STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SEAL_LOVE,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE;
DPS_K, in his quasi-official capacity
as a State Trooper in the Ridgeway
State Police,
Defendant(s).
Case Number: RSC-CV-2544
Presiding: Hon.
TaxesArentAwesome
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
DISMISS
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF, Seal_love, by and through the undersigned counsel, submits this response to
the motion to dismiss in the above-entitled matter.
INTRODUCTION
The arguments made in the motion to dismiss are inappropriate. The defense requests
that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety because the actions of the defendant were
justified. This is wholefully untrue & not what a motion to dismiss is intended for, and we
will show that in our response.
March 31, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Clarke & Associates, LLP.
Associate Attorney
R. Bar. No. 23102
Derogatoryyy
Counsel of Record
Clarke & Associates, LLP.
Senior Associate
R. Bar. No. 19119
Attorneys for Plaintiff
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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ARGUMENTS
I. FACTUAL ARGUMENTS ARE INAPPROPRIATE IN A MOTION TO DISMISS
Undoubtedly, motions to dismiss serve a singular purpose—to test the legality of a
complaint. Indeed, in a motion to dismiss, “factual questions are…left unresolved.”
San
Diego Gas Electric Co. v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 645 (1981).
More importantly, the court must “assume the veracity” of “well-pleaded factual
allegations”. The court must take allegations as true, so long as they are not “mere
conclusions”.
Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009).
If the defense disagrees with the factual content of the complaint, it is their job to
make this their argument at trial. A complaint cannot be dismissed because the defense
believes that their actions were “justified”, this is what is
proved, at trial.
II. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO SEARCH
PLAINTIFF
Regardless as to the arguments of the defense, the decision in
Terry is not a
talisman which leads the Fourth Amendment to fade away and disappear. While a law
enforcement officer “need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed”, the
relevant standard at hand is whether “a reasonably prudent man, in the circumstances,
would be warranted in his belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
When looking at whether a law enforcement officer acted reasonably, the court
shall not turn to the vague “hunch” of a law enforcement officer, but they shall turn to
“the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience.”
The defense claims that the Plaintiff’s “abrupt and unusual entry into a
government facility and his unpredictable conduct…gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.” With this, we ask, how should the Plaintiff have entered the
building? He entered through the front doors, stopped at the reception desk briefly, went
up the stairs, and then entered the viewing gallery for the Ridgeway State Senate—all
with a law enforcement officer following him to open those locked doors. It becomes
clear that this law enforcement officer didn’t stop & frisk him, did this officer, the one
who followed him from the lobby, after watching him enter the building, to the viewing
gallery, not have reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity?
The Defendant could not have possibly drawn “reasonable inferences” which
“gave rise to…criminal activity” from the Plaintiff entering the building. It certainly
becomes clear that no other “reasonably prudent man” in the viewing gallery of the
session showed any signs “that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Regardless,
these are questions left for trial, as our first argument states.
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, NOR IS IT
APPROPRIATE TO INVOKE AT THIS STAGE
Qualified immunity dissolves liability of public employees for actions taken during
the commission of their duties, except when their actions “violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Further, “qualified immunity provides
ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.”
Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
The rationale behind qualified immunity is that citizens should not have their
constitutional rights violated without redress, but also that public officials are required to
use their discretion and should not be intimidated with lawsuits when they use it, or it
may deter them from making necessary split-second decisions.
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
In the landmark case of
Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the court established
a two-pronged test on when a government official is entitled to qualified immunity:
a. Whether a right has been violated; and
b. Whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct.
To determine whether a right is “clearly established”, the court must consider
whether the “contours of the right be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Indeed, a question need not have
been held unlawful in the past, rather, in the lack “...of pre-existing law[,] the
unlawfulness must be apparent.”
Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-615 (1999) (quoting
Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
It is apparent, in this case, that a right has indeed been violated—the Plaintiff had
his consent overridden from a search, and the law enforcement officer had no reasonable
suspicion, as we mentioned earlier, to search him in the first place. The first prong is met.
Further, it becomes apparent that the right was indeed “clearly established”. There
was no reasonable suspicion to search the Plaintiff. The Defendant never saw a gun
located on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff displayed no threat in the viewing gallery at the
Ridgeway State Senate session. Reasonable suspicion is suspicion that a crime is about
to, is being, or has been committed. All state-certified law enforcement officers are
trained in the Law Enforcement Training Institute on what reasonable suspicion is. Any
reasonably, prudent, and trained officer would agree that an individual walking into a
building does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—nor would any
reasonable member of the public. The second prong is met.
Furthermore, when a law enforcement officer conducts a search that violates the
Fourth Amendment, that law enforcement officer is “entitled to…qualified immunity…if
he can establish…that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search
comported with the Fourth Amendment, even though it actually did not.”
Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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The defense fails to meet the standard set by
Anderson, and accordingly, qualified
immunity must not be granted. As explained earlier, the Defendant had no grounds of
reasonable suspicion. An individual walking into a government building does not allow
law enforcement officers to
override their consent to search them under the decision of
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Accordingly, the Defendant shall not be entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss merely proves that there is in fact a factual dispute for trial—the
legality of the search & seizure—and frankly, the arguments on why it was legal, are
weak. This matter is ripe for trial, and will remain ripe for trial. For the aforementioned
reasons, we pray that the court denies the motion to dismiss.
March 31, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Clarke & Associates, LLP.
Associate Attorney
R. Bar. No. 23102
Derogatoryyy
Counsel of Record
Clarke & Associates, LLP.
Senior Associate
R. Bar. No. 19119
Attorneys for Plaintiff
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SEAL_LOVE,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE;
DPS_K, in his quasi-official capacity
as a State Trooper in the Ridgeway
State Police,
Defendant(s).
Case Number: RSC-CV-2544
Presiding: Hon.
TaxesArentAwesome
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nicklaus_s, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and the contents thereof
has, on March 31st, 2024, been served upon the opposing parties of the above-entitled
matter and all proceedings within.
March 31, 2024 So certified,
Nicklaus_s
Clarke & Associates, LLP.
Associate Attorney
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Plaintiff
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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