SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
CITATION: Matric_oc v. Techiey, et al.,
RSC-CV-2461
DATE OF JUDGEMENT:
2024-03-23
BETWEEN:
Matrix_oc
Plaintiff
and
Techiey and Stickza
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
OF THE
HONOURABLE JUDGE KOALA4IIFE
I. Background
[1] Plaintiff Matrix_oc applied for a preliminary injunction against defendants
Techiey and Stickza from exercising powers under s. 6.4(c-d) and (f) of the Judiciary
Act.
[2] Plaintiff submits that s. 6.4(c-d) and (f) of the Judiciary Act are unconstitutional
because they deprive the Attorney General of his “sole power to prosecute” as provided
in.
[3] Trial of the action on some of its merits was consolidated with the hearing of
the application.
[4] The facts are simple and largely undisputed. Techiey, as the Attorney General,
appointed Stickza to be Special Counsel under s. 6.4(a) of the Judiciary Act. Stickza,
as special counsel, exercised powers under s. 6.4(c) to investigate and prosecute
plaintiff Matrix_oc. Defendants have been exercising these powers since March 9,
2024.
II. Analysis
[5] For the reasons that follow, I find that s. 6.4(c) of the Judiciary Act is partly
unconstitutional, and that the s. 6.4(d) and (f) are entirely not unconstitutional.
[6] When s. 6.4(c) confers the Special Counsel with the “authority and ability to
exercise…prosecutorial functions as the Attorney General”, it is in conflict with the
constitutional mandate that the Attorney General “shall have the sole power to
prosecute”. Sole power to prosecute means that no person other than the Attorney
General may exercise the power to prosecute except when that power is derived from
the Attorney General.
[7] Even though none of the Special Counsel’s powers would exist except at the
Attorney General’ designation, when s. 6.4(c) allows the Special Counsel to exercise
prosecutorial functions “as” the Attorney General, it has created essentially a second
person holding the same prosecutorial powers as the Attorney General, albeit limited
in terms of jurisdiction, prescribed by the Attorney General. This is because s. 6.4(c)
allows the Special Counsel to exercise the authority to prosecute independent of the
Attorney General.
[8] To be clear, the Special Counsel can exercise many powers independent of the
Attorney General. It is the purpose of a special counsel to do as much. The
constitutional validity of the s. 6.4(c) is only called into question because it infringes
on the Attorney General’s sole power to prosecute. Indeed, a law which allows a special
counsel to exercise the investigative powers as the Attorney General would cause no
constitutional issue. For this reason, s. 6.4(c) is not unconstitutional for insofar as
allowing the Special Counsel to exercise investigative functions as if he were the
Attorney General.
[9] For the same reason, it is constitutionally sound for the Special Counsel, in
accordance with s. 6.4(d), to “determine whether and to what extent to inform or consult
the Attorney General about the conduct of their responsibilities”, insofar as the conduct
of their responsibilities does not involve exercising the power to prosecute.
[10] Likewise, s. 6.4(f) which prescribes that the “Special Counsel shall not be
subject to any day-to-day supervision by a member of the Attorney General’s Office”
is also constitutionally sound because nothing in that section runs afoul of the Attorney
General’s sole power to prosecute. After all, the Attorney General does not have the
sole power, in the constitutional sense, to supervise his staff because s. 6.4 of the
Judiciary Act provides for an independent special counsel.
[11] Having consolidated the trial on some of the merits with the hearing of the
application and found that a portion of the Judiciary Act is unconstitutional, plaintiff
has demonstrated a valid claim and the public interest requirements for a preliminary
injunction.
[12] I do not accept plaintiff’s purported loss of reputation as a valid rationale for
raising harm to the level of irreparable harm. It is a dangerous notion that an “important
government figure” is more worthy of preliminary relief because of the loss of potential
political support which monetary compensation cannot atone for, especially in the
context of a criminal investigation and prosecution. In my view, the irreparable harm
in this case lies solely to being prosecuted by an illegitimate authority, and the only
remedy available to correct that is an injunction.
[13] Defendants raise a fair point that the public interest may not be best served by
an injunction. This is true both when considering the larger objectives of a special
counsel as provided in the Judiciary Act and also when considering the unique context
of this case. It is relevant that there was a probable cause finding by a grand jury and
the return of a true bill of indictment against the plaintiff. There is strong public interest
against the scope of the injunction requested which I find to be overbroad. To minimise
the harm to the public interest, the preliminary remedy will be narrowly tailored as to
not disrupt the legitimate functions of the Attorney General and of the Special Counsel.
III. Preliminary injunction
[14] Defendants are enjoined from enforcing or acting under s. 6.4(c) of the
Judiciary Act insofar as it concerns prosecutorial functions.
[15] No security will be required from the applicant because it is improbable that I
would later find the adverse party to have been wrongfully enjoined. I do not intend to
change my judgement on the certain merits of the action that I have made in granting
in part the application for a preliminary injunction.
Dated at the City of Palmer, in the State of Ridgeway on March 23, 2024.
“koala4Iife”
Judge koala4Iife
