Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2461 MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants Techiey and Stickza, proceeding on their own behalfs, hereby requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(2) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Attached hereto is a memorandum of law in support of Defendants’ Motion. Dated: March 14, 2024 Palmer, Ridgeway. Respectfully Submitted. TECHIEY STICKZA PRO-SE DEFENDANTS MATRIX_OC, Plaintiff, v. TECHIEY; and STICKZA, Defendants. SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2461 ATTORNEY GENERAL TECHIEY AND SPECIAL COUNSEL STICKZA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT MATRIX_OC, Plaintiff, v. TECHIEY; and STICKZA, Defendants. i. TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities .................................................................................................ii Preliminary Statement .............................................................................................1 Legal Standard ........................................................................................................4 I. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted .............4 Arguments ...............................................................................................................4 I. The Appointment of Special Counsel is Constitutional .....................4 A. The Constitution Empowers the Attorney General to Delegate and Form Prosecutorial Positions and Offices ....4 B. Criminal Proceedings Are Not ‘Unconstitutional’ If Special Counsel Brings The Charges ..............................................8 C. State Statute Governing Special Counsel Appointments Do Not Yield An “Unaccountable” Force Separate From The Attorney General.................................................................9 II. State Criminal Proceedings Cannot Be Enjoined. .............................9 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................12 Certificate of Service ..............................................................................................13 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Statutes Page 1 R. Stat. § 3201 ......................................................................................................1 2 R. Stat. §§ 2217, 2218, and 2220 .........................................................................5 2 R. Stat. § 2216 ......................................................................................................6 2 R. Stat. §§ 2219 and 2221 ....................................................................................8 Court Cases Page Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007) .......................................3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 664 (2009)..............................................................3 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 289 (1964) ...........................................................4 Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) ..........................4 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ......................................................4 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 844 (2008)......................................................4 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 431 (1969) ....................................................7 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 418 (1997) ...............................................7 Juluke v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..........................................9 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) ...............................................9 McKee v. Rudolph, 12 F.2d 148, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1926) ...........................................9 Jacobs v. Ramirez, 400 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) .............................................9 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398 (1979) ..............................................................................10 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944) .............................................10 State of Ridgeway v. Lx1nas III, 1 Rid. 46, 59 (2022) ............................................10 Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (1941) ........................................10 largeTitanic2 v. NevPlaysGames, 1 Rid. 80, 85 (2023) ..........................................10 Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) ....................................11 2 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Governor Matrix_OC, alongside several co-defendants, was indicted by the Grand Jury on March 12, 2024, for his involvement in a conspiracy to unlawfully remove two guardsmen from their positions in a retaliatory manner. One day after receiving his indictment, Matrix_OC filed this civil action against Attorney General Techiey and Special Counsel Stickza. Matrix alleges that the criminal proceedings from his March 12 indictment are unconstitutional because the Attorney General lacks constitutional authority to appoint special counsel. To support this claim, Matrix brings a single cause of action—1 R. Stat. § 3201—which challenges the constitutionality of a ‘policy, order, procedure, or directive.’ Matrix alleges that the appointment of special counsel is unconstitutional because the power vested to the position negates the ‘sole prosecution power’ granted to the Attorney General. Furthermore, Matrix alleges that the special counsel is a fully autonomous force with no oversight nor supervision from the Attorney General. As such, Matrix argues that the appointment of special counsel automatically makes criminal proceedings filed by the special counsel unconstitutional. However, a quick and simple reading of state law depletes Matrix of this claim—the special counsel is neither fully autonomous nor unconstitutional. As demonstrated below, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s one and only claim. Plaintiff has failed to plead allegations which would agree with his 3 proposition that the text of the state constitution prevents the Attorney General from appointing special counsel—this flawed interpretation is contradicted by simple legal rules. Plaintiff is also wrong to suggest that the mere appointment of special counsel makes criminal proceedings unconstitutional. This is, of course, the entire purpose of an independent body of jurors—while the special counsel brings the charges, the grand jury files them. Plaintiff is also mistaken that this Court retains jurisdiction to redress his claims with the requested relief. The rules of equity forbade this Court—a court of equity—from issuing an injunction restraining criminal proceedings. And even in light of the exceptions to this rule, Plaintiff does not satisfy any mitigating circumstance which would permit this Court to issue such an injunction. Furthermore, if this Court enjoins Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings, it will burden judicial officers because, in its functional state, an injunction will not be carried about by the prosecuting officers, but instead the court itself—this is forbidden by the Supreme Court of Ridgeway. This case relies on flawed interpretation and strawman arguments to survive. In the eyes of the law, such a case cannot even survive lenient scrutiny. Matrix fails to plead allegations which would entitle him to relief and overlooks the Court’s lack of jurisdiction in this matter. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court should 4 dismiss the one and only count in the Complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction under Rid. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(2). LEGAL STANDARD I. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). These rules are virtually identical when one compares them to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—namely, Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2) to Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). For this case to proceed, the civil complaint, and all the facts therein, must be “plausible on [their] face.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007). Even if all the facts of the civil complaint were taken as true, it is not enough for this complaint to make its course through this Court. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 664 (2009) (holding that claims must be dismissed if the facts do not “entitle the Plaintiff to relief”). Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. ARGUMENT I. The Appointment of Special Counsel is Constitutional. A. The Constitution Empowers the Attorney General to Delegate and Form Prosecutorial Positions and Offices. Article IV, Section V, of the Ridgeway Constitution provides that the Attorney General is the “Chief Prosecutor and Chief Attorney of the State…[who] shall have the sole power to prosecute…and to enact other duties as prescribed by law” RID. 5 CONST. ART IV, § V. Plaintiff hinges his cause of action on the premise that the Attorney General is the only individual who retains prosecutorial duties in the state, and that he cannot delegate Special Counsel to handle those duties. Indeed, Plaintiff believes that the Attorney General “maintains no control whatsoever over their duties and is unable to remove them from their position” Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 6. As such, Plaintiff alleges that the Attorney General unconstitutionally appointed Stickza to Special Counsel. We disagree. This Court’s reading of Article IV, Section V, must “effectuate the intent and purposes of the Framers” Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 289 (1964). Furthermore, it is important to consider “‘our whole experience’ as a Nation.” Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)). While in a traditional sense this form of textual construction has applied to reading the United States Constitution, the text of our state constitution must be examined in a similar manner. In doing so, this Court should also “give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of its adoption by the people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 844 (2008) First, Attorney General Techiey may delegate duties and positions—including Special Counsel—under the Ridgeway Constitution. The construction of Article IV, Section V, is simple: (1) the Attorney General has the “sole power to prosecute”; and (2) he may “enact other duties as prescribed by law” ART IV, § V, supra. We address 6 these clauses individually in their respective sequences. Obviously, the Framers’ intent for the former clause is not to preclude the formation of prosecutorial positions and offices by the Attorney General. The general understanding of this clause is that the Attorney General holds the primary authority to prosecute cases on behalf of the state. To that end—as scholarly analysis has confirmed— “the constitutional provisions do not expressly define all the powers and functions of the office.’”1 And, usually, “the structure of the office [is] the product of statute and common law.”2 Relying solely on the text of the state constitution to govern the Attorney General’s authority is woefully insufficient to address the nature of his duties. Indeed, “the written state constitution need not and should not be the only reference.”3 When delegating prosecutorial power to an independent prosecutor, the Attorney General relies on the provisions of 2 R. Stat. §§ 2217, 2218, and 2220; these provisions govern the Special Counsel’s Office. Under state law, the Special Counsel, while an ‘outside’ officer, is still held to the standards and regulations set forth by the Attorney General. Simply adopting prosecutorial discretion does not usurp the state constitutions’ delegation of “sole power to prosecute” given to the 1 TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE GOVERNMENT 193 (1967). 2 See generally Lacy H. Thornburg, “Changes in the State's Law Firm: The Powers, Duties and Operations of the Office of the Attorney General.” 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343 (1990). In 44 states the attorney general is established in the constitution, and in six states by statute. 3 Matheson, Scott, Jr. “Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General.” University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 1. 7 Attorney General. This is not new, and in the context of special counsel investigations, the Attorney General retains supervision and control over the prosecutorial powers of independent counsel.4 The latter clause also breaks down Plaintiff’s one and only argument: the Attorney General reserves the right—as expressly mentioned in the state constitution—to create and enforce duties prescribed by law. Special Counsel appointments are governed by state law, and, by that very nature, the Attorney General retains full discretion and oversight of prosecutorial activity. The mere existence of an independent counsel does not deplete the Attorney General—nor any other prosecutorial officer—of his ‘prosecuting power’ because, as the text makes clear, the “sole power to prosecute” does not mean that the Attorney General is the only individual who may prosecute criminal offenses in the state. The textual considerations make clear that the constitution not only empowers the Attorney General to appoint independent counsel, but that it also relies on a legislative body to expound the Attorney Generals’ powers and duties. Plaintiffs’ claims are not redressable because—among other things—the unambiguous understanding of Article IV, Section V, depletes them of their one and only claim challenging the appointment of independent counsel. The Attorney 4 See 2 R. Stat. § 2216 (The Attorney General shall provide the jurisdiction in which the special counsel may operate); see also 2 R. Stat. § 2219 (The Special Counsel shall comply with all rules and procedures of the Attorney General’s Office). 8 General reserves discretion over all prosecutorial decisions in the state; however, simply delegating prosecutorial duties to a regulated, independent counsel, is not unconstitutional. If the flawed logic that the Attorney General is the one and only individual who may prosecute criminal offenses is accepted, centuries of textual construction and interpretation will be negatively impacted, and justice will falter under the most lenient forms of scrutiny. Therefore, this Court must dismiss. B. Criminal Proceedings Are Not Inherently ‘Unconstitutional’ If Independent Counsel Investigates and Brings The Charges. By default, the grand jury is designed to “interpose an independent body of citizens between the accused and the prosecuting attorney and the court” Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 431 (1969). Plaintiff suggests that the criminal proceedings against BrandonnLUV, RoyaltySyn, and Matrix_OC are inherently unconstitutional because the Attorney General appointed Special Counsel to lead the prosecution. But even if the Plaintiff’s Complaint is accepted as true, this Court cannot not reasonably conclude from the allegations that the involvement of Special Counsel immediately nullifies the decision of an independent panel of jurors who “exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence…” Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 418 (1997). Plaintiff has failed to state in a reasonable manner that the unconstitutionality of the appointment of special counsel means that any criminal proceedings from his investigation are also unlawful. Therefore, no relief in this matter can be issued, and the claims must be dismissed. 9 C. State Statute Governing Special Counsel Appointments Do Not Yield An “Unaccountable” Force Separate From The Attorney General. Plaintiff challenges three state laws that govern the appointment of special counsel. Specifically, he challenges 2 R. Stat. §§ 2217, 2218, and 2220. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that that these laws “intrude[] upon [the] exclusive power of the Attorney General[] which makes the Special Counsel unaccountable” Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 25. However, Plaintiff omits two other provisions under the same section—2 R. Stat. §§ 2219 and 2221—which establish several measures to hold the special counsel accountable. Section 2219 provides that the special counsel “shall comply with all rules and procedures of the Attorney General’s Office,” Id. at 2219. On the other hand, Section 2221 states that the special counsel “shall be subject to disciplinary action for misconduct and breach of ethical duties…to the same extent as are other employees of the Attorney General's Office” Id. at 2221. Plaintiff excludes the remaining provisions of this state law because it is detrimental to his case—the special counsel is not fully independent, and any individual appointed to that position is held to the same standards as an ordinary employee. The special counsel is hardly unaccountable, contrary to Plaintiff’s claim. II. State Criminal Proceedings Cannot Be Enjoined. Plaintiff asks this Court to enter an injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the criminal prosecution against Plaintiff and his co-defendants. To the 10 extent that there is no party to enjoin, and that active criminal proceedings cannot be enjoined, this Court cannot favorably redress Plaintiff’s claims with relief. i. This Court Cannot Redress Plaintiff’s Claims Because It Lacks Jurisdiction to Enjoin Active Criminal Proceedings. As a general rule, “when the civil action does not seek to enjoin an ongoing prosecution and where the movants are not being prosecuted, an injunction may issue” Juluke v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1987); C.f. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975).5 Plaintiff seeks to enjoin active criminal proceedings where he, the movant in this case, is being prosecuted. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails even the simplest of requirements. To that end, equity cannot take jurisdiction to “stay criminal proceedings already commenced” McKee v. Rudolph, 12 F.2d 148, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1926). For this reason, the Plaintiff’s prayer for relief lacks legal grounds. As such, his claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Jacobs v. Ramirez, 400 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a complaint may be dismissed on these grounds “only if there are no legal grounds upon which relief may be 5 In Doran, two businesses sought an injunction against Doran, a law enforcement officer, claiming that a local ordinance violates their constitutional rights. Their injunction was denied. Later, after being summoned to criminal proceedings, their injunction was granted. Doran appealed, arguing that the injunction should have been denied because of active criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating, “[n]o state proceedings were pending against [the businesses]…” Doran, 422 U.S. 922, 930. To the contrary, if proceedings were active or pending against the businesses, the injunction would have been arbitrary. Because Plaintiff and his co-defendants are actively being prosecuted, an injunction cannot be granted. 11 granted”) (emphasis added). To this point, Plaintiff is also not entitled to injunctive relief because he has failed to plead allegations that, if taken as true, would “appear[] to a certainty that [he] is entitled to [relief]” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398 (1979). ii. The Rules of Equity Forbade Injunctions Restraining Criminal or Quasi-Criminal Proceedings. Equity is “the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims” See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944); see also State of Ridgeway v. Lx1nas III, 1 Rid. 46, 59 (2022). Plaintiff seeks to bend the rules of equity and reconcile an interest in criminal proceedings. However, the issue here boils down to a simple concept: equity jurisdiction. This Court lacks equity jurisdiction over criminal proceedings. See Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U.S. 45, 49 (1941) (affirming “courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions”). While in some instances this Court may enjoin criminal proceedings—such as when the party files suit in advance to the filing of criminal charges—there is no real interest in obtaining an injunction; simply put, injunctions resolving private matters have no functional purpose in the administration of criminal justice. iii. An Injunction Is Not Enforceable Against Any Parties. “For an injunction to be enforceable, it needs a person who it can be enforced upon” largeTitanic2 v. NevPlaysGames, 1 Rid. 80, 85 (2023). Plaintiff seeks an 12 injunction against the Attorney General and Special Counsel from continuing criminal proceedings against him. Although the Defendants oversee the prosecution of the case, they cannot just halt the proceedings if this Court ordered such. In fact, “the only persons able to carry into effect such an order are judicial officers” Id. at 86. Neither the Attorney General nor Special Counsel have the authority to vacate the criminal proceedings as Plaintiff desires; instead, the judicial officers of this Court would have to voluntarily conform to the ruling and dismiss it themselves. As the Supreme Court of Ridgeway unequivocally affirmed in largeTitanic2, “judicial officers, including their clerks, are totally immune from equitable remedy” Id. (quoting Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021)). For this reason, an injunction cannot be entered against Defendants because, in its functional state, the injunction would impose a burden upon court employees to effectuate the ruling by dismissing and/or staying the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. This fact alone, among other things, demands that this Court dismiss the Complaint. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, for at least one of the two grounds. 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2461 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE We, the undersigned defendants, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and the contents thereof have, on March 14, 2024, been served upon the opposing counsel and all parties pertinent to the pursuance of the above-entitled matter and all proceedings within it. Dated: March 14, 2024 Palmer, Ridgeway. Respectfully Submitted. TECHIEY STICKZA PRO-SE DEFENDANTS MATRIX_OC, Plaintiff, v. TECHIEY; and STICKZA, Defendants.

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