ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
chappie342
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DOCKET NO. RSC-AD-2579
Petitioner
v.
Ridgeway State Police
Respondent
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT
BACKGROUND
1. On April 4th, petitioner chappie342 submitted an administrative claim against the
Ridgeway State Police.
2. On April 7th, Chief Judge koala4life allotted seven (7) days to the Government to
produce a reply to the administrative claim, was the government going to context the
aforementioned claim.
3. Deputy Attorney General Hecxtro asked the Magistrate to clarify on the deadline, who
stated [the magistrate], at 2:02 PM EST, that the Government had seventy-two (72) hours
to submit a reply to the claim.
4. On April 11th, the Deputy Attorney General submitted the reply to the claim at 12:58
AM EST.
5. On April 19th, the petitioner, by his attorneys, submitted a motion for entry of default.
ARGUMENT
6. There exist three substantive rules for the setting aside of a default judgment: (a) whether
the default was willful, (b) whether setting aside the default would prejudice the
adversary, and, (c) whether a meritorious defense is presented. See Enron Oil Corp. v.
Diakuhara 10 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1993), LinRCross v. Ridgeway County Fire Department
(2024).
I. The Default Was Not Willful
a. Deputy Attorney General Hecxtro had the intention of submitting the
administrative claim reply within the established deadline, and he, in fact, did
submit the reply at the end of his day, before he went to sleep. To reiterate, there
was no “willfulness” by the Government to turn over the claim past the deadline,
because no exact deadline was imposed by the court.
II. Setting Aside The Default Would Not Prejudice The Adversary
a. The so-called “late filing” of the reply would not prejudice them, nor the
proceedings of this matter, considering that the report was, at the end, turned over
diligently. Further, the petitioner’s motion for default was entered eight full days
after the reply was filed. The petitioner’s failure to litigate their claim has incurred
more prejudice against them than the government’s alleged failure to reply by an
unstated deadline.
b. “Delay standing alone does not establish prejudice.” Id. Cf. Davis, 713 F.2d at
916 (when vacating a default judgment, "delay alone is not a sufficient basis for
establishing prejudice") Id. The petitioner fails to make any other showing of
prejudice in their motion for default aside from the failure of the government to
file their reply by the arbitrarily assumed deadline of 05:00 CET.
III. A Meritorious Defense Is Presented
a. This court may also take into consideration other equitable factors, including
whether the failure to follow a rule of procedure was a mistake made in good faith
and whether the entry of default would bring about a harsh or unfair result. See
Sony Corp. v. Elm State Elecs., Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1986).
b. Even if the deadline was at the literal end of the day in Eastern Time of the 11th,
the Deputy Attorney General made an honest mistake by submitting the reply
fifty-eight (58) minutes past the day the deadline was set because he assumed the
deadline to be the end of his personal day. Nevertheless, it still needs to be
pointed out that no actual deadline was set. The only established deadline to
provide a reply to the claim was three (3) days, without a clear time deadline for
the extensions granted after.
c. It would be unfair to default when no particular deadline was set.
For the aforementioned reasons, we, the government, ask this court to deny the motion
for entry of default submitted by the petitioner.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ natrix368
natrix368
Assistant Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
RBN#12109
/s/ Hecxtro
Hecxtro
Deputy Attorney General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
RBN#17169
Counsel of Record
