IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ZACHCASISBEAST,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
State of Ridgeway
Defendant(s).
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Case No. RSC-CM-2319
Memorandum Opinion & Order
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff ZACHCASISBEAST who brings this Application for a
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the State of Ridgeway from enforcing the Checkpoint Act,
passed by the State Legislature on April 3, 2022, and signed by the Governor on the same day.
On review of the substance of the Application and on review of briefs submitted by both parties,
it is ordered that the Application is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The Checkpoint Act (Pub. L. 1-16) allows for law enforcement officers to “ask for the
[i]dentification of those who stop at a checkpoint to check for any BOLOs, active warrants, and
RFLID cards.” 6 R. Stat. § 6102. This authority is typically used in larger cities within the State
of Ridgeway for crime-fighting purposes to ensure motorists stopped at these minute checkpoints
are not wanted by police for violent crime. In this form of law enforcement operation, vehicles
are stopped either at random, by a systemic choice, or in entirety once they reach a set point on a
roadway where law enforcement are operating a checkpoint. During the stop, vehicle operators
are asked for their identification and are then examined to see if the motorist is wanted by other
law enforcement agencies (commonly referred to as a BOLO) or for other offenses that may lie
within the plain view of the officer.
Plaintiff was recently stopped at a vehicle checkpoint operated under the authority of the
Checkpoint Act by a police officer who worked for the City of Palmer. At that stop, they were
asked for identification by the police officer. Plaintiff refused to provide their identification and
argued that they were not being investigated for a crime, so they did not have to provide it. The
police officer arrested Plaintiff and charged them with R.C.C. §2.05 for Failure to Identify, which
criminalizes “[f]ailing to present identification to a peace officer after having being lawfully
detained.” Plaintiff separately filed for habeas corpus on that arrest under 1 R. Stat. § 2210 to
seek release from the arrest and expungement from record. ZachCasisbeast v. iiSandwich_Lawz,
RSC-CV-2317 (2024).
After that action, Plaintiff filed this action against the State of Ridgeway seeking
declaratory judgment to review the facial constitutionality of the Checkpoint Act which
authorized the police officer to compel Plaintiff to provide their identification in the first place.
Rid. R. Civ. P. 39. Now, Plaintiff made an application for a preliminary injunction which aimed
at “prohibiting the State from enforcing 6 R. Stat. § 6102 of the Checkpoint Act.”
LEGAL FINDINGS
I. Requirements for Preliminary Injunction
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of
the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390, 395 (1981). “‘[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, pp. 129-130 (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis and footnotes
omitted)). The preliminary injunction is a potent weapon in the judicial arsenal of tools to
maintain order in any matter that comes before its review. Except where there is extraordinary
showing, it is “never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). “[W]hether a preliminary injunction shall be awarded rests in sound
discretion of the trial court.” Meccano, Ltd., v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141 (1920).
“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 1) they are likely
to succeed on the merits; 2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; 3)
the balance of equities and hardships is in favor of the plaintiff; and 4) whether that injunction is
in the public interest.” largeTitanic2 v. NevPlaysGames, 1 Rid. 80, 98 (2023) (citing Winter,
supra, at 20). In the absence of any one of these requirements, the application for injunction must
be denied. In light of this, this test is not a rigid examination that requires stringent review from
one part to the next. Generally, review should begin on the second ground and advance to the
others. A review on the merits should be reserved for the end.
On the second ground, Plaintiff’s application is flawed that they assert that they are likely
to face injury absent restriction by the Court to compel the State of Ridgeway to cease enforcing
the Checkpoint Act. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that they are any more likely than the normal
person to suffer injury or that their circumstances position them to be at-risk of further injury
from their past incident. Instead, their assertion is based that there is a possibility that they may
face injury if they encountered another checkpoint which may then cause injury. The
examination of likelihood here provides no other conclusion.
“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may
only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, supra,
at 22. Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that they are in need of extraordinary relief to halt a
likely infringement of their equities that may encumber proceedings before a court. In this case,
there exists no substantial evidence to demonstrate that.
II. Lack of Specific Officer
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the State of Ridgeway from enforcing the Checkpoint Act which
they now seek judgment against. To name the State of Ridgeway in a suit for declaratory
judgment is, itself, a questionable exercise under various grounds of consideration. In terms of a
request for preliminary injunction, the prohibition against this is clear. “The capacity to issue an
injunction is contingent, among other things, the ability to enforce it. A statewide injunction is
inherently unenforceable.” State of Ridgeway v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. 502, 506 (2022) (cert. denied)
(JACKSON, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
A preliminary injunction must be narrowly tailored to meet its goal and must justify
expansion with an inherent need to enjoin whatever party it seeks to affect. As was past noted,
Plaintiff failed to even justify injunction on the bare minimal standards promulgated by Winter.
Its second flaw is a lack of an enjoined officer that can be bonded to the Court’s order so as to
have teeth to the injunction. Enjoining the entire population of the State of Ridgeway, or even
just the employees of the government, is an expansion which demands even more extraordinary
showing that may bring a need for such a widespanding order. Plaintiff’s application fails to do
that and so the request is too broad with little showing to justify the large request.
There do exist expansive injunctions which enjoin larger parties from enforcing a statute,
even under our structure in Ridgeway. “Injunctions that prohibit the Executive Branch from
applying a law or policy against anyone [...] have become increasingly common.” Trump v.
Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___, ___ (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op. at 2). Admittedly, Justice
Thomas would go on to attack the common law standing of these executive-wide injunctions in
his concurring opinion, but they exist nevertheless. This opinion makes clear that it does not
reject the notion of a statewide injunction, nor does this Court read our Supreme Court’s decision
to do so except where it is not narrowly tailored to be possible to enforce. Absent these flaws and
any other that may stand in the way of a showing of extraordinary remedy, there could be a
well-properly executed statewide injunction. In practice, these are few and far between.
CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Palmer, Ridgeway
County, this 4th day of March 2024 that, for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s Application for
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
/s/ TaxesArentAwesome
TaxesArentAwesome
Superior Court Judge
