STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
CHAPPIE342,
Petitioner(s),
v.
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE,
Respondent(s).
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Case Number: RSC-AD-2579
Presiding: Hon. Xiqaq
PETITIONER’S CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PETITIONER’S CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PETITIONER, Chappie342, by and through the undersigned counsel, submits this
motion in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 38. Petitioner respectfully moves
the court to grant summary judgment in favor of Petitioner, rather than Respondent, because
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and Petitioner is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Attached hereto and herewith is a memorandum of law in support of Petitioner’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
June 22, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Senior Associate
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Petitioner
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
CHAPPIE342,
Petitioner(s),
v.
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE,
Respondent(s).
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Case Number: RSC-AD-2579
Presiding: Hon. Xiqaq
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................................................4
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................5
STANDARD OF REVIEW........................................................................................................... 5
a. Summary Judgment................................................................................................................5
b. Arbitrary Punishment.............................................................................................................6
ARGUMENTS............................................................................................................................... 6
I. The Petitioner’s Conduct Did Not Constitute Political Activity Under the Plain Meaning of
Section 301-5.6(G).....................................................................................................................6
II. The Application of Section 301-5.6(G) to Petitioner’s Conduct is Absurd.......................... 7
III. Section 301-5.6(G) Becomes Overly Broad When Applied to Petitioner’s Conduct..........8
a. The Meaning of Section 301.5-6(G)................................................................................ 8
b. The Scope of Section 301.5-6(G).................................................................................... 9
IV. Section 301.5-6(G) Cannot Be Applied to Petitioner’s Conduct Because the Policy Does
Not Satisfy the Balancing Test Set Forth in Pickering............................................................ 10
a. The Capacity of Employee Speech................................................................................ 11
b. The Interests of the Public, Employee, and Government.............................................. 12
1. Preventing Actual or Expected Workplace Disruption............................................ 13
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................ 15
INTRODUCTION
Respondent Ridgeway State Police has willingly conceded that Petitioner Chappie342
was involuntarily discharged due to encouraging, in jest, individuals to “VOTE MATTCERN,”
whilst he was on duty. Therefore, the appropriate venue to address this matter is now summary
judgment, rather than a trial. The remaining question in this matter is, of course, whether the
discharge of Petitioner due to violating 301.5-6(G) was arbitrary.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 12, 2024, Petitioner Chappie342 was on-duty as a Probationary Trooper of the
Ridgeway State Police at the Government Annex in Palmer, Ridgeway. While performing his
duties, he stated “VOTE MATTCERN,” in jest. At the time the statement was made, Colonel
Mattcern was a candidate in the election for the Sheriff of Ridgeway County—as a joke. As a
result of his conduct, he was terminated due to violating Ridgeway State Police Policy Guide §
301-5.6(g).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
a. Summary Judgment
Generally, a party is entitled to, “at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and “the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Indeed, the “movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A dispute about material fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” A fact is only “material” if it is critical to, or “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson, supra, at 248.
b. Arbitrary Punishment
This suit falls under 2 R. Stat. § 3135, alleging that Petitioner was subject to “arbitrary
punishment.” Arbitrary punishment is defined as, inter alia, “[p]unishment outside and beyond
what is explicitly prescribed in policy” and “[p]unishment that takes no accounting of mitigating
factors, circumstances, or liabilities.” Naturally, arbitrary punishment is “prohibited.” Id.
ARGUMENTS
I. The Petitioner’s Conduct Did Not Constitute Political Activity Under the Plain
Meaning of Section 301-5.6(G)
“In the absence of…a definition” the Court must “construe a statutory term in accordance
with its ordinary or natural meaning.” Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994).
That is, the Court must interpret the text. Generally, “[t]he rules of statutory construction apply
when interpreting an agency regulation.” Roberto v. Department of Navy, 440 F.3d 1341, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2006). The first step to interpret an agency regulation, therefore, is to “examine the
regulatory language itself to determine its plain meaning.” Id.; see also Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 576 (1988). When finding the plain meaning of the statutory language, the Court
should generally assume that the words of a statute mean what an ordinary or reasonable person
would understand them to mean—that is, “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
Ridgeway State Police Policy Guide § 301-5.6(g) unequivocally forbids:
“Engaging in political activities while on-duty, except as expressly
authorized by state statutes, or the Colonel.”
To determine the plain meaning, the term “political activities” must be understood in its
ordinary sense. Generally, “political activities” refers to actions intended to influence or
participate in politics—this includes activities such as campaigning, soliciting, or fundraising for
a bona fide political candidate. That is, the policy is meant to prohibit true and genuine political
activity, unsolicited by the law or department.
II. The Application of Section 301-5.6(G) to Petitioner’s Conduct is Absurd
No statutory language can ever be perfect. Therefore, there will always be cases that may
fit within the ordinary meaning of a statute’s language—and, at the same time, to which the
statute should not apply. However, it is precisely in these cases that the court should step in and
correct the resulting injustice, because “[t]he reason of the law…should prevail over its letter.”
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868). General terms, of course, “should be so limited
in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.” Id., at 486.
“It will always, therefore, be presumed that the [writers] intended exceptions to its language,
which would avoid results of this character.” Id., at 486-87.
The Court shall set aside the application of Section 301.5-6(G) here, because the result is
absurd—so grossly absurd that it “shocks the general moral and common sense.” Crooks v.
Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) (holding that to depart from the letter of the law, the result of
the law must be so grossly absurd as to shock the general moral or common sense); see also Pirie
v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 182 U.S. 438 (1901). The absurdity doctrine is an exception
to the plain-meaning rule, applying only when the unambiguous language of a statute would
yield an obviously unintended result—that is, “a disposition that no reasonable person could
intend.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 175 (2012).
The nature of Petitioner’s statement is that of an innocent joke. Section 301.5-6(G) is,
undoubtedly, meant to forbid true and genuine political activities, not comical
statements—which, at the time, were commonly recited by several employees of the Ridgeway
State Police.1 Applying Section 301-5.6(G) to Petitioner’s conduct results in absurd
1 See Resp’s. App. Ex. H, https://prnt.sc/-O0x5TIYz_fk. See also Resp’s App. Ex. I,
https://prnt.sc/yuAZcSWQOTjA. Accessed 22 June 2024.
consequences because the intent of the policy is meant to hold employees accountable for
political activity, not innocent comical statements.
III. Section 301-5.6(G) Becomes Overly Broad When Applied to Petitioner’s Conduct
The Court shall interpret Section 301-5.6(G) as if it were statute—the law. Of course, as
an extension of state law, “administrative regulations consistent with the agencies’ substantive
statutes have the force and effect of law.” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307 (1979).
“[P]olicemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights.” Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). And where “a law
reasonably dissuades individuals from engaging in constitutionally-protected speech for fear
of…punishment” its “chilling effects” forms the “basis for legal challenge.” Bryant v. Woodall,
363 F. Supp. 3d 611, 626 (M.D.N.C. 2019). So, when a policy or statute “does not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but…sweeps within its ambit other
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of” protected rights, a court may
hold the law void on its face. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); see also Nationalist
Movement v. City of Cumming, 934 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a court may
hold a law void if it suppresses protected rights). This is because the overbreadth doctrine
prohibits the government from “banning unprotected speech if…protected speech is prohibited
or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002). Thus, a
statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if “a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”
U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted).
a. The Meaning of Section 301.5-6(G)
To first begin analysis, the court shall look to the meaning of the statute—for “it is
impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute
covers.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). And the meaning is ambiguous
here, because while Section 301-5.6(g) forbids “[e]ngaging in political activities while on-duty,”
it, at the same time, fails to define what constitutes a political activity. Thus, when an employee
engages in a political activity, such as campaigning, soliciting, or fundraising for a bona fide
political candidate, they are subject to the policy and the reprimand in which it imposes.
Likewise, however, when an employee engages in a constitutionally protected activity—in this
case, a joke—their conduct falls within reach of the same policy. But, of course, the government
“may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.” Indeed,
“[p]rotected speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter.”
Ashcroft, supra.
b. The Scope of Section 301.5-6(G)
Second, the court must turn to whether the statute, as it has construed it, illegalizes “a
substantial amount of protected expressive activity.” Williams, supra, at 297. Political speech is
categorically included in the First Amendment—and “[t]he First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to…political expression.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (emphasis
added). “Advocating” for a political candidate’s “election or defeat is pure political speech that
occupies the core of the First Amendment’s protection.” Federal Election Com'n v. Public
Citizen, 268 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the “[d]iscussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government.” Buckley, supra.
As a result, Section 301-5.6(G) must be scrutinized under the overbreadth doctrine. The
law’s failure to narrowly define what constitutes “political activities” means it encompasses a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. Such broad application is impermissible
under the First Amendment, which safeguards against government action that excessively
intrudes on free expression.
IV. Section 301.5-6(G) Cannot Be Applied to Petitioner’s Conduct Because the Policy
Does Not Satisfy the Balancing Test Set Forth in Pickering
“[P]ublic employees do not renounce their citizenship when they accept employment,
and…public employers may not condition employment on the relinquishment of constitutional
rights.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236 (2014). To that end, “public employees do not
surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.” Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). In fact, political speech by government employees is encouraged—not
discouraged, for “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the
agencies for which they work” and “public debate may gain much from their informed
opinions.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). It “is as much the public’s interest in
receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.” City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004).
However, the government does have some power to regulate the speech of its employees.
The government “has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from…the speech of the citizenry in general.” Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). “Government employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be
little chance for the efficient provision of public services.” Garcetti, supra, at 418. The problem
in any case, however, “is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”
Pickering, supra. And when public employees “seek to exercise their right as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest” the government “must be able to satisfy a balancing test.”
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, (1995).
Thus, there exists two-fold inquiry into assessing whether a public employee’s speech is
entitled to protection: (a) whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern;
and (b) whether the government employer had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public. Garcetti, supra, at 411; see also
Pickering, supra, at 568. If the answer to the first question is no, the inquiry ends there—“the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on the employer’s reaction to the
speech.” Id. And while employees bear the burden of showing that the speech in question is
protected—that is, whether it is spoken by a citizen on matters of public concern—the
government bears the ultimate burden of showing that its “legitimate administrative interests
outweigh the plaintiff's First Amendment rights.” Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Pool v. Vanrheen, 297 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); Ohlson v. Brady, 9 F.4th
1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2021); Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 397 (3d
Cir. 1998); Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002); Moser v. Las
Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 984 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2021).
a. The Capacity of Employee Speech
To first begin analysis, the Court shall first look to the capacity in which the speech was
spoken. Generally, “employee speech…receives no First Amendment protection.” De Ritis v.
McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2017). In order for a public employee to raise a
successful claim for the government’s restriction of their speech, the speech must be in their
capacity as a citizen, addressing a matter of public concern.
Determining what constitutes a matter of public concern is complex, and “ is…a question
for case-by-case adjudication.” Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1037 (6th Cir. 2003). To that
end, however, a public employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern when it relates to
an issue “of political, social, or other concern to the community.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146 (1983). Obviously, the courts have long held “that political speech regarding a public
election is undoubtedly a matter of public concern.” Brammer v. Twin Peaks, 492 F.3d 1192,
1205 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 2005); Nord v.
Walsh Cnty., 757 F.3d 734, 743 (8th Cir. 2014); Wiggins v. Lowndes County, Miss, 363 F.3d 387,
390 (5th Cir. 2004). And, of course, that means statements specifically “in support of political
candidates are firmly within the sphere of matters of public concern.” Poindexter v. Sequoyah,
548 F.3d 916, 931 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). After all, this isn’t
unreasonable—political speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment, which “was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
The speech of Petitioner Chappie342 undoubtedly touches on an issue of politics, and, in
specific—even in jest—makes a statement in support of Colonel Mattcern for Sheriff of
Ridgeway County. Therefore, the Court must turn to the second part of the analysis—whether
Respondent Ridgeway State Police had adequate justification for treating Petitioner Chappie342
differently from any other member of the general public.
b. The Interests of the Public, Employee, and Government
The matter is not settled simply because a public employee speaks on a matter of public
concern. See Lane, supra, at 242. The Court must look further to “whether the government had
an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
public based on the government's needs as an employer.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
It is the burden of the government employer to show that they have interests that
significantly outweigh that of the employee’s. However, the bar here is even higher—a “stronger
showing” of interest is neccessary when an “employee’s speech more substantially” involves
“matters of public concern.” Connick, supra, at 152. The courts have employed “a sliding scale
for how much weight to give to a statement of public concern when balancing the employee's
and the government’s competing interests.” Moser v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 984 F.3d
900, 905 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted). And undoubtedly, political speech
“occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special
protection.” Connick, supra, at 145 (quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added). Other
speech, such as “hostility toward racial or religious minorities,” however, “may be of particularly
low First Amendment value” when concerning the sliding scale of the “Pickering balancing
test.” Hernandez v. City of Phoenix, 43 F.4th 966, 979 (9th Cir. 2022).
And the Court has identified various components of the government’s interest in
“effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.” Connick, supra, at 150.
Indeed, employees have a substantial interest to “speak out freely on such questions without fear
of retaliatory dismissal.” Pickering, supra, at 572. However, this must be weighed against the
government’s interest to “promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties” and
“maintain proper discipline in the public service.” Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).2
Here, the government’s side of the scale is empty. The Ridgeway State Police has not
demonstrated any substantial disruption caused by Petitioner Chappie342’s speech. There is no
evidence that the speech has impeded Petitioner’s ability to perform his law enforcement duties
and responsibilities. Nor is there evidence to suggest that he disrupted the workplace
environment, or undermined the discipline within the department.
1. Preventing Actual or Expected Workplace Disruption
First, the government can justify dismissal if the speech (a) “impairs discipline by
superiors” or (b) impairs…harmony among co-workers” or (c) “has a detrimental impact on
close working relationships” or (d) “impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties” or, finally,
(e) “interferes with the regular operation of the” department. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 388 (1987). And in finding such, “the statement will not be considered in a vacuum; the
2 See also Connick, supra, at 150-51.
manner, time, and place of the employee’s expression are relevant, as is the context in which the
[speech] arose.” Id.
While “an employer” certainly need not “allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office…is manifest,” the employer must “reasonably” believe that the events
would lead to such an outcome. Connick, supra, at 152, 154. Yet, the mere potential for
disruption, without more, is insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake—“an
employer must provide some evidence for the court to evaluate whether the government’s claims
of disruption appear reasonable.” Moser, supra, at 909. Courts have accepted an employer’s
“predictions of disruption” when they provide evidence “that the community it serves discovered
the speech or would inevitably discover it.” The same is generally true when “some disruption
has already occurred.” Id. Yet, “the government cannot prevail if it does not provide enough
evidence to support the prediction of future disruption.” Id., at 910. And “[e]ven where the
employer provides evidence of a negative reaction to speech,” such as the public complaint
against Petitioner Chappie342 in this instance, “courts require evidence that it will disrupt the
workplace.” Id. Even if an employee’s speech “caused arguments and made people dislike him”
the speech must impair “his working relationship with his fellow employees.” Id.; see Lindsey v.
City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2007). Here, there is no evidence to suggest it did—and the
mere allegation that “the statement was unprofessional and reflected poorly on the State Police’s
image of impartiality and professionalism” does not suggest that the statement, in fact, did.
Resp’s. Adm. Clai. Resp. The chance for the public to see the comment is also important here.3
But, that chance is low—very low—because a chat bubble lasts a relatively low amount of time,
around only fifteen to thirty seconds.4
4 See TextChatService.BubbleChatConfiguration.BubbleDuration,
https://create.roblox.com/docs/chat/bubble-chat#behavior. It appears the default listed on the documentation is 30
3 See, e.g., Moser v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 984 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And importantly, the chance
that the public would have seen the Facebook comment remained low because Moser deleted that December 2015
comment by February 2016.”)
Given that Petitioner’s speech involves political support—a core concern of the First
Amendment—and that the government has failed to show significant workplace disruption, the
balance tips heavily in favor of protecting the speech. Consequently, Section 301.5-6(G) fails the
balancing test set forth in Pickering and cannot be applied to justify the suppression of
Petitioner’s protected political expression.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court shall grant the Petitioner’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and deny the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
June 22, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Senior Associate
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Petitioner
seconds, but when you open a starter place you can see that it is actually 15 seconds, see
https://gyazo.com/056699489372faf1873906bbaf5d9d42. Accessed 22 June 2024.
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
CHAPPIE342,
Petitioner(s),
v.
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE,
Respondent(s).
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Case Number: RSC-AD-2579
Presiding: Hon. Xiqaq
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nicklaus_s, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and the contents thereof has,
on June 22, 2024, been served, by electronic means, upon the opposing parties of the
above-entitled matter.
June 22, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway
Beneath my hand,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Petitioner
