ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
LinRCross
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DOCKET NO. RSC-AD-2364
Plaintiff
v.
Ridgeway County Fire Department
Defendant
ORDER
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff, LinRCross’ Motion for Default Judgment. Plaintiff
entered a Civil Complaint against the Defendant, Ridgeway County Fire Department, and the Solicitor
General’s Office was notified on March 6th, 2024. The Court allowed five days for a settlement to be
reached, which failed, then allowed a further seven (7) days for a response to be filed by the Defendant
which expired, resulting in Plaintiff to move for Default Judgment. Due to the aforementioned,
Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On February 22nd, 2024, the Plaintiff submitted an application for employment with the Ridgeway
County Fire Department. Upon review, the Ridgeway County Fire Department Recruitment Board
determined that further evaluation of the application was needed and scheduled additional interviews
with the Plaintiff. Despite positive impressions during these interviews, the Plaintiff's responses were
flagged by an AI writing detection system utilized by the department, leading to the rejection of the
employment application.
Subsequently, on February 28th, the Plaintiff initiated a Civil Complaint against the Defendant, the
Ridgeway County Fire Department, asserting that the use of an AI detection software contravened the
protections provided to Ridgeway State citizens under the Administrative Procedure Act Section 2. The
Office of the Solicitor General received notification on March 6th, 2024, setting a five-day window for
settlement discussions and a subsequent seven-day period for the defendant to respond. However, these
deadlines elapsed without resolution, prompting the Plaintiff to file a motion for Default judgment,
which was ultimately granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 37(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure delineates the conditions under which a party may seek
default judgment. The rule stipulates:
"When a party, against whom affirmative relief is sought, fails to plead or otherwise defend as outlined
by these rules, and this failure is demonstrated through affidavit or other means, the clerk is directed to
record their default."
Following the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, the State referenced the three criteria for vacating
default judgments, which are as follows: "(1) the willfulness of the default; (2) the potential prejudice to
the opposing party should the default be set aside; and (3) the presentation of a viable defense." This
standard was established in Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1993).
Within the Administrative Complaint, the following statutes are discussed:
2 R. Stat. § 3241, “It is a violation of law to engage in prejudicial or unfair hiring practices.”
2 R. Stat. § 3305, “The administrative courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil claims
involving administrative action, or policy, or rules of a government agency.”
2 R. Stat. § 3202, “A secondary agency shall be any as so defined:
(i) The Ridgeway County Transit Authority
(ii) The Ridgeway Parks Service
(iii) The Ridgeway National Guard
(iv) The Ridgeway County Fire Department
2 R. Stat. § 3204, ”The rank at which a staff position begins shall be clearly defined by a department
through their policy. If a department does not specify a staff position then it shall be considered that they
have no staff positions for the purposes of this subsection and section.”
2 R. Stat. § 3240, “A prejudicial or unfair hiring practice is a hiring practice that does not conform to
what has been established by law.”
2 R. Stat. § 3233, “Background checks shall be over an objective criteria that shall remain static and
non-subjective.”
2 R. Stat § 3223, “When making a hiring decision, officials can use the following attributes to discredit
and demerit a hire:
(i) Bad performance in another department or agency;
(ii) Poor completion of an application, cover letter, or letter of interest;
(iii) Poor accredited exam scores;
(iv) Past disciplinary actions
(v) Character defects which would bring harm to the health of the department or
community;
(vi) Failure to use discretion;
(vii) Inability to gain a security clearance;
(viii) Refusal to comply with regulations or lawful orders;
(ix) Terrible activity in a previous department or agency;
(x) No, or little experience within the State of Ridgeway
ANALYSIS
When considering the appropriateness of granting Default judgment, a thorough examination of legal
standards and precedents is paramount. Rule 37(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure serves as a
cornerstone in this assessment, delineating the conditions under which default judgment may be sought.
This rule underscores the fundamental principle that a party's failure to plead or respond as required by
the rules warrants judicial intervention, with the court empowered to enter a judgment accordingly. In
the present case, the State's failure to meet the prescribed deadlines and provide a substantive response
aligns with the criteria outlined in Rule 37(a), thereby justifying the pursuit of default judgment in
accordance with procedural norms.
Building upon the legal framework established in Enron Oil Corp v. Diakuhara, it becomes evident that
the State's default was not merely a passive oversight but rather a willful disregard of its legal
obligations. The absence of any proactive efforts to engage with the plaintiff's claim underscores a
deliberate neglect of due process, reinforcing the argument for default judgment. Denying default
judgment in this context would not only condone such willful defaults but also perpetuate prejudice
against the plaintiff, who has diligently followed procedural requirements and awaited a timely response.
Furthermore, the State's failure to present a substantive defense further strengthens the case for default
judgment, as it reflects a lack of meritorious grounds to contest the allegations.
Expanding the legal analysis to encompass broader principles articulated in Sony Corp v. Elm State
Elecs, it is imperative to ensure that the imposition of default judgment aligns with principles of fairness
and proportionality. Granting default judgment, in this case, does not result in an unduly harsh or unjust
outcome but rather upholds the integrity of the legal process by holding parties accountable for their
procedural responsibilities. The State's default, rooted in its failure to adhere to procedural rules, does
not warrant leniency but rather underscores the importance of timely and substantive engagement in
legal proceedings.
Turning to the statutory framework outlined in the Administrative Complaint, a comprehensive
examination of relevant statutes sheds light on the legal standards governing hiring practices and
administrative actions. Section 3241 of the Ridgeway State statutes unequivocally prohibits prejudicial
or unfair hiring practices, with Section 3240 further elucidating that such practices are those that deviate
from established legal norms. Additionally, Section 3233 mandates background checks based on
objective criteria, emphasizing the imperative of fairness and impartiality in the hiring process.
The Plaintiff's initial favorable assessment during the application process, juxtaposed with the
subsequent rejection based on an AI detection software flag, raises profound concerns regarding
compliance with Section 3233's mandate for objective background checks. While AI detection software
can offer non-subjective evaluations, ensuring the objectivity and fairness of its criteria remains a
paramount consideration. The utilization of AI detection software in the application denial necessitates
a critical violation of the Plaintiff's protections against unfair practices as delineated by the law, due to
the objective criteria of the software being non-existent.
CONCLUSION
In light of the violations of protections against prejudicial and unfair hiring practices, specifically
concerning the use of AI detection software in the application process, the following relief is deemed
appropriate and is hereby granted:
(a) The Ridgeway County Fire Department is directed to cease the utilization of AI-detection software in
its employment processes due to the demonstrated unreliability of such software. This directive aims to
safeguard against potential biases and inaccuracies inherent in AI systems, ensuring a fair and equitable
hiring process moving forward.
(b) The Defendant, representing the Ridgeway County Fire Department, is held accountable for the costs
incurred by the Plaintiff in pursuing legal recourse. This includes the awarding of Attorney Fees to the
Plaintiff, acknowledging the burden and expenses incurred in seeking justice for the violations suffered.
(c) It is duly acknowledged and established that the denial of the Plaintiff's application was not only
contrary to the protections afforded to them by the Administrative Procedure Act but also in violation of
relevant Ridgway State Statutes governing fair and unbiased hiring practices. This acknowledgment
serves to underscore the importance of adherence to legal standards and procedural fairness in
administrative actions, highlighting the need for accountability and rectification of infringements on
individual rights and protections.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 14th day of April, 2024.
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE
