MOTION TO DISMISS PLEADING FORM MT-69
STATE OF RIDGEWAY (FORM MT-69) (Rev. 2024)
Crim. Action No. 04-2024-CV-002454-F018 Document 01 Filed 3/15/24 Page 1/13 PageID #:1
RIDGEWAY STATE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MANDATORYMORALE,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CM-2454
Presiding Judge: Hon. siteowner
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant mandatorymorale, proceeding by and through the undersigned counsel,
requests that this court dismiss the above-mentioned matter because the State has failed to
include the elements necessary to bring these charges against the defendant. Attached below is a
memorandum of law in support of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
DATED: March 15, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
DavidLClarke, Esq.
R. Bar No. 17134
Clarke & Associates, LLP
Counsel of Record
AlexJCabot, Esq.
R. Bar No. 17128
Arthur_Chen, Esq.
R. Bar No. 20104
notsfeelings, Esq.
R. Bar No. 21101
Clarke & Associates, LLP
turntable5000, Esq.
R. Bar No. 17111
Attorneys for the Defendant
1
LAW OFFICES OF CLARK & ASSOCIATES, LLP
Crim. Action No. 04-2024-CV-002454-F018 Filed 3/15/24 Page 2/12
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is a criminal prosecution concerning two counts: (1) Obstruction of Justice
R.C.C. §2.07 and (2) Failure to Comply R.C.C. §2.04. This motion to dismiss requests that this
court dismiss the charges presented against the defendant on the grounds that the necessary
elements required to charge the defendant with these crimes are absent in the true bill of
indictment presented against him.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Failure to State an Offense
The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure is by no means an exhaustive list that
contains every single motion that may be submitted. However, it has taken significant inspiration
from various states and their rules of criminal procedure, which in turn takes significant
inspiration from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. “Owing to the mirroring of these rules,
this Court tends to rely on federal precedent to guide its interpretation of relative issues.”
Lazerify v. StudsPerSecond, 1 Rid. 101, 104 (2023) (citing Titanic v. Nev, 1 Rid. at 84; State v.
Lx1nas, 1 Rid. 46, 46, 51, 52-54 (2023)). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may be
viewed as a guiding authority with respect to the scope of Rule 13 of the Ridgeway Rules of
Criminal Procedure which authorizes pre-trial motions.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a Defendant may move to dismiss
charges because the state “fail[ed] to state an offense.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(b)(v). If an
indictment “fails to include all of the essential elements of the charged offense,” then the
indictment is “defective.” United States v. Haggerty, 997 F. 3d 292, 296 (C.A. 5 2021); United
States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (C.A. 9 2020) (holding that the state’s failure to include an
essential element warranted dismissal of the indictment). Ancillary to this, a test to determine the
“sufficiency” of an indictment is to consider whether it holds the “essential elements of the
offense so that it fairly informs the defendant of the charges against him and adequately enables
the defendant to be protected against further prosecution for the same offense.” United States v.
Campbell, 685 F. 2d 131, 132 (C.A. 5 1982) (per curiam); see also Russell v. United States, 369
U.S. 749 (1962).
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Generally, a criminal defendant may move for dismissal of indictment based on an
“objection which is capable of determination without trial of the general issue [and] shall be
raised before trial by motion” for dismissal. Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(c)(2). An indictment must
“contain a caption as provided by law, together with a plain, concise description of the act which
constitutes the crime or an appropriate legal term descriptive thereof.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 4(a). If
the Government’s indictment, even with its facts taken as true, has failed to provide how the acts
alleged constitute a crime under the statutory offenses which a Defendant is charged with, then
dismissal must be entered. To succeed on this motion, we must demonstrate that the
Government’s indictment is impossible to succeed on at trial based solely on questions of law
and not of fact.
ARGUMENT
I. Exit Searches Are Not “Processes of Justice”
There are two elements of the charge of obstruction of justice: that (1) the accused
interferes with the process of justice and (2) the accused hinders any county official or law
enforcement officer from performing their duties. This section will cover the first element and
the next will cover the second. The actions alleged in the indictment bring forth the accusation
that the defendant refused to engage in a routine “exit search” after he had been discharged from
the Ridgeway National Guard and alleging that an “exit search” is somehow a ‘process of
justice’ under the meaning of this statute.
When reading a criminal statute, the court should “exercis[e] restraint [. . .] out of
deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), and
out of concern that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,’ McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).” Aguilar, 515 U.S., at 600 (1995). The construction of
criminal statutes must generally be handled with a conservative nature to avoid, for lack of a
better term, bastardizing the law to an amalgamation unrecognizable from its plain language.
By departing from well-settled law, the Department of Justice is automatically subject to
scrutiny as it begins to test a novel interpretation of the law. A criminal prosecution, “where an
individual’s reputation and liberty are at stake, is not the place to experiment with novel
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interpretations of state law.” U.S. v. Welch, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (D. Utah 2001).
Generally, “due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute that
neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.”
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 366 (1997). Here, not only are there dozens of cases that
have identified actual duties that have a basis in the law, but there is no prior judicial decision
that has disclosed that complying with an “exit search” falls within the ambit of the Obstruction
of Justice charge.
There are multiple cases where the Department of Justice has construed this charge
properly, with the first element in mind, supporting the construction where some kind of
criminal-related process is or was underway. Common ways to meet this standard include
obstructing police who are responding, making detainments, or otherwise handling a criminal
matter, see The People v. tfs2004, CCRC-CM-1409 (2021); State of Ridgeway v. PirateHookTail,
RSC-CM-762 (2022); State of Ridgeway v. d_arkshadws, RSC-CM-877 (2023), or by
obstructing or hindering a criminal investigation, see The People v. TomDonovanSmith,
CCRC-CM-1424 (2021); The People v. Gibster97, CCRC-CM-1549 (2021). The Superior Court
has also rejected a similar, but not identical, test of this construction of the charge, rejecting the
validity of a charge that “suggests that the defendant engaged in the act of ‘Obstruction of
Justice’ through the mere deletion of documents – not utilized in a criminal investigation.” See
State of Ridgeway v. BattalionGavin, RSC-CM-971 (2023) at 4. The U.S. Supreme Court has
past interpreted similar provisions revolving around terms like “the process of justice” to mean
one involving the judicial process. “The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to
influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence
some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's
authority.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). Whether this court accepts the
Ridgeway-specific precedent which includes police investigations (in light of the constraints and
reasonable exceptions necessary on Roblox) or the very specific United States precedent
regarding a necessity of including some kind of judicial proceeding, the standard to meet this
element is still missing under the current allegations.
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Defendant was not being investigated for any wronging which required the
administration of justice to follow. In fact, had the search continued without any alleged
hindrance, the likelihood of it going before the judiciary for pleas of justice or law enforcement
is very low. The Government may then contend that the search may later be used in a court
proceeding that Defendant would then frustrate if they hindered the initial search. Under a
constricted view of the statute, and based on the plain language of the penal code, Defendant’s
actions could not have knowingly hindered the process of justice even if the fruits of the search
were to be presented to a court at a later time. At the time of the search, they were not informed
of any active proceedings which would be frustrated or hindered had they acted how they acted.
An “exit search” is in no way a process of justice, especially under the meaning of the
statute here and the consistent construction by the Department of Justice and similarly, consistent
approval (and in one case, disapproval) of those usages by the court, because it has no relation to
any criminal matter or proceeding. Additionally, as evidenced in the next section, nowhere in the
law requires the execution of an exit search. The government cannot call any usual act it
undertakes a process of justice and then send people to jail when they make those processes
difficult. Any alleged interference or non-cooperation falls to irrelevance in fulfilling the first
element of count I, and thus this court must dismiss that charge under the failure to state an
offense standard established in Haggerty, supra.
II. No Official Duty Is Present as Military Exit Searches Lack a Statutory Basis
Also saliently missing in this case is the second element: an official duty. Duties imposed
upon law enforcement officers must have a statutory basis. Without this, it is not a duty under the
meaning of Obstruction of Justice. The charge criminalizes the “act of interfering with the
process of justice and hindering any . . . law enforcement officer from performing their duties.”
R.C.C. § 2.07 (emphasis added). The charge bifurcates into two elements where (1) the state
must demonstrate that the Defendant’s actions interfered with the process of justice and (2) the
state must also demonstrate that as a result of the Defendant’s actions, a law enforcement officer
was hindered from performing their duties. Even if the state contends that the duty was imposed
upon the officer through policy, that does not survive statutory scrutiny. In total, this segment
regarding dismissal is substantiated by three factors: (1) this is a novel interpretation of the law
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and the Department of Justice has never used these charges in such a setting, subsequently, it
must be scrutinized heavily; (2) exit searches are fruits of a standard search agreement, which is
a contractual creation, and cannot rise to the level of creating an “official duty” because it lacks
statutory backing; and (3) the contract between the employer and the employee ends once the
employee is no longer employed; the employee was served his discharge notice before being
requested to join in-game for a search and anything beyond that point solely relied on the
Defendant’s consent to be searched.
a. Novel Interpretations of Existing Laws Are Subject to Careful Review
The Department of Justice brings this court into murky waters as it begins to test a novel
interpretation of a law that has long maintained a settled meaning. Not only is it wholly
inappropriate to test such in a criminal forum, but it is also a travesty to pervert the language of
the statute. There are several cases, ranging from the days our state proceeded under a county
government, to recent cases involving the Obstruction of Justice charge, where the Department
of Justice utilized it in a lawful manner as intended and prescribed by the legislature. See The
People v. tfs2004, CCRC-CM-1409 (2021); The People v. TomDonovanSmith, CCRC-CM-1424
(2021); The People v. Gibster97, CCRC-CM-1549 (2021); State of Ridgeway v. PirateHookTail,
RSC-CM-762 (2022); State of Ridgeway v. d_arkshadws, RSC-CM-877 (2023). In every single
one of these cases, there was an actual incident where an individual hindered a county official or
a law enforcement officer from performing their duties. Their duties must be lawful and this can
only be prescribed by one authority: a law. A policy cannot masquerade as a law unless it is a
policy derived as a result of some statutory obligation; no such policy exists here as a result of
some statutory creation, only a contractual creation.
The prosecution, by using the criminal statute for conduct that is not “clearly covered,” is
barred from bringing it forward under the rule of lenity which resolves any ambiguity, if it is
present, in favor of the accused. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971);
United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). This prevents the prosecution from “giv[ing]
the text a meaning that is different from its ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the
defendant.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014). Exit searches are intrinsically
products of a contractual agreement between two parties and the enforcement mechanism is
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lodged in two venues: (1) a civil proceeding seeking relief based on a breach of contract; and (2)
an administrative proceeding to dishonorably discharge someone who has violated an internal
administrative policy. Instead, the Department of Justice has subverted the text of the statute and
has used it in an unfair manner that is not authorized as per the law.
b. Exit Searches Are Products of a Contractual Search Agreement
An individual cannot be searched by a government agent unless it is permitted by the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and by Section VIII of our state Constitution. In this
case, the agent of the government did not have probable cause to search the Defendant. Instead,
the Defendant voluntarily consented to being searched as a product of a contractual search
agreement that was signed as a pre-condition for the Defendant to maintain employment in the
Ridgeway State National Guard. Consent can be withdrawn at any time as it is a contract. Failing
to abide by the contract “can result in a termination or disbarment from employment with the
[employing entity].” Ridgeway County, Standard Search Agreement DA-10, ¶ 8. The
government is also authorized to “seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement.”
Id., at ¶ 6. However, criminal prosecution merely deprives the Defendant of their liberty and it
does not serve as a means to enforce a contract. The Standard Search Agreement is not a law in
and of itself; it is a contract signed between two consenting parties—the employer and the
employee. This is not to suggest that the Defendant is immune from prosecution on the basis that
the contract does not provide it as a means of enforcement, rather, the authority that permitted
the “exit search” emanates from a contract.
The state might try to invoke 3 R. Stat. § 1608 as justification for constructing exit
searches as an ‘official duty’, however, this is erroneous for several reasons. This statute
promulgates that “[t]he military police shall enforce all regulations of the National Guard, and
may use force necessary to achieve such a purpose.” 3 R. Stat. § 1608. This clause merely
defines the scope of their internal purpose which is to serve as a policing unit that engages in
“disciplinary proceeding[s] or investigation[s].” 3 R. Stat. § 1605. The contractual agreement
that provides for exit searches to exist does not rise to the level of a departmental policy and thus
is not subject to obtaining status as an “official duty” conducted by any person attempting to
conduct a search under the provisions of that agreement. Furthermore, even if the contractual
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agreement was to be held to the standard of departmental policy and thus held as an “official
duty,” the defendant was discharged from the National Guard prior to the military police
attempting to execute an exit search. As a non-member of the department, he is not subject to the
policies of that department, and thus the military police officer would not have had an “official
duty” to conduct with respect to the defendant as the would-be policy in question would not
apply to the defendant.
Defendant’s conduct during the search was entirely voluntary. Complying with a contract
is voluntary. Parties are free to approach a court of law and invoke their equity jurisdiction to
compel the other party to comply with the terms of the agreement. That is not what happened
here. Defendant’s decision to appear for the “exit search” was entirely voluntary and the
government agent’s decision to continue with the voluntary, consensual search was a personal
decision that he decided to make. It is not a hindrance to him if he chooses to engage in such
conduct; this is bolstered by the fact that conducting an “exit search” is not a lawful duty that
was imposed upon him by any statute in the State of Ridgeway.
c. Defendant Was No Longer Employed with the Ridgeway National Guard
Upon Being Requested to Join for a Search
When an individual is no longer employed by an agency in the State of Ridgeway, they
are no longer bound to any administrative policies. Some contracts, like non-disclosure
agreements, may have timeliness clauses added that may span well over a year, even after an
employee has left before the end of the clause’s set expiration date. The Grand Jury found that
the Defendant “hindered the search from proceeding after receiving a general discharge for
activity violations.” State of Ridgeway v. mandatorymorale, 24-221 (2024) (True Bill of
Indictment, Count #1) (emphasis added). The term “exit search” would imply that to exit
employment, an individual must be searched; the Ridgeway State National Guard had already
issued notice of the Defendant’s discharge before asking them to join a search. This is an
oversight entirely on their front and the Defendant cannot be penalized for their errors, yet that is
exactly what is happening in this case. From this point on, the Defendant then joined a voluntary
search. No legal, policy, or contractual clause obligated the agent of the government to continue
with the search, but he did so anyway. Every time that the Defendant “hindered” the agent of the
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government from continuing the search can reasonably be construed as a withdrawal of consent
under the Fourth Amendment. This action is supported by several cases, in which, an individual
who has consented to be searched may also revoke that consent at any time so long as no
incriminating fruits are found during the interim period that would justify the continuation of the
search. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 576 F. 2d 243, 244 (1978) (C.A.9 1978) (holding that “a
person who waives his rights under the Fourth Amendment by consenting to a search of his
personal records can revoke the consent at any time prior to completion of the search”); Mason v.
Pulliam, 557 F. 2d 426, 429 (C.A. 5 1977) (affirming the “right to withdraw [one’s] consent and
reinvoke [one’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”); Painter v. Robertson, 185 F. 3d 557, 567 (C.A. 6
1999) (holding that “the consenting party may limit the scope of that search, and hence at any
moment may retract his consent.”).
The decision to charge an individual on the grounds that they exercised their Fourth
Amendment rights is patently prohibited and outright unconstitutional. The agent of the
government voluntarily decided to continue with the search of the individual, and the
Defendant’s actions displayed that they were constant withdrawals of consent, with some
mannerisms that could be considered as subsequent invitations to continue the search.
Nonetheless, the agent of the government is the one who subjected himself to continue with the
search despite not being obligated to do so under any law, policy, or contractual clause. For these
reasons, the case must be dismissed as the agent of the government was not hindered by the
exercise of a constitutional right. Even if the Defendant had been subject to a search before his
discharge, the result would be the same as the basis for the search arose out of a contractual
agreement that can only be enforced through measures that do not include criminal prosecution
unless there is a violation of a state statute: this part is solely reserved for matters like dealing,
stockpiling, or other explicitly named offenses under the Standard Search Agreement. See e.g.,
Ridgeway County, Standard Search Agreement DA-10, ¶ 2, 4-5. One’s refusal to comply with a
search agreement that is not effectuated by probable cause does not amount to a hindrance to the
executing agent’s duties as there is no legal basis.
III. Failure to Comply Cannot Be Applied in the Shadow of a Falsely Applied
Obstruction of Justice.
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For a conviction to be sustained for Failure to Comply R.C.C. § 2.04, the state must
contend that the Defendant “disobey[ed] a lawful order which has been given by a peace officer
prior.” R.C.C. § 2.04. A lawful order can only be given if a peace officer is acting in line with an
official duty as promulgated by state law. If the court dismisses the Obstruction of Justice charge
because no official duty is present when a military police officer is conducting an “exit search,”
then all of the orders issued by him are not lawful. Orders must have a basis in the law for them
to be lawful. Indeed, the “official functions” must be defined as per state law. State of Ridgeway
v. mandatorymorale, 24-221 (2024) (True Bill of Indictment, Count #2).
CONCLUSION
The matter before the court is entirely one of law and not of fact. The facts remain plain
and simple. The government, in its indictment, has failed to properly establish all the essential
elements that are necessary to prosecute the Obstruction of Justice charge. The government has
failed to establish that “exit searches” are conducted to further the “process of justice.” By failing
to do so, this charge falls flat on its face and it must be dismissed. A law enforcement officer’s
duties must be established or bestowed upon him by a statute. Whereas here no statute exists
regarding “exit searches,” because they are purely contractual in nature, there is no lawful duty
that was hindered as a result of the Defendant’s actions, providing a second reason for the
charge’s failure.
Second, the Failure to Comply statute relies on the presence of a “lawful order.” This
charge relies on the applicability of the first charge, specifically the second element—one that
requires the government agent to conduct a duty that is specified by law. Because the
government agent was not conducting a duty that is recognized under the Obstruction of Justice
charge, any of his orders that were issued during the exit search are also not lawful as they have
no basis in the law.
Additionally, the Defendant was already discharged prior to receiving the notice for an
“exit search.” As such, the search conducted was purely consensual under the Fourth
Amendment and an individual can revoke consent at any time. To say that continually revoking
consent amounts to a criminal charge would be unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, this court must dismiss both charges.
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DATED: March 15, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
DavidLClarke, Esq.
R. Bar No. 17134
Clarke & Associates, LLP
Counsel of Record
notsfeelings, Esq.
R. Bar No. 21101
Clarke & Associates, LLP
turntable5000, Esq.
R. Bar No. 17111
Attorneys for the Defendant
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RIDGEWAY STATE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MANDATORYMORALE,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CM-2454
Presiding Judge: Hon. siteowner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this March 15th, 2024, a copy of the foregoing motion was
submitted to the Department of Justice via electronic submission. I further certify that an attempt
was made to contact the Department of Justice via smoke signals to notify them of said
submission.
turntable5000, Esq.
R. Bar No. 17111
Attorney for the Defendant
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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