RIDGEWAY STATE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
MAYOLLID
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-2467
MOTION TO DISMISS
PRESIDING JUDGE: Hon. koala4life
Plaintiff
v.
TECHIEY
Defendant
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Techiey, proceeding on their own behalf and on the behalf of the Department of
Justice and the State of Ridgeway, hereby requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to
R. Civ. P. 28(b)(2) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Attached hereto is a memorandum of law in support of Defendant’s Motion.
DATED: March 21, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
/s/Techiey
Techiey
Attorney General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
RSB 17140
Counsel of Record
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
MAYOLLID
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-2467
Plaintiff
v.
TECHIEY
Defendant
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff Mayollid, on or about February 12, 2024, was brought before this Court as the
Defendant in a criminal case, RSC-CM-2284, in which a Criminal Information was filed to
begin the proceedings at the direction of Attorney General Techiey, prosecuting the case.
Plaintiff claims entitlement to Grand Jury Indictment under pain of a violation of their 14th
Amendment rights as outlined in the United States Constitution, and that the use of Grand Jury
Indictments as established in Article I, Section VII of our own State Constitution is in violation
of those rights. As will be shortly established, Plaintiff is not entitled to Grand Jury Indictment
nor is the filing of RSC-CM-2284 without a Grand Jury Indictment a violation of Plaintiff’s
14th Amendment or due process rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s requested relief is not able to
be granted by this Court, such that in part it would require a complete violation of the
separation of powers of government and the invention of new jurisdiction to meet their request,
and otherwise is not permissible under state law as applicable relief in a civil suit against the
government. For these reasons, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s one and only claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). These rules are virtually
identical when one compares them to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—namely, Fed. R.
Civ. P. (8)(a)(2) to Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). For this case to proceed, the civil
complaint, and all the facts therein, must be “plausible on [their] face.” See Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007). Even if all the facts of the civil complaint were taken as
true, it is not enough for this complaint to make its course through this Court. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 US 662, 664 (2009) (holding that claims must be dismissed if the facts do not
“entitle the Plaintiff to relief”). Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.
ARGUMENT
I. The Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Grand Jury Indictment
Article I, Section VII, of the Ridgeway State Constitution is exceedingly clear when a
Grand Jury is required in a criminal prosecution, such that “public officials or those
accused of offenses to be explicitly specified shall enjoy the right to be charged by grand jury
Indictment” Rid. Const. Art I, § VII. There is no more plain or simple way of putting the facts:
Plaintiff is not a public official by any means, nor are they being accused of an offense that has
been specified that entitles them to the right to be charged by Grand Jury Indictment,
something Plaintiff has admitted. Yet, still, Plaintiff contends that the usage of the Grand Jury
in its current form is unconstitutional and too narrowly applied. We disagree.
We will proceed by analyzing Plaintiff’s claim from the angle of ensuring due-process
is upheld in all proceedings, as, at the core of their argument, Plaintiff is effectively claiming
that the due-process rights of criminal defendants not charged by Grand Jury Indictment are
infringed. On this matter, the law is very clear, and such that the ability of Justice Stanley
Matthews to articulate a legal argument far outpaces my own, his will be provided in full:
“Tried by these principles, we are unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or
indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information, after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on
his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the
prosecution, is not due process of law… It is merely a preliminary proceeding, and can result
in no final judgment except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial, conducted precisely
as in cases of indictments.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Not to mention, the
same preliminary proceeding of establishing probable cause for the charges alleged is done in
all criminal cases as established in the rules of procedure of our criminal courts. See Rid. R.
Crim. P. (Title II, Rule 3). Hurtado goes on to further cement this opinion: “The natural and
obvious inference is that, in the sense of the Constitution, "due process of law " was not meant
or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case.”
Id.
II. This Court Cannot Grant the Requested Relief
In their complaint, Plaintiff requested relief including “a declaratory judgment that the Grand
Jury Clause in the Ridgeway Constitution must equally protect all ordinary persons under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; For a
permanent restraining order pursuant to 1. R. Stat. § 3201 restraining and enjoining Defendants
from prosecuting any person within the jurisdiction of Ridgeway without an indictment of a
grand jury;” (Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶19, 20). There is no way to achieve such relief without
explicitly changing the wording of Art. I Sec. VII of the State Constitution, something that this
court is not empowered to do. No review or analysis of the current verbiage could allow for
such a broad expansion of the clause. Plaintiff also requests “For an order directing Defendants
to take reasonable measures to end any ongoing criminal prosecution initiated without an
indictment of a grand jury;” (Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶21). Again, the law is explicitly clear on
this matter as well. As a general rule, “when the civil action does not seek to enjoin an ongoing
prosecution and where the movants are not being prosecuted, an injunction may issue” Juluke
v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1987); C.f. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
930 (1975). Plaintiff seeks to enjoin active criminal proceedings where he, the movant in this
case, is being prosecuted. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails even the simplest of requirements.
To that end, equity cannot take jurisdiction to “stay criminal proceedings already commenced”
McKee v. Rudolph, 12 F.2d 148, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1926). For this reason, the Plaintiff’s prayer for
relief lacks legal grounds. As such, his claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See Jacobs v. Ramirez, 400 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a complaint may be
dismissed on these grounds “only if there are no legal grounds upon which relief may be
granted”). To this point, Plaintiff is also not entitled to injunctive relief because he has failed to
plead allegations that, if taken as true, would “appear[] to a certainty that [he] is entitled to
[relief]” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398
(1979). “For an injunction to be enforceable, it needs a person who it can be enforced upon”
largeTitanic2 v. NevPlaysGames, 1 Rid. 80, 85 (2023). Plaintiff seeks an injunction against the
Attorney General from continuing criminal proceedings against him. Although the Defendants
oversee the prosecution of the case, they cannot just halt the proceedings if this Court ordered
such. In fact, “the only persons able to carry into effect such an order are judicial officers” Id.
at 86. The Attorney General does not have the authority to vacate the criminal proceedings as
Plaintiff desires; instead, the judicial officers of this Court would have to voluntarily conform
to the ruling and dismiss it themselves. As the Supreme Court of Ridgeway unequivocally
affirmed in largeTitanic2,
“judicial officers, including their clerks, are totally immune from equitable remedy” Id.
(quoting Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021)). For this reason, an
injunction cannot be entered against Defendants because, in its functional state, the injunction
would impose a burden upon court employees to effectuate the ruling by dismissing and/or
staying the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. This fact alone, among other things,
demands that this Court dismiss the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to
state a claim.
