SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2461
ATTORNEY GENERAL TECHIEY AND SPECIAL COUNSEL STICKZA’S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
MATRIX_OC,
Plaintiff,
v.
TECHIEY; and
STICKZA,
Defendants.
1
LEGAL STANDARD
I. The Winter Test.
An individual who seeks a preliminary injunction must establish several
factors, including: (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits; to which (2) he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; where (3) the
balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public
interest” See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 375 (2008); see
also United States v. Texas, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 643 (2023) (holding that in order to win
an injunction from any court, “a party must satisfy several factors”). A movant is not
entitled to preliminary injunctive relief if he does not satisfy these standards.
Because Plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief, this Court should DENY his motion for a preliminary injunction.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF IS NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.
“The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the
plaintiff to show…he…is likely to prevail on the merits.” Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). To demonstrate a likelihood of succeeding on the merits,
movants must establish “a reasonable chance, or probability, of winning” In re Revel
AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015). Determining what constitutes a
likelihood of success is subject to broad interpretation. As such, we accredit the Third
2
Circuit’s ‘more likely than not’ analysis to its application.1 This lenient requirement
guarantees that most plaintiffs who bring a valid claim will prevail on the first prong
of Winter. Even though this standard is effortlessly satisfied by most, Plaintiff does
not sufficiently establish that he is likely to prevail on the merits.
A. The Appointment of Special Counsel is Constitutional
Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits with respect to his argument that
the appointment of special counsel is unconstitutional. Plaintiff alleges that a special
counsel depletes the Attorney General of sole prosecuting power because state
statute guarantees powers similar to that of the Attorney General.2 As such, Plaintiff
argues that the Attorney General cannot appoint an individual who is not politically
qualified to retain the same prosecuting power as he does. This is wrong for several
reasons. The text of the state constitution clearly defers to the legislature to define
the Attorney General’s duties. In a traditional sense, some officials “exercise
powers…left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law
found in the Constitution,” but a larger portion of them “are the creation of statutory
law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by that law.” The Floyd
Acceptances, 74 U.S. 666, 677 (1868). It is worth noting that, in the United States,
1 Lynch, Kevin. “Preliminary Injunctions in Public Law: The Merits.” 60 Hous. L. Rev. 1067,
1084 (2023).
2 E.g. the ability to bring charges in a manner such as the Attorney General, deciding how much
information is released, and reducing the amount of special counsel supervision.
3
“the structure of the [Attorney General] [is] the product of statute and common
law.”3 The circumstances are no different in Ridgeway.
Generally, “[w]here the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular
power…the power is 'either delegated to the state government or retained by the
people’” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 847-848 (1995).
Ridgeway state law—primarily 2 R. Stat. § 2215—governs the appointment of
special counsel. Under that statute, the Attorney General may “appoint a special
counsel to investigate [public officials]” Id. The special counsel has “the authority
and ability to exercise…functions as the Attorney General” 2 R. Stat. § 2217. The
special counsel also reserves full discretion in “consult[ing] the Attorney General
about the[ir] conduct” 2 R. Stat. § 2218. In the course of his duties, the special
counsel is immune from “day-to-day supervision by a member of the Attorney
General’s Office” 2 R. Stat. § 2220. Plaintiff contends that special counsel is
‘unaccountable’ because the position—as defined by state statute—wields the
Attorney General’s “sole prosecuting power” RID. CONST. ART IV, § V.
The special counsel is not as unaccountable as Plaintiff suggests. Under 2 R.
Stat. §§ 2216, 2219, and 2221, for example, the special counsel is, in the sequence
provided, subject to: (i) limitations of his jurisdiction; (ii) compliance with rules and
3 See generally Lacy H. Thornburg, “Changes in the State's Law Firm: The Powers, Duties and
Operations of the Office of the Attorney General.” 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343 (1990).
4
regulations set forth by the Attorney General; and (iii) accountability for a violation
of those rules and regulations or for misconduct. To that point, “[i]t is presumed that
public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the rules
of law” New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 560 (1905).
Plaintiff does not allege that Special Counsel Stickza violated any rules; in fact, he
fails to mention any of laws that govern accountability for the special counsel.
Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits because his claim relies on the
premise that the special counsel is entirely unaccountable. This claim is easily
confuted by a reading of state statutes which impose figurative ‘order’ upon the
special counsel and the limitations of his duties. From start to finish, the Attorney
General maintains discretion in “the [scope of] jurisdiction in which the special
counsel may operate” Id. at § 2216. If the Attorney General could not limit or
broaden the scope of the special counsel’s investigations, Special Counsel Stickza
would be deemed an ‘unaccountable’ official; but in its current condition, state
statute sufficiently permits the Attorney General to restrain his jurisdiction and
enforce departmental rules and regulations. Because existing state law does not
impose some ‘blanket immunity’ from accountability against the special counsel,
Plaintiff’s claim that Special Counsel Stickza is not accountable necessarily fails.
5
II. PLAINTIFF WILL NOT SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IN ABSENCE OF A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FROM THIS COURT.
A. Reputational Injury To Defendants In The Course of a Criminal
Prosecution Does Not Establish Irreparable Injury.
Even if Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits—which he is not—
preliminary relief is not warranted because the movant cannot demonstrate
irreparable injury, an essential element that Plaintiff must establish to obtain the
extraordinary remedy they seek. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)
(“[T]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable
harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959)). In Plaintiff’s Motion, he argues that because he is
being prosecuted by a so-called ‘unconstitutional’ special counsel, he “sustains
significant reputational damage, harming his chances in future elections” [PMI 1, ¶
12] While this is true in an ordinary sense, the notion that a public official ‘suffers’
irreparable injury shifts in criminal proceedings.
Injuries that are merely “incidental to every criminal proceeding brought
lawfully and in good faith” do not constitute “irreparable injury that justifies an
injunction” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 614 (1975) (quoting Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)). Plaintiff—the Governor—was indicted
on one count of Conspiracy to Commit a Crime. In Plaintiff’s own words, he is “an
important government figure” [PMI 1, ¶ 12]. Nonetheless, like any ordinary
6
individual, Plaintiff suffers a comparable reputational injury that is merely
incidental in the nature of criminal proceedings. As such, Plaintiff’s self-proclaimed
“loss of political support, voters, and the goodwill of the public” Id., neither holds
merit nor constitutes a sufficient showing of adequate irreparable injury.
B. Plaintiff Has Not “Alleged” a Violation of a Constitutional Right.
“[T]he alleged violation of a constitutional right” results in a presumption of
irreparable harm. Id., at ¶ 13 (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (1996)).
Defendants agree. Defendants disagree, however, that Plaintiff argues—or has ever
argued—that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of a constitutional right.
Plaintiff’s only argument is that the appointment of special counsel is
unconstitutional, not that he has been deprived of any constitutionally protected
right. And, even if Plaintiff did argue that the appointment of special counsel
deprives him of constitutional protections, he would be wrong—the text governing
the Attorney General’s prosecuting power does not constitute a protected ‘liberty.’
So, even if Plaintiff’s allegations are true—that the appointment of special counsel
is unconstitutional—there are simply no liberties protected under this clause.
III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST STRONGLY WEIGH
AGAINST ANY PRELIMINARY RELIEF.
Plaintiff has not established that either the balance of equities or the public
interest weighs in their favor. It is cautioned that “courts of equity should pay
particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy
7
of injunction” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). In cases
that involve the public interest defined by legislation, “courts have long held that
equitable discretion ‘must be exercised in light of the large objectives of the Act.
For the standards of the public interest not the requirements of private litigation
measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases’” United States v.
Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944) (emphasis added). Indeed, “a court sitting in equity cannot
ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.” United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 497 (2001).
State legislators determine that granting the Attorney General the power to
limit the jurisdiction of special counsel and enforce department regulations prevents
an ‘unaccountable’ independent prosecutor. The State Legislature is correct. Like the
United States Department of Justice, a Special Counsel’s jurisdiction of a Special
Counsel is established by the Attorney General.4 This permits the Attorney General
to limit or expand a Special Counsel’s scope of investigation. The public ought to
feel confident that an independent prosecutor does not retain uncontrollable power.
And with Ridgeway’s laws, this concern is put to rest—a Special Counsel cannot
‘take over’ the Attorney General and his constitutionally-protected powers.
4 (E.g., 28 CFR Code § 600)
8
The effects of a preliminary injunction would place a cloud of uncertainty
over state law, impede the clear-cut restrictions of a Special Counsel, and displace
the policy judgments of those elected to make them. Such extraordinary judicial
intervention would be unwarranted because of Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate,
among other things, how they might be harmed, much less suffer irreparable injury.
In short, “the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation,” Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. at 497, as to the public interest, far outweighs
any alleged equities that Plaintiff attempts to skew in his Motion.
CONCLUSION
The motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
Dated: March 15, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully Submitted.
TECHIEY
STICKZA
PRO-SE DEFENDANTS
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2461
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
We, the undersigned defendants, do hereby certify that a copy of this
document and the contents thereof have been served upon the opposing counsel and
all parties pertinent to the pursuance of the above-entitled matter and all proceedings
within it on March 15, 2024.
Dated: March 15, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully Submitted.
TECHIEY
STICKZA
PRO-SE DEFENDANTS
MATRIX_OC,
Plaintiff,
v.
TECHIEY; and
STICKZA,
Defendants.
