IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
v.
NOHATALEX,
Defendants.
___________________________/
CRIMINAL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 08-2024-CF-002721-F017
JUDGE ENFORCEMENTBEYOND
ORDER FOR DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL - SUA SPONTE
THIS MATTER came before Superior Court Judge Arthur_Chen’s (“Chen”) on April 26,
2024. The State having filed a criminal information against Defendant nohatalex, and Defendant
having appeared on alongside an assistant public defender, the Court permitted the proceeding to
progress to pre-trial and trial. This Court, having reviewed the relevant file, transcripts, and
orders, intervenes and submits an order sua sponte declaring mistrial, for the reasons explained
below.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2024, the State filed before the Court a criminal information against
Defendant nohatalex. The State alleges that on April 6, 2024, the Defendant ambushed an
individual as he exited the Sterling Gun Club, having noticed the individual and returned to
follow them closely and fire upon them, resulting in their death. The State further alleges that the
Defendant acquired a box of shotgun shell ammunition possessed by the injured party. Based
upon these facts, the State submitted charges against the Defendant of first-degree murder,
unlawful discharge of a firearm, brandishing a firearm, and evidence theft, charges which carry
severe punishments. On April 26, 2024, the Clerk of the Superior Court’s office assigned the
matter before Superior Court Judge Arthur_Chen, and on such date, the Court assigned
Magistrate Judge Derogatoryy to preside over these matters.
Defendant nohatalex appeared on April 26, 2024, shortly after service of summons, and
requested the representation of a public defender, one was appointed on such a date. Defendant
appeared before Magistrate Judge Derogatoryy and the State entered into a plea agreement with
the Defendant. On April 27, 2024, it was alleged that the Defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel on the grounds that he was persuaded by his counsel to accept a plea
agreement on charges which were not justified, and which would sentence him to a higher time
than that permitted through trial. The Court declined post-conviction relief on the grounds that an
affidavit was absent as prescribed by Rid R. Crim. P. 30(c)(3). On May 2, 2024, Defendant’s
counsel submitted a second Motion to Vacate, and an affidavit in support of the Motion. The
State filed a response on the same date.
On May 11, 2024, Defendant’s previous counsel, ItzARandomBoi, and Defendant’s
current counsel, MatthewSandringham, engage in a disagreement on the Court’s transcript and
record regarding the disclosure of previous communications between previous counsel and the
Defendant, with the intent to indicate whether there was ineffective counsel. On the same date,
the Court held a hearing on the Motion to Vacate, with the Court once again denying the
post-conviction relief, noting it would file an opinion at a later date. On May 12, 2024,
Defendant’s counsel requested reconsideration, requesting reasoning for the denial of
post-conviction relief.
On June 13, 2024, no opinion had been filed. On July 30, 2024, no opinion had been
filed, Defendant’s counsel engaged himself in a disagreement with Chief Judge koala4life over
the reassignment of the proceedings to a different judge. On August 8, 2024, this Court
interjected to address the matter, offering the declaration of mistrial. Solicitor General stickza
appeared on behalf of the State, Public Defender MatthewSandringham appeared on behalf of the
Defendant, neither party rendered any objection to a declaration of mistrial nor offered any
alternatives when provided the opportunity.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The declaration of mistrial is dependent upon the concept of a manifest necessity and the
relevant court rules. The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, lack any rule which
explicitly describes a mistrial or provides any guidance for the declaration of a mistrial.
Similarly, the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, from which the Ridgeway Rules of
Criminal Procedure largely derive, similarly lack any guidance on the declaration of a mistrial.
As such, the Court is left with no option other than to seek the guidance of other procedures in
states outside of Ridgeway, an option which should seldom be exercised by any Court.
Manifest necessity itself carries varying interpretations across states, yet the Court has
chosen to adopt the federal standard of manifest necessity. Under the federal judiciary system,
trial courts are afforded a broad level of discretion over the declaration of mistrial. The trial
courts are afforded the power to declare a mistrial where a verdict could not be reached
impartially, or where such a verdict could be reached but must be reversed on appeal due to
obvious procedural errors. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 1070
(1973). The federal judiciary further imposes a standard within its rules which require that a trial
court first provide the defendant and the government the opportunity to comment on the
propriety of the order, to state their consent or objection, and to suggest alternatives to a mistrial.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.3. The Court finds that these standards, absent guidance from the
Supreme Court or the Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure, present the best manner in which
to evaluate the grounds for a mistrial.
Additionally, under similar standards, states have found that grounds exist for the
declaration of a mistrial where it is found that the presiding trial judge is absent, ill, disabled, or
deceased. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1224. Though not intended for application under the concept of
“inactivity”, the term “absent” or “deceased” would adequately describe the conditions which are
present when a judge abandons his duties for a prolonged period of time, failing to dispose of his
proceedings in a timely and speedy manner.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court, having provided both the State and the Defendant’s counsel with the
opportunity to state their consent and provide alternatives, satisfies the requirement established
in the federal rules. Neither the State nor the Defendant’s counsel raised any objection against the
declaration of mistrial, and as such, the Court does not need to consider the presence or absence
of manifest necessity, as such could not be considered a relevant consideration when all parties
are consenting to a mistrial. Regardless, where a presiding trial judge has been absent for a
prolonged period of time, to such an extent where questions may be brought as to the violation of
a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, grounds exist for a mistrial. These grounds may be found not
only in the guidelines of states like North Carolina, but also in the federal judiciary, where it
remains that if a verdict would surely be reversed on appeal due to a procedural error, grounds
for a mistrial exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the absence of the presiding trial judge for a
prolonged period prejudices the administration of justice to both the Defendant and the State.
The Court finds no manner in which to repair the presiding judge’s absence, but it can serve the
administration of justice in protecting the Defendant’s rights by remedying the effects of the
absence. The Court therefore sua sponte declares a mistrial.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Milton, Ridgeway
County, Ridgeway, this 9th day of August, 2024.
ENFORCEMENTBEYOND
CHIEF JUSTICE
Copies to: Defendant
insertreality, Attorney General
stickza, Solicitor General
MatthewSandringham, Counsel for Defendant
