SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
CITATION: State of Ridgeway. v. BrandonnLUV, et al.,
RSC-CM-2642
DATE OF JUDGEMENT:
2024-04-23
BETWEEN:
State of Ridgeway
Plaintiff
and
BrandonnLUV, RoyaltySyn, and Matrix_oc
Accuseds
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT
ON VARIOUS MOTIONS BY THE ACCUSEDS
OF THE
HONOURABLE JUDGE KOALA4IIFE
I. The motions
[1] Each of the accuseds moved jointly to dismiss the entire Indictment because the
Indictment was refiled without having been presented to the grand jury a second time.
[2] Matrix_oc moved individually to disqualify RyanJSyndicate from prosecuting
count 6 on the Indictment, alleging that the prosecutor is not disinterested.
[3] BrandonnLUV and RoyaltySyn moved jointly to dismiss counts 2 and 5 on the
Indictment, alleging selective prosecution.
[4] The motions to dismiss are with prejudice, alleging negligence by the
government that has caused prejudice to the accuseds.
II. Motion to dismiss entire Indictment
[5] The Ridgeway Constitution affords public officials the right to be charged by
grand jury indictment. The right of each of the accuseds to be charged by grand jury
indictment is not contested.
[6] The grand jury is first and foremost an investigative body and secondarily a
probable cause-finding body. In the State of Ridgeway, the grand jury almost only ever
exercises its latter power when the accused is a public official entitled to grand jury
indictment. Hence, the right to be charged by grand jury indictment is merely the right
to have a grand jury find probable cause for the charges with which an accused public
official is being charged, and nothing more.
[7] The right to be charged by grand jury indictment is not the right to have a grand
jury consent to the filing of a charging document, so when the government refiled an
identical Indictment, it did not need the consent of the grand jury to do so. The grand
jury is not a consent-granting body; it is a probable cause-finding body. And when
previous Indictment, identical to the current Indictment, was dismissed for want of
prosecution, the probable cause findings by the grand jury for each of the 6 counts on
the previous Indictment were not set aside, nor did the accuseds move a motion to that
end when the government refiled the Indictment.
[8] Even if the government had filed an indictment in the current case not identical
to the one presented to the grand jury for the dismissed case, as long as the indictment
did not add charges or allege new facts in existing charges, it would not have needed
the grand jury to return a second true bill. After all, the grand jury had already found
probable cause for the same charges on the same factual allegations, and courts should
look to minimise extraneous proceedings.
[9] It is not a convincing argument to leap from “dismissal of charges entails
finality” to “probable cause findings by the grand jury are set aside upon administrative
dismissal”. The submissions that indictments “operate” and that grand juries “consent”
are curious metaphors, but the argument could not be entertained further without some
legal basis for it.
[10] Accordingly, the entire Indictment can stand.
III. Motion to disqualify prosecutor RyanJSyndicate
[11] The government contests the applicability of caselaw cited in the motion, but it
is appropriate to use it as reference, which it appears the accused had intended for
anyways.
[12] Although the accused has only identified one argument—that the prosecutor
has an “axe to grind”—it is in reality two arguments that should be looked at
independently.
[13] The first argument is that the conduct of prosecutor RyanJSyndicate is alleged
to have had a “reasonable potential for prejudice” against the accused Matrix_oc. The
“evidence”—if one were to call it that—submitted in support of their claims consists
of images of messages from an unknown source and of images of what appears to be
posters also from an unknown source. It is not evidence. None of the images had been
certified by a clerk as genuine. Not a single affidavit had been filed in support of the
motion. Any remaining hint of material that might have been considered “evidence”
presented in the memorandum of law itself consists of entirely hearsay. This claim is
not at all ripe for adjudication. The nonchalant way that random media has been treated
as “evidence” by the movant makes me inclined to, in the spirit of Court of Québec
Judge Dennis Galiatsatos, literally and not just figuratively take the “evidence” and
throw it out the window.
[14] The second argument is more worthy of serious consideration, which is whether
the prosecutor must be disqualified if he had ran as a candidate in an election against
the person who now stands accused of charges first levied and now prosecuted by said
prosecutor. To be successful on this argument, which is evaluated on a lesser standard
because the motion seeks the disqualification of a prosecutor rather than dismissal of
the Indictment, the accused must show that the prosecutor, due to this status, now has
a reasonable potential of prejudice against the accused.
[15] There would be no question that if an election is ongoing and one candidate is
prosecuting another candidate using the powers of the state, then that would be entirely
inappropriate, but that is not the case here. It strains credulity for the accused to suggest
that the prosecutor’s past status as a candidate in the same election as the accused or
even the mere fact that the government has treated an individual shabbily in the past
somehow indicates likelihood of a perpetuation of a prejudice that will continue to
affect the parties or the integrity of the justice system, lest the court intervenes.
[16] Competition and even animosity during election cycles or hiring processes is
not uncommon. But election cycles and hiring processes do not occur indefinitely, and
without evidence showing otherwise, I cannot presume that any state of competition or
animosity that might have existed between the prosecutor and the accused during a
previous election cycle is continuing at the time of filing this Indictment. I also cannot
presume, without evidence showing otherwise, that the state of competition or
animosity that might have existed in the past has any likelihood of perpetrating a
prejudice.
[17] If this line of argumentation were to be sustained, it would open the door for
an accused seeking to disqualify every prosecutor who has competed with the accused
in an election cycle or hiring process no matter how distant and without any evidence
showing a potential for continuing prejudice.
[18] I am not convinced that political discourse between a prosecutor and the
accused on its own can sustain a reasonable potential for prejudice or an assumption
that there is a reasonable potential of the prosecutor using the criminal process to
advance his own, improper interests. There is no evidence to suggest that the prosecutor
would have pursued this case unless he believed that the accused is guilty. Accordingly,
I have no reason to believe that the prosecutor is not pursuing a proper course of justice.
[19] The prosecutor’s past conduct outside of this case was not inappropriate such
that the mere fact of the prosecutor’s continuing prosecution in light of it could
perpetuate a reasonable potential of prejudice and disqualification need not occur.
[20] Nonetheless, the prosecutor, now having been put on notice that his past
conduct is perhaps objectionable at least to some, should consciously avoid any conduct
that might appear to be a source of improper prejudice. Should the first argument
become ripe for adjudication, disqualification is not ruled out as a possibility. If he feels
that any of his public statements might adversely affect the appearance of the course of
justice, he is encouraged to withdraw them as to not bring the administration of justice
into disrepute. I remind counsel that he was and continue to be each bound to maintain
the public’s confidence in the justice system by being called to the bar.
IV. Motion to dismiss counts 2 and 5
[21] Movants correctly state that prosecutors generally have great discretion in the
deciding whether to bring criminal charges, so long as the decision was not based on
an unjustifiable standard. I do not plan to fetter that discretion here and will accept the
government’s submission that counts 2 and 5 were motivated by an allegation of some
form of retaliation on the part of the accuseds BrandonnLUV and RoyaltySyn against
employees to whom the accuseds issued disciplinary action. Additionally, I accept that
an allegation of some extent of conspiracy among the accuseds BrandonnLUV and
RoyaltySyn is satisfactory grounds to distinguish the accuseds from persons not
charged for what the movants claim is similar conduct.
[22] Although no allegations of retaliation or conspiracy on the part of the accuseds
BrandonnLUV and RoyaltySyn as to counts 2 and 5 were made in the Indictment, these
facts are not essential to the charges. Given that the claim of selective prosecution is
viewed with great deference to the government, I must accept the government’s
submission that, in their assessment, the accuseds BrandonnLUV and RoyaltySyn are
not similarly situated as the nine individuals who the movants identified as similarly
situated but who were not charged.
V. Disposition
[23] Each of the motions to dismiss and to disqualify are denied.
Dated at the City of Palmer, in the State of Ridgeway on 23 April 2024.
“koala4Iife”
Judge koala4Iife
