Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY TRENDLUV, Plaintiff, v. RIDGEWAY COUNTY TRANSIT AUTHORITY; RJVIEW, in his individual and official capacity as Director, Defendant. Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2575 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. The State of Ridgeway’s towing regime is a textbook unconstitutional seizure that requires licensed drivers to pay an impound fee to recover their property. Senate Bill 14 (“S3-14” or the “Act”) allows the Ridgeway County Transit Authority—without mandating post-seizure hearings or traffic court proceedings—to seize a vehicle and force its rightful owner to pay a fee for its recovery. This civil action seeks declaratory relief that S3-14 is unconstitutional, and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the same. PARTIES 1. Plaintiff TrendLuv is a citizen of Ridgeway. 2. Defendant Rjview is Director of the Ridgeway County Transit Authority and citizen of Ridgeway. He is sued in both his individual and official capacity as Director. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section IV of the Constitution of the State of Ridgeway. 4. Venue is proper in this Court because the incident took place within Ridgeway County. 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 2. On or about March 24, 2024, Plaintiff was attending a probable cause hearing at Palmer City Hall. 3. During the hearing, his vehicle was impounded by the Ridgeway County Transit Authority and transported to a state-funded junkyard. At the time, he was unaware of this. 4. One day later, on March 25, 2024, Plaintiff was notified by a pop-up interface that his Actila was impounded at the Transit Authority impound lot. 5. Plaintiff paid approximately $300.00 to recover his property from the Transit Authority impound lot. 6. From the moment his vehicle was impounded to paying the fee, Plaintiff was never offered a hearing by the State to challenge the impound. CAUSE OF ACTION FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (1 R. Stat. § 3115 – Deprivation of Rights) 7. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth therein. 8. Article I, Section VI of the Ridgeway Constitution provides that no person can “be justly deprived of liberty, except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of the person's peers” 9. Section VI is a state analog to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which, in pertinent part, provides that no person can be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” U.S. Const. amend. V. 10.The Supreme Court of Ridgeway has endorsed reliance on federal precedent “to guide … interpretation of relative issues” Lazerify v. StudsPerSecond, 1 Rid. 101 (2023) (emphasis 2 added). While Section VI of the Ridgeway Constitution is merely comparable to the Fifth Amendment, the principles of due process remain the same. As such, federal precedent concerning the Fifth Amendment is relevant to the reading of Section VI. 11.Plaintiff’s vehicle was impounded by the Ridgeway County Transit Authority while attending an in-game event. Despite no proceedings on the impound, Plaintiff was fined several hundred dollars and was forced to pay the fee in order to recover his vehicle. 12.Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, procedural due process requires that deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The requirement is no different in these circumstances. 13.The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has narrowly applied this requirement to the impounding of vehicles, holding, “[e]very court which has considered the issue has held that the owners of towed vehicles…are entitled, at minimum, to post-deprivation notice and a hearing” Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 14.To that end, “the government may not take property like a thief in the night; rather, it must announce its intentions and give the property owner a chance to argue against the taking” Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008). 15.But ultimately, the right to be heard “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 3 16.Assuming the government is consistent with its obligations under the principles of procedural due process, it bears the burden of starting and conducting a hearing. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 57, 80 (1972). This requirement is yet borne by the State. 17.S3-14 does not define the procedure for post-deprivation hearings or dispositive traffic court proceedings when an individual’s vehicle is impounded. 18.But because drivers have more than a de minimis property interest in owning and utilizing their vehicles, notice and hearing must be provided. See e.g., Propert, 948 F.2d 1327 at 1331 (“Propert’s economic interest in his car was certainly more than de minimis.”); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir.1983) (“Whether a junk car has little or great value, it is constitutionally protected property.”) (emphasis added). 19.As it exists today, S3-14 seizes property without allowing property owners to challenge the taking. This taking of non-trivial, protected interests, is owed notice and hearing under law. Ridgeway not only denied a hearing to Plaintiff but currently denies notice and hearing to every person whose vehicle is seized by the Transit Authority. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands relief for the foregoing. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 20. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands that this Court: a. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants and their officers, employees, servants, agents, appointees, or successors from administering, enforcing, or giving effect to any provision or authority under S3-14 and any other policy, order, or directive that could be construed to give effect to S3-14, including department policy governing the same; 4 b. Issue declaratory judgment that, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, S3-14 is unconstitutional and invalid because failing to provide post-deprivation hearing or notice violates procedural due process; c. Award attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and other costs incurred in filing this suit; d. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate. DATED: March 31, 2024 Palmer, Ridgeway RIDGEWAY JUSTICE INITIATIVE BY: /s/ - Stickza, Esq. Ridgeway Bar No. 17120 Palmer Apartments, Suite 5B Palmer, Ridgeway Disc: #33368 Rblx: #62651952 E-mail: [email protected] BY: /s/ - Josef13344 d/b/a Josef Sullivan Ridgeway Bar No. 21109 (Class 11) Palmer Apartments, Suite 5B Palmer, Ridgeway Tel.: (430) 946-8594 Fax: (753) 632-2442 E-mail: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiff 5

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