STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SUPERIOR COURT
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Plaintiff
v.
Njthan
Defendant
_______________________________________/
Case No. _________
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2024, Njthan (“Defendant”), through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss
count one of the State’s (“government”) information claiming that the count one of the
information is constitutionally insufficient. The Defendant additionally argues that this violation
occurred when the government charged him with count one where the description did not contain
sufficient particularity. The government responded on May 23, 2024, through counsel, claiming
the total opposite of the Defendant’s argument with the government claiming that the information
does contain sufficient particularity and a reasonable description of the actual offense.
DISCUSSION
Criminal actions in Ridgeway begin with a criminal information which is known as a
charging document. The purpose of this document is to describe the action(s) of the Defendant
that violated the law. The criminal information (“information”, “charging document”) must
“contain a caption as provided by law, together with a plain, concise description of the act which
constitutes the crime or an appropriate legal term descriptive thereof.” Ridg. R. Crim. Pro. 4(a).
When an information is filed with the court, it will be filed along with an affidavit
supporting probable cause for an arrest warrant or for the summons of the Defendant. This
affidavit is not intended to serve in the place of the charging document because it is simply a
preliminary affidavit required specifically for probable cause means. Affiants for probable cause
are almost always police officers and they describe the actions of the Defendant that they believe
constitute a particular offense. But this does not mean that the government will bring charges
based solely on the affidavit. Ultimately, the charging document picks apart the individual
charges and respective allegations for each charge that they are alleging against the Defendant.
Individuals facing a criminal action in Ridgeway courts have a right “to demand the
cause and nature of the accusation” that the government has made. See Ridg. Const. Art. I, sec.
VI. Though, more importantly, “[a] defendant's right to notice of the charges against which he
must defend is well established.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1996) (citing In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)). It is fundamentally noted
that “the accused is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and that
a charge must be sufficiently definite to enable him to make his defense and avail himself of the
record of conviction or acquittal” Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83 (1908)
(emphasis added).
The true substance of count one reads as: “On or about February 19, 2024, the Defendant
knowingly caused the death of ReedDom by causing serious bodily injury using a Cline 911
pistol by shooting dead the Defendant.” Gov’ts Criminal Information ¶ 1. When the government
alleges that the Defendant knowingly caused the death of ReedDom (“Victim”) they include a
vital error in their pleading when they explain the serious bodily injury that was inflicted by the
Defendant. They plead that the Defendant essentially inflicted death upon himself.
When hearing a motion to dismiss for want of sufficient information, the court must first
determine whether the typographical error is fatal to the Defendant’s ability to mount his
defense. If a substantial right in this situation was not violated, then it would not warrant a
dismissal of the information. United States v. Morrison 449 U.S. 361 (1981). Defendants having
an opportunity to mount their defense is undoubtedly a right and the court must strike down any
obstacles which prejudicially trench upon the Defendant’s ability to defend himself.
Second-degree murder is a felony offense in Ridgeway and it reads as: “The act of
intentionally or knowingly causing death of an individual; or of causing, with intent, serious
bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes death of an
individual; or of committing or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the
commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human
life.” 3 R.C.C. § 10. Alleging enough facts to overcome the “reasonable certainty”1 hurdle
requires that the government describe how each element of the offense is somehow violated by
an act of the Defendant. "It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the
definition of an offence, whether it be at common law or by statute, includes generic terms, it is
not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms as in the
definition; but it must state the species, — it must descend to particulars." United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (internal quotations omitted).
As a result of this error, the government has failed to plead how the Defendant intended
to or did cause severe bodily injury.
It is this 26th day of May 2024, that in chambers at Palmer, RW, this was adjudicated. It is
for these foregoing reasons that the motion to dismiss count one of the information is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED
By:
Derogatoryyy
Magistrate Judge
Ridgeway Superior Court
1 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962).
