IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SEAL_LOVE,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
DPS_K, et al.,
Defendant(s).
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Case No. RSC-CV-2544
Memorandum Opinion & Order
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant DPS_K who brings this Motion to Dismiss, which contains
some arguments inappropriate for a dismissal challenge, therefore the Court will substitute the
motion for a joint Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on those arguments and a Motion to
Dismiss on others. On review of Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and on
review of briefs submitted by both parties, it is ordered that the Motion is DENIED. On review
of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and on review of briefs submitted by both parties, it is ordered
that the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an individual who entered the County Hall building on Jackson Street in the
City of Palmer to view an ongoing government proceeding. In the lobby of the building are two
security checkpoints with metal detectors and armed law enforcement officers to oversee the
operation of the checkpoints. Plaintiff “jumped over the reception desk and went directly toward
the stairs” that led to the chambers where the proceedings were taking place. Plaintiff’s Civil
Complaint, ¶ 7. This was done to evade and avoid the security checkpoint and to gain immediate
access to the chambers where proceedings were taking place. Plaintiff’s route of entry took them
directly to the main entrance doors where other spectators were entering.
Defendant DPS_K is a trooper with the Ridgeway State Police who was in the chambers
in the galleries where Plaintiff had just breached entry, unbeknownst to the Defendant. Within
seconds of entering the chambers through the main entrance, Defendant detained the Plaintiff in
handcuff restraints and then forcibly searched their person. Plaintiff was discovered to be in
possession of a concealed firearm within the building and was charged with 5 R.C.C. § 12, a
statute which prohibits possession of a firearm within a restricted government building with
posted signage, which the County Hall has. Plaintiff then filed this suit against the Defendant
seeking declaratory relief, monetary relief (both punitive and compensatory), and injunctive
relief.
Defendant’s answer to the suit came in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, which is
permissible under Rid. R. Civ. P. 12, in lieu of an answer. Their argument is based on three
assertions: (1) Defendant had reasonable suspicion of danger given the Plaintiff’s “abrupt and
unusual entry into a government facility and his unpredictable conduct” which justified search;
(2) Plaintiff’s claim is barred under Qualified Immunity; and (3) that “that certain social
circumstances may warrant exceptions to the warrant requirement” of the Fourth Amendment.”
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 1-2.
LEGAL FINDINGS
I. Some of Defendant’s arguments are inappropriate for a Motion to Dismiss, but are
better served in a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Traditionally, a dismissal motion only has narrow grounds which may be argued
appropriately. For example, such a motion cannot make a factual dispute because the Court must
make the “assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In our jurisdiction, there are six
grounds with a dismissal motion may argue: (1) Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) Improper
venue; (3) Insufficiency of process; (4) Insufficiency of service of process; (5) Failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted; or (6) Pendency of a prior action in a court of the State
of Ridgeway.
Defendant’s first argument regarding exigent circumstances is based on the legal merits
of the case, not an attack on any of the prior grounds mentioned which are the only methods of
concern that a dismissal motion can address. An argument on legal application on the facts
asserted in the civil complaint are best reserved for a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
which our court allows under Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(b). For this reason, the Court will instead treat
the dismissal motion as one seeking judgment on the pleadings instead so as to preserve the
judicial economy.
II. Plaintiff’s actions did not constitute an emergency given the totality of the
circumstances, therefore it was not a search under exigent circumstances
“To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting
without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U.S. 141, 149 (2013). Today’s review is whether “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–394 (1978)). On this point, the Defendant makes the argument
that because of the “incident's secure government setting, the Fourth Amendment's protections
must be applied carefully” and that such a situation requires an exigency exception to the Fourth
Amendment.
Reviewing the totality of circumstances in this case, this Court is not inclined to agree
that a person entering a government building with a firearm necessarily entails an emergency
circumstance that requires categorical intrusion of the person’s privacy. In past, there have been
cases where “programmatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment
intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-46 (2000). Those cases have resulted in exceptions to
the general requirement of a warrant, such as for DUI checkpoints, but applying that review to
this case would not sufficiently allow for the exception nor the discovery of exigent
circumstances.
In this case, Plaintiff was not searched by a systematic scheme but instead by an
individualized suspicion by the Defendant who picked them out from a crowd of people once
they made it up the stairs into the chamber. Furthermore, the Edmond inquiry was specifically
tailored to ensure that the purpose of the intrusion is the execution of a specific duty where the
main purpose is not crime-fighting. In the case of DUI Checkpoints, the program was sanctioned
for community-safeguarding against drunk drivers. See Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). For impounded vehicle searches, the search was allowed for
inventory-purposes. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In this case,
Plaintiff’s search was individualized and tailored for crime-fighting, given that they were later
taken into custody for possession of a firearm within the building.
Defendant’s basis of search because of the Plaintiff’s “abrupt and unusual entry into a
government facility and his unpredictable conduct” is woefully untailored to allow this Court to
find an exigency or emergency to require an exception for warrantless search. It is unsystematic
and instead based on subjective perception of another individual’s conduct. Defendant’s
argument is overly broad and casts too wide of a net for this Court to allow an exception.
This argument is best served in a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings instead of
dismissal, because it is based on the merits of the case instead of an attack of the foundation of
the filing itself. In light of that, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings must be denied.
III. The applicability of Terry in reference to government proceedings was not clearly
established; therefore, Defendant is entitled to immunity.
“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a
qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Defendant, a trooper for the Ridgeway State Police, was acting in
their official capacity during the course of the incident that this suit is related to, so the claim of
immunity must be evaluated. Review usually begins first on the prong which is weakest for the
party invoking immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (Courts evaluating a
claim of qualified immunity are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which
of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand”).
In this case, the invocation of immunity is weakest on whether the Defendant violated a
clearly identifiable constitutional procedure. In this inquiry, a right is clearly established if it is
“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right” and that “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Plaintiff contends that the right we examine in this inquiry
is the general Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. “The
operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level of generality at which
the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified.” Id., 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). The right that is being
examined today is the application of Terry in the setting of government proceedings where,
understandably, security concerns are heightened. This review is not on the overly broad
examination of the Fourth Amendment.
A search for weapons on an individual may be done based on “whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). During Plaintiff’s arrest and search,
both parties engaged in “street-lawyer” discussion on whether the search was justified.
Defendant explicitly cited this holding in Terry as their justification for the search, and that they
felt some form of apprehension regarding Plaintiff’s conduct when entering the chambers.
Admittedly, Defendant’s claim of apprehension may not hold much water in light of the
circumstances reviewed in this matter which, to the view of the Judge writing this opinion, gave
little indication of imminent danger to spectators in the chambers. However, this review is not
whether Defendant was correct in their assumptions, that is what the other prong in a qualified
immunity inquiry is for. This prong examines strictly whether the application of Terry that
Defendant relied upon for situations in similar government proceedings was clearly established.
This Court is very much aware of the growing problem faced by in-game proceedings on
an online platform such as Roblox, where players face little repercussion for their in-game
actions. Time and time again has shown instances of in-game proceedings being attacked
repeatedly by malicious actors and criminal syndicates. Thankfully, we have law enforcement
officers that spend immense resources and time in defending our safety when executing duties
related to maintenance of this player government. However, we still recognize the challenges that
they face in this duty.
To recallable memory, this is the first time that this Court has seen an application of Terry
be used in reference to searches conducted at or near government proceedings for the purposes of
protecting the officials present. Whether it is applicable in this context has not been explored
enough in past reviews nor by law enforcement training. This is not to say that Terry itself is not
clearly established, but that this weight of the specific circumstances has not been explored
before, which is collateral to a claim of Terry. Ibid (“[I]n determining whether the officer acted
reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences which he-is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience”).
This Court cannot find that the application of Terry in terms of the Fourth Amendment is
clearly apparent for any reasonable officer to easily be able to determine whether it is or is not
applicable in the context of Plaintiff’s arrest.
CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Palmer, Ridgeway
County, this 6th day of April 2024 that, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED but that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
/s/ TaxesArentAwesome
TaxesArentAwesome
Superior Court Judge
