STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Governor Matrix_oc )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-2461
JUDGE. HON. _______
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff
v.
Techiey,
in his official capacity as Attorney General;
Stickza,
in his official capacity as Special Counsel
Defendants
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff Matrix_oc, Governor of the Great State of Ridgeway, hereby moves for this
Court to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Attorney General Techiey from enforcing or
acting under Section 6.4 of the Judiciary Act (or, more specifically, under 2 R. Stat. § 2217,
2218, and 2220) and Special Counsel Stickza from invoking any power under the authority of the
same, including but not limited to pursuing the prosecuting of Governor Matrix_oc.
ARGUMENT
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 1) they are likely
to succeed on the merits; 2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; 3)
the balance of equities and hardships is in favor of the plaintiff; and 4) whether that injunction is
in the public interest.” Titanic v. Nev, 1 Rid. 80, 98 (2023) (citing Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “In a case against the government, the public
interest is already accounted for in the balance of equities portion of the test and is therefore not
required to be explicitly proven or denied.” Id., at 99.
2. PLAINTIFF SATISFIES THE TEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
a. Plaintiff is Likely to Succeed on the Merits
Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his challenge to Section 6.4 of the Judiciary
Act (or, more specifically, under 2 R. Stat. § 2217, 2218, and 2220). The Constitution of the State
of Ridgeway provides that “There shall be an Attorney General who is the Chief Prosecutor and
Chief Attorney of the State; and shall have the sole power to prosecute; and to enact other duties
as prescribed by law.” Rid. Const., Art. IV, § V. (emphasis added). The word “sole” vests the
Attorney General with an exclusive power — one which no one else may exercise. As the
Supreme Court of the United States explained regarding a similar provision in Nixon v. United
States, “the word ‘sole’ indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else.”
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993). The Court went on to say that “[t]he
commonsense meaning of the word ‘sole’ is that the Senate alone shall have authority to
determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted. The dictionary definition
bears this out. ‘Sole’ is defined as ‘having no companion,’ ‘solitary,’ ‘being the only one,’ and
‘functioning ... independently and without assistance or interference.” Id., at 231 (citing
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2168 (1971)).
Certainly, our Constitution expects that the Attorney General will have subordinate
officers who assist in carrying out his lofty duties. However, the prosecutorial power must
ultimately belong to the Attorney General alone. Analogizing to the President of the United
States, “These lesser officers must remain accountable to the President, whose authority they
wield. As [James] Madison explained, ‘[I]f any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is
the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.’” Seila Law
LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020)
(citing 1 Annals of Cong. 463 (1789)).
Section 6.4 of the Judiciary Act, which permits the Attorney General to appoint
unaccountable and wholly independent Special Counsels removable only for cause, violates
Article IV, Section V, of the Constitution of the State of Ridgeway. The provision meaningfully
dilutes the Attorney General’s “sole power to prosecute.” Rid. Const., Art. IV, § V.
This is at odds with our whole system of constitutional governance. Indeed, again
analogizing to the President, “[t]he Framers deemed an energetic executive essential to ‘the
protection of the community against foreign attacks,’ ‘the steady administration of the laws,’ ‘the
protection of property,’ and ‘the security of liberty.’ Accordingly, they chose not to bog the
Executive down with the ‘habitual feebleness and dilatoriness’ that comes with a ‘diversity of
views and opinions.’ Instead, they gave the Executive the ‘[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch’ that ‘characterise the proceedings of one man.’” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2203 (citing The Federalist No. 70, at 471-6 (A.
Hamilton)). “To justify and check that authority—unique in our constitutional structure—the
Framers made the President the most democratic and politically accountable official in
Government. Only the President (along with the Vice President) is elected by the entire Nation.
And the President's political accountability is enhanced by the solitary nature of the Executive
Branch, which provides ‘a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people.’” Ibid.
(citing The Federalist No. 70, at 479 (A. Hamilton)). Therefore, “the President ‘cannot delegate
ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it,’ because Article II
‘makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch.’” Ibid. (quoting
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–497
(2010)).
“The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the
laws also gives him the power to do so… Without such power, the President could not be held
fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.
Such diffusion of authority ‘would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of
the chief magistrate himself.’” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S., at 513-4. (quoting The Federalist
No. 70, at 478).
“The resulting constitutional strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except
for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to the people through regular
elections. In that scheme, individual executive officials will still wield significant authority, but
that authority remains subject to the ongoing supervision and control of the elected President.
Through the President's oversight, ‘the chain of dependence [is] preserved,’ so that ‘the lowest
officers, the middle grade, and the highest” all ‘depend, as they ought, on the President, and the
President on the community.’” Ibid. (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 499 (J. Madison)).
The Special Counsel provisions of the Judiciary Act contravene this carefully calibrated
system by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single individual accountable
to no one. The Special Counsel is neither elected nor controlled by someone who is. He wields
power that the Constitution designates for the elected Attorney General alone. This independent
official “has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at Conference of United States Attorneys
(Apr. 1, 1940).
Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which held that Congress could provide for the
appointment of an independent counsel outside the supervision of the executive branch, does not
shield defendants’ conduct for two reasons. First, Morrison is wrong — egregiously wrong. The
decision ought not be binding upon this court. The Supreme Court of Ridgeway has made clear
that courts generally should defer to federal or state precedent when there is a mirroring of rules
or clauses. It has not, however, held that these decisions are binding. Justice Scalia’s powerful
dissent in Morrison has borne fruit, and the coercive decision must be rejected. Second,
Morrison is inapplicable to the current case. The Supreme Court held that an Independent
Counsel was constitutional because the Appointments Clause of Article II says “the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Since the Court concluded that the Independent Counsel was an inferior office, his appointment
by a special court created by Congress was lawful. Our Constitution, however, admits of no
difference between principal and inferior officers. Deference to other courts for guidance on
relative issues is done when provisions of our law or constitution have been obviously derived
from some other source. Indeed, “[o]wing to the mirroring of these rules, this Court tends to rely
on federal precedent to guide its interpretation of relative issues.” 1 Rid. 101, 104 (2023) (citing
Titanic v. Nev, 1 Rid. at 84; State v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. 46, 46, 51, 52-54 (2023)). “We believe that
where a provision from our Constitution has obviously been derived from a provision of a
real-life state constitution, we should adopt the interpretation of the provision from that state’s
highest appellate court.” State v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. at 51. The Ridgeway Constitution does not have
an appointments clause obviously derived from the United States Constitution, nor does the latter
have a clause giving the Attorney General the “sole power to prosecute” like the former. Rid.
Const., Art. IV, § V. (emphasis added). Morrison also concerned intra-branch appointments,
while this case deals with unconstitutional sub-delegation within a single branch. For the
aforementioned reasons, Morrison — even if correct — would be an inappropriate and
inapplicable guide on this issue.
Given the abhorrent nature of the Special Counsel to the Constitution of the State of
Ridgeway, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
b. Plaintiff is Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm Without the Injunction
Absent an injunction from this court, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm — harm he is
already suffering due to Defendant’s unlawful and unconstitutional conduct — for two reasons.
First, Each day that Plaintiff’s unconstitutional and unaccountable prosecution continues
for, Plaintiff — an important government figure — sustains significant reputational damage,
harming his chances in future elections. “Irreparable harm ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that
compensation in money alone cannot atone for it.’” Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent
Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187 (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 372 (3d Cir.1987)
(citation omitted)). “Grounds for finding irreparable injury include loss of control of reputation,
loss of trade, and loss of good will.” Ibid. Plaintiff ‘s loss of political support, voters, and the
goodwill of the public are irreparable harms which cannot be remedied through monetary
compensation.
Second, Plaintiff will endure irreparable damage to his constitutional rights as a citizen of
the State of Ridgeway. He has been unconstitutionally indicted and prosecuted by an official
unlawfully weidling power that is not his. These events not only harm Plaintiff’s reputation, but
threaten criminal penalties. “[T]he alleged violation of a constitutional right” results in a
presumption of irreparable harm. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (1996).
c. The Balance of Equities and Hardships is in Favor of the Plaintiff
In addressing the Balance of Hardships and Equities, we must demonstrate that if this
injunction is denied, the harm to the movant outweighs the harm to the respondent if the
injunction is granted. Plaintiff faces the loss of his liberty, the continued violation of his rights,
immense reputational damage, and the loss of public trust should Defendants’ unlawful actions
persist. All of these damages are permanent and irreparable. If this injunction is granted, the
damage to the state would be limited. Section 6.4 of the Judiciary Act (or, more specifically,
under 2 R. Stat. § 2217, 2218, and 2220) and actions thereunder would not be permanently
enjoined from enforcement, but only temporarily pending the resolution of this case. If the
injunction is denied, however, the continuance of an overt deprivation of constitutionally
protected rights are further jeopardized and the usurpation of constitutional power continued.
The balance of equities tips in favor of the Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that his motion for a preliminary
injunction be granted and that this Court enjoin Attorney General Techiey from enforcing or
acting under Section 6.4 of the Judiciary Act (or, more specifically, under 2 R. Stat. § 2217,
2218, and 2220) and Special Counsel Stickza from invoking any power under the authority of the
same, including but not limited to pursuing the prosecuting of Governor Matrix_oc.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Totoro987123, Esq.
State Bar No. 17148
Counsel of Record
/s/ Turntable5000, Esq.
State Bar No. 17111
/s/ David Clarke
Managing Partner
Clarke and Associates, LLP
State Bar No. 17134
