Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY MAYOLLID, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TECHIEY, Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway, in his official capacity; RIDGEWAY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, a government entity; STATE OF RIDGEWAY, a government entity, Defendants. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : Case No. RSC-CV-2467 Judge: Hon. Koala4Iife ⠀⠀ ⠀⠀ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF MAYOLLID’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO ABOVE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ____ __Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned attorney, files this response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” For the reasons set forth below, the Court should deny Defendants’ motion. I._____PLAINTIFF STATES A “PLAUSIBLE CLAIM” UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN I._____BE GRANTED BY “SHORT AND PLAIN STATEMENT” ____ _Plaintiff Mayollid, a resident of Ridgeway County and a citizen of the State of Ridgeway, has been prosecuted by the above Defendants, acting jointly and severally, since February 12, 2024. Plaintiff brings this claim under 1. R. Stat. § 3201 which empowers this court to review and enjoin “[a]ny policy, order, procedure, or directive” that impedes on an individual’s constitutional rights. See Titanic, Governor of Ridgeway v. Nev, 1. Rid. 89 (2023) (The Superior - 1 - Court is empowered “to review any “policy, order, procedure, or directive” for whether it is legally or constitutionally compatible. 1 R. Stat. § 3201.”) It is settled law, that the language “policy, order, procedure, or directive” as used in this statute refers to “any executive action.” See State v. Lx1nas, 1. Rid. 506 (2022) (The wording of the language “policy, order, procedure, or directive” refers to “any executive action.”) In order to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and cannot be dismissed unless it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). ____ __1. R. Stat. § 3201 grants a cause of action to any plaintiff who alleges 1) the commission of an illegal or unconstitutional executive action and 2) that this action has caused him some “concrete, non-hypothetical harm.” 1 R. Stat. § 3201(i) and (ii). When these two conditions are met, a plaintiff is entitled to “injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the government prohibiting them from enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and injunctive relief reversing any harm done.” See ibid. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges these criteria in his complaint by “a short and plain statement” and therefore states a claim to relief under 1. R. Stat. §3201 that is “plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 US 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868. Under the Ridgeway Constitution, only ‘public officials’ and those ‘explicitly specified’ by the State legislature enjoy the right to be "charged by grand jury indictment." Rid. Const. Art. I., Sec. VII. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the prosecution against him impedes his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to - 2 - the U.S. Constitution because it arbitrarily or invidiously denies him the benefits of the Grand Jury Clause in the Ridgeway Constitution. See Compl. ¶ 10-17. II.____DEFENDANTS ERRONEOUSLY APPLY A CASE INVOLVING THE ‘DUE II.____PROCESS CLAUSE’ TO PLAINTIFF’S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM ____ __Defendants’ argue in their motion to dismiss that the landmark case of Hurtado v. California 110 US 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884), gives the government of the State of Ridgeway carte blanche to capriciously discriminate against classes where grand jury protections are concerned. To call this view ill-founded would be putting things mildly. In Hurtado, the U.S. Supreme Court merely held that the phrase "due process of law" did not, in the judgment of the framers of the Constitution, necessarily require a grand jury in capital cases. See Hurtado v. California, supra, 110 US 521, 539, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232 (“And the words 'due process of law' in the amendment do not mean … to limit the powers of State governments to prosecutions for crime by indictment.”) This holding only involves the Due Process Clause and carries no relevance to the issues presented in Plaintiff’s claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, in determining whether a denial of a benefit violates the Equal Protection Clause, it is not relevant whether the government benefit is characterized as a “right” or “privilege.” See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. at 627, n. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1322. ____ __Instead, the court must consider whether the State of Ridgeway denies the benefits to another class based on an “invidious discrimination.” See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-361, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 26 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the State of Ridgeway’s denial of the benefits of a grand jury to everyone except - 3 - ‘public officials’ and those ‘explicitly specified’ is based on an invidious discrimination because it is “arbitrary” and because it lacks “a fair and substantial relation to the object” of the Grand Jury Clause. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 76, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971). The object of the Grand Jury Clause is evident judging by its plain language. It provides persons with heightened due process protections in the face of criminal prosecutions. With this object in mind, it is impossible to identify a rational basis on which to justify the underinclusion pervasive throughout the Clause. It benefits ‘public officials’ and those ‘explicitly specified’ on one hand, but denies the same benefits to everyone else without reason The Grand Jury Clause, perforce, is “so clearly arbitrary or invidious” as to fall within “constitutional prohibition.” See Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 418, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989 (1920). III.___THIS COURT HAS POWER TO GRANT PROPER RELIEF NECESSARY TO III.___ENFORCE PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ____ __Plaintiff, having stated a plausible claim to relief under 1. R. Stat. § 3201, is undoubtedly entitled to “injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the government prohibiting them from enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and injunctive relief reversing any harm done.” See 1. R. Stat. § 3201; see also Titanic, Governor of Ridgeway v. Nev, supra, 1. Rid. 89 (The Superior Court is empowered “to review any “policy, order, procedure, or directive” for whether it is legally or constitutionally compatible. 1 R. Stat. § 3201.”) ____ __Plaintiff’s complaint makes 4 distinct prayers for relief: ____ __1) “For a declaratory judgment that the Grand Jury Clause in the Ridgeway Constitution must equally protect all ordinary persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;” ____ __2) “For a permanent restraining order pursuant to 1. R. Stat. § 3201 restraining and enjoining Defendants from prosecuting any person within the jurisdiction of Ridgeway without - 4 - an indictment of a grand jury; “ See Compl. ¶ 20. ____ __3) “For an order directing Defendants to take reasonable measures to end any ongoing criminal prosecution initiated without an indictment of a grand jury [...]”. ____ __4) “For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper” (See Compl. ¶ 19-22.) ____ __First and foremost, Defendants argue that the Court lacks the ability to “change the verbiage” of the Ridgeway Constitution and therefore lacks the power to grant the above relief. However, this claim is based on a misreading of the authorities provided in Plaintiff’s complaint. When a court holds a discrimination invalid under equal protection principles, it has the power to grant one of two remedies: A) the court can treat the provisions containing the discriminatory underinclusion as “generally invalid,” or B) the court can “extend the coverage” of the law to repair its underinclusion. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542, 543, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942); Welsh v. United States, supra 398 U.S. at 361, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (Harlan, J., concurring); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 US 738, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 79 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1984); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1698, 198 L. Ed. 2d 150, 582 US 47 (2017). It is in accordance with this precedent, that Plaintiff requests the latter remedy in his complaint and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to “extend the coverage” of the Grand Jury Clause to ordinary persons (i.e. persons not covered by the current reading of the Clause.) ____ __Defendants mistakenly believe that the language “extend the coverage” of the Grand Jury Clause implies that the Court needs to physically edit the text of the Ridgeway Constitution. However, as seen in all of the aforementioned cases, this is untrue. Rather, a court extends the coverage of a law by enforcing its application, by appropriate relief (i.e. declaratory and, or, injunctive relief), “to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.” See Welsh v. United States, - 5 - supra 398 U.S. at 361, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (Harlan, J., concurring). Even if, arguendo, this Court lacks the power to grant this form of remedy, the Court would nonetheless have power to grant the alternative remedy, which is to declare the Grand Jury Clause “a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit.” See ibid. This, however, is a drastic remedy and should naturally be considered only in the absence of its alternative. ____ __Defendants also claim in their motion that this Court lacks the power to issue “an order directing Defendants to take reasonable measures to end any ongoing criminal prosecution initiated without an indictment of a grand jury.” In support of this claim, Defendants cite Juluke v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which states “when the civil action does not seek to enjoin an ongoing prosecution and where the movants are not being prosecuted, an injunction may issue.” However, this quote is grossly taken out of context. Juluke was based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Younger v. Harris which exclusively prohibits “federal courts” from enjoining state criminal proceedings “except under special circumstances.” 401 US 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971) (“We have concluded that the judgment … must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.”) Since these holdings apply solely to federal courts, they are neither binding nor persuasive in this State court. ____ __Moreover, it should be noted that the language “take reasonable measures” as used above precludes Defendants’ assumption that such an order would require them to immediately “halt the proceedings.” Indeed, the language “reasonable measures” as commonly used in the legal realm, necessarily implies that the action commanded is done reasonably (i.e. in accordance with the law and rules of the Court). It goes without saying, that such an order cannot be construed as to allow Defendants to bypass pertinent laws and rules. Further, such an order - 6 - would only effectively apply to Defendants Techiey and the Ridgeway Department of Justice and not, as Defendants assumptively claim, the “judicial officers” of this Court. Defendants can easily fulfill such an order by filing for dismissal pursuant to the Court’s rules. Lastly, Defendants’ arguments fall flat as Plaintiff’s complaint requests “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.” This “omnibus clause" preemptively bars the possibility of dismissal on the ground that relief prayed for is improper and allows the Court to enter other proper relief pursuant to its own discretion. See e.g. Watson v. Jones 80 US 679, 20 L. Ed. 666, 1871 US LEXIS 1383 (1872) (Recognizing the validity of such a clause as being a “prayer for general relief.”) Ergo, even if Plaintiff requested improper relief, the Court retains the power to grant “such other and further relief” as it alone deems just and proper. Accordingly, Plaintiff states a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted by this Court. ____ __For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. DATED: March 22, 2024 JOSEF SULLIVAN, ESQ. /s/Josef13344 - Josef13344 Ridgeway Bar No. 21109 Counsel of Record Palmer Apartments, Suite 5B Palmer, Ridgeway Tel.: (430) 946-8594 Fax: (753) 632-2442 E-mail: [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiff - 7 -

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