Memorandum Opinion and Order - Chambers of Judge Chen
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-2708
v.
EIHUOLTA, ET AL.
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS CAUSE comes before the court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and the State's
Opposition thereto. In the filings, counsel for both defendants moved the Court to dismiss count one of
the information, Murder in the First Degree (R.C.C. § 3.09) due to a lack of probable cause.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the arguments of counsel as well an examination of the affidavit
contained within the Criminal Information, it is this 27th day of April 2024, that the Superior Court for
Ridgeway County, Ridgeway, makes the following findings with respect to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss:
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts of the Case
In this case, both EiHuolta and thystvr are both charged with three separate offenses in the
government’s April 22nd Information, including: R.C.C. § 3.09 (Murder in the First Degree), R.C.C. §
5.04 (Brandishing), and R.C.C. § 5.05 (Unlawful Discharge of a Firearm).
The State alleges that on or about March 26th, 2024, aspenfun, an employee of the Ridgeway
County Transit Authority assigned as a Tow Trust Driver, was working in Ridgeway County, USA
when EiHuolta and thystvr asked that their vehicle be towed. In the course of towing their vehicle, state
alleges that both EiHuolta and thystvr discharged their personal firearms into aspenfun, thereby killing
him without lawful cause of justification.
B. Legal Standard
The Defense is correct that Probable Cause is derived from the 4th Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 237 (1985) ("Arrests are governed by
the probable-cause standard provided by the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.") The Supreme Court
has defined the probable cause standard as a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. See Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). In order “to determine whether an officer had probable cause to
arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to
probable cause." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). More specifically, it refers to the
existence of facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a belief
by a person of reasonable caution that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. See
Michigan v. Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) See also Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 111; Adams v. Williams,
supra, at 148; Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 91; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v.
United States, supra, at 175-176; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
When applying these constitutional principles to the State of Ridgeway’s rules of proceedure, we
must “apply precedent from the jurisdiction in which our rules originated - Massachusetts.” State v.
mandatorymorale, RSC-CM-2454 (2024). See also Arthur_Chen v. DevMix, RSC-CV-2157 (2024)
(holding that the Ridgeway Rules of Procedure are based on those of the real-life Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and precedent may be used to apply them). All criminal informations submitted for
prosecution must demonstrate “probable cause to believe that the person against whom the information
is sought committed an offense.” Rid.R.Crim.P. 3(g)(2). For the Information to show probable cause, it
“requires only evidence 'sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] in believing that the
[accused] had committed' the offense." Commonwealth v. Rakes, SJC-10046, at *12 (Mass. Sep. 29,
2017). It must also “set forth reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable or
prudent person in believing that the defendant has committed the offense.” Commonwealth v. Geordi
G., 111 N.E.3d 1102, 1107 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). At the end of the day,
the state need only show the “amount of information that would warrant a prudent person in believing
that the defendant committed the crime.” Commonwealth v. Stoico, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 559, 565 (1998).
The only contested charge in the information is that of First Degree Murder. For the State to
obtain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, they must prove three separate prongs: 1) The
defendants caused the death of the victim, aspenfun 2) The killing was unlawful 3) At the time of the
killing, the defendants had a premeditated design to kill aspenfun. R.C.C. § 3.09 outlines several other
factors in which the state can pursue a First Degree murder charge, but they are irrelevant to the case at
hand. When analyzing the charge to determine if Probable Cause is present, we must “view the
information…in the light most favorable to the [State] to determine whether it supports probable cause
as to each essential element of the offense. See Commonwealth v. Ricardi, 99 Mass.App.Ct. 496, 498
(2021). We must also assume that, for the purposes of Probable Cause, that all the details delineated
within the State’s Information are true and show a prima facie case for a conviction. In fact, “probable
cause must be established based only on the facts contained within the four corners of the [State’s
information ]and supporting affidavit, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts.”
Commonwealth v. Louis, 169 N.E.3d 1173, 457 (Mass. 2021) (citing See Commonwealth v. Morin,
478 Mass. 415, 425, 85 N.E.3d 949 (2017)) (emphasis added).
For the reasons stated below, the Court shall DENY the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss count 1
of the Information. The Court holds that: (1) The State has sufficiently pleaded that the alleged murder
was premeditated; and (2) The victim's status as an employee of the state falls under the statutory
definition of first-degree murder involving the killing of a civil department employee discharging
official duties.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Information Sufficiently Pleads that the Murder was Premeditated
The facts that the state has presented, which this court must accept as true, indicate that the defendants
EiHuolta and thystvr unlawfully and intentionally killed aspenfun, an employee of the state, after
requesting their personal vehicles to be towed. in order to carry out the premeditated murder. This
suggests that the defendants had engaged in a "strong and calculated desire to bring about the victim's
death" and engaged in planning and deliberation prior to the killing. Courts have held that even a short
period of time between the formation of intent and the criminal act can be sufficient to establish
premeditation, as long as the proper facts are present. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 325 (1979)
("Under that law it is well settled that premeditation need not exist for any particular length of time,
and that an intent to kill may be formed at the moment of the commission of the unlawful act."); Fisher
v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 467 (1946) ("Although formation of a design to kill may be
instantaneous, as quick as thought itself, the mental process of deliberating upon such a design does
require that an appreciable time elapse between formation of the design and the fatal act within which
there is, in fact, deliberation.") Here, the defendants' actions of requesting the tow trucks to facilitate
the murder, as well as the fact that the victim was a state employee who would eventually respond to
the call for a tow truck, further support the conclusion that the killing was premeditated and thus a
violation of our State’s First Degree Murder Statute.
B. The Information Sufficiently Pleads that the Victim was Executing a Lawful and Official Duty
as an Employee of the State
The Ridgeway County Transit Authority is a civil service agency outlined in Title V., Chap. I follow
our State’s laws. Its employees are therefore civil service agents who may execute the powers given to
them by the laws, statutes, or other authorizing authorities. The information alleges that the Defendants
collectively shot aspenfun, a Ridgeway Transit Tow Truck driver, while responding to a call for service
that the Defendants themselves initiated. It should remain undisputed that towing vehicles is a lawful
and official duty of transit authority that employees like aspenfun routinely execute. The first degree
murder statue explicitly prohibits “committing murder of a [...]civil department employee discharging a
lawful and official duty, with the knowledge of the person being a [...] civil department employee.” It
can be reasonably assumed that if the Defendants were calling for a tow truck driver with the intent to
kill its operator, they knew they would be ending the life of a civil department employee in the course
of his duties. For probable cause to be absent here, the information must lack any identifying
information describing aspenfun as a member of either law enforcement or a civil department. Instead,
the State has described him as an “employee of the state” and the affidavit further expands that he was
“attempting to carry out his duties as an Ridgeway County Transit Authority employee by towing the
[Defendants’] car.” If the above is in fact true, which we must again assume for the purpose of
determining probable cause, the State would certainly obtain a conviction for Murder in the First
Degree.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above. and upon consideration of the pleadings and the arguments made
by counsel, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Information shall be and hereby is
DENIED.
An Order accompanies this Opinion.
Hon. Arthur_Chen
JUDGE, Superior Court for
Ridgeway County, Ridgeway
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-2708
v.
EIHUOLTA, ET AL.
Defendant
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Defendants’ April 27, 2024 Motion to Dismiss count one of the
Information, the State's Opposition thereto, and the entirety of the information presented in the
Memorandum Opinion, it is this 28th day of April 2022, that the Superior Court for Ridgeway County,
Ridgeway, hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Information shall be and
hereby is DENIED.
SIGNED
Apr. 28th, 2024 (0100 EST)
Hon. Arthur_Chen
Superior Court Judge
