority. The allegations forming
the basis for this action thus reflect private conduct by Defendant, and not State action.
The Court further notes that the Complaint is silent on Defendant’s capacity. Accordingly,
the substance of the pleadings and course of proceedings determine whether this action is for
individual or official liability. In examining the substance of the Complaint, it is evident that this
action can only be for individual liability. Indeed, under the Civil Claims Act, battery and assault
are expressly defined as individual-capacity torts. Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel has stipulated to
the Court that this action is for individual liability. Premises considered, the Court finds that this
action is not one against the State but against SquareHeadDude individually.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: … (5) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” See Rid. R.
Civ. P. 12(a); cf. LargeTitanic2, Gov. of Rid. v. Nevplaysgames, et al., 1 Rid. 98 (2023) (“[W]e
have held that federal doctrines … are incorporated into our system of laws and therefore federal
precedent relating to such may be used as precedent.”)
A failure-to-state-a-claim motion tests the “legal sufficiency” of a complaint. See
Navarro v. Block, 250 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir.2001). A complaint may be dismissed only if "it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
2
entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir.1996). In deciding such a motion, all material allegations of the
complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. See
Cahill, supra, 80 F.3d at 338.
III. ANALYSIS
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted filed on May 17, 2024. Under 1 R. Stat. § 3203, the government is “immune
from all claims except those in this section, and later laws in which liability is explicitly created
against the government." Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's action is barred by sovereign
immunity because it is not brought under a claim to which immunity is waived. In order to reach
this conclusion, it appears that Defendant assumes that Plaintiff’s action is one against the
government. The Court is not convinced that this is the case.
The "caselaw is murky" as to when a State official "acts personally and when he acts
officially." Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) (internal citations omitted). And the “line
between private conduct and state action” is “difficult to draw.” Ibid. In determining whether an
individual’s conduct is “state action” for purposes of sovereign immunity, it is irrelevant whether
“he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private capacity,” or “that the
particular action which he took was not authorized by state law.” See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 135 (1964); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
Rather, a court asks whether the individual was "possessed of state authority" and
whether he "purport[ed] to act under that authority” in the commission of his challenged conduct.
See Griffin v. Maryland, supra, 378 U.S. at 135. While it is true that the state-action requirement
3
“protects a robust sphere of individual liberty,” Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck,
587 U.S. at 808 (2019), it does not include acts of officials made "in the ambit of their personal
pursuits." Screws v. United States, supra, 325 U. S. 91, 111.
Defendant’s violent and random assault on Plaintiff, who was innocently walking down
the street and who had no previous meaningful encounters with Defendant, does not appear to
have been made in pursuance of the authority delegated to him as Superintendent in the
Ridgeway State Police. Defendant’s conduct instead falls within the ambit of his personal
pursuits and consequently does not constitute state action. Accordingly, the Court rejects the
notion that Defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity.
The Court further notes that the Complaint does not on its face state whether the action is
for individual or official liability. In such cases, "[t]he course of proceedings .. will indicate the
nature of the liability sought to be imposed." See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 n. 14
(1985) (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985)). Under the "course of proceedings"
test, courts are not limited by the presence or absence of language identifying capacity to suit on
the face of the complaint alone. Rather, courts may examine "the substance of the pleadings and
the course of proceedings in order to determine whether the suit is for individual or official
liability." Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir.1993).
Factors relevant to this analysis include "the nature of the plaintiff's claims, requests for
compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses raised in response to the
complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity." Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769,
772 n. 1 (6th Cir.2001); see also Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir.1995). A court may
also take into consideration "whether the parties are still in the early stages of litigation," Moore,
supra, 272 F.3d at 772 n. 1, including whether amendment of the complaint may be appropriate.
4
No single factor is dispositive in an assessment of the course of proceedings. "Throughout, the
underlying inquiry remains whether the plaintiff's intention to hold a defendant personally liable
can be ascertained fairly." Biggs, supra, 66 F.3d at 61.
Although the Complaint is silent on capacity, the substance of the action admits of
Plaintiff’s intent to hold Defendant individually liable. The Complaint states two causes of
action: battery and assault. The Civil Claims Act expressly defines these as individual-capacity
torts.2 Furthermore, on May 27, 2024, during early stages of the action, Plaintiff informed the
Court that he intends to hold Defendant individually liable. The Court therefore finds that the
course of proceedings indicate that individual liability is sought.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to sovereign
immunity under 1 R. Stat. § 3203 as this action is not one against the government of the State of
Ridgeway. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Palmer, Ridgeway
County, Ridgeway, this 27th day of May, 2024.
BY: /s/ -
ALEX J. CABOT
Ridgeway Superior Court Judge
Copies to: Epidermiguspta69
SquareHeadDude
Stickza, Solicitor General
2 See 1 R. Stat § 3102 (Any individual [...]); 1 R. Stat. § 3103 (Any individual [...]).
5
