STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ZachCasisbeast
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-2323
JUDGE. HON. TaxesArentAwesome
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff
v.
State of Ridgeway
Defendant
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The State of Ridgeway hereby submits the following response to the Plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction.
ARGUMENT
1. PLAINTIFF FAIL’S TEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 1) they are likely
to succeed on the merits; 2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; 3)
the balance of equities and hardships is in favor of the plaintiff; and 4) whether that injunction is
in the public interest.” Titanic v. Nev, 1 Rid. 80, 98 (2023) (citing Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008)). In “in a case against the government, the public
interest is already accounted for in the balance of equities portion of the test and is therefore not
required to be explicitly proven or denied.” Id. at 99.
While the state disagrees that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, we will
reserve such arguments for later.
Plaintiff fails the test for a preliminary injunction because he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm without said injunction. Indeed, the likelihood that Plaintiff finds himself detained at a
checkpoint again is not likely. It’s not more than that of the average citizen. Since these
checkpoints are created by the discretion of law enforcement, it’s possible that they never be
created again. Just like “[p]laintiff cannot rely on speculation about ‘the unfettered choices made
by independent actors not before the court’” to establish imminent harm for standing, he cannot
do so to establish likelihood of harm for a preliminary injunction. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, at 414 no.5 (2013) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 562). Moreover, even
if such a checkpoint was created, Plaintiff could not encounter it. It’s possible that Plaintiff
suffers harm in the future, but that chance falls far short of the “likely” that is required to enjoin a
law.
2. THE “STATE OF RIDGEWAY” CANNOT BE ENJOINED
“For an injunction to be enforceable, it needs a person who it can be enforced upon.”
Titanic, supra at 85. Indeed, “[w]hen a court enters a negative injunction against a law, an order
prohibiting certain conduct, it is not removing that law or making it inoperative, but enjoining
those who are charged with enforcing that law.” Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447, 488 (1923)). Indeed, “The capacity to issue an injunction is contingent, among other things,
the ability to enforce it. A statewide injunction is inherently unenforceable. What remedy would
the court have if its order was violated by those enjoined? Take deputy John Doe before the
judge for a contempt hearing? The ridiculous means for enforcement of this injunction thereby
serve as its principal flaw.” State v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. at 506 (JACKSON, J. concurring in the denial
of certiorari) (Lx1nas II). Since Plaintiffs fail to name any government officials whom they seek
to be enjoined, their request fails; for, the State is not a monolith capable of being enjoined.
3. STATEWIDE INJUNCTIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL1
Plaintiff here seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the statute against everyone, not just
him. However, such a broad statewide injunction against non-parties is unconstitutional.
This court has the power to hear “all civil and criminal cases or controversies.” Rid.
Const., art V, § IV. Thus, Article IV defines the judicial role as "redress[ing] an injury resulting
from a specific dispute." Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (20II); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) ("It is the role of courts to provide relief to
claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual
harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of
government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution."). Once a court has
given an appropriate remedy to the plaintiffs, there is no longer any case or controversy left for
the court to resolve. Indeed, the case and controversy has ceased.
The court has no constitutional basis to decide disputes and issue remedies for those who
are not parties. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The rationale for our power to review federal legislation for constitutionality . . . only extends
so far as to require us to determine that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to this party, in
1 The state requests the court withhold judgment on this issue unless it becomes determinative in the outcome of the
motion.
the circumstances of this case."); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("The Art. III
judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining
party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally."); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 318 F. Supp. 786, 793 (W.D.N.C. 1970) ("The orders of
this court have been confined to the only area they can properly embrace, and that is the rights of
the particular parties represented in this case, on the particular facts and history of this case.");
see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (rejecting on Article III
grounds the argument that "when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain action
or threatened action but has settled that suit, he retains standing to challenge the basis for that
action ... apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his interests").
One cannot bypass this Article IV conclusion by making a distinction by arguing that the
limits of Article IV control "standing" but not "remedies." “In decision after decision, the
Supreme Court has understood Article III [or Article IV under the Ridgeway Constitution] as
giving shape and definition to the remedial authority of the federal courts.” Multiple
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 472 (2017) (citing
e.g. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-93; Lewis, 518 U.S. 343; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227 (1937); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927); Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447
(1923); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); cf. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 1 3
6 S. Ct. 1036, 1053 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Article III does not give federal courts
the power to order relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not."))
“This intertwining of who can sue and what a court is willing to do on that person's
behalf is supported by good reasons. Equitable remedies tend to be more costly and more
vulnerable to abuse by the parties. They invite, and sometimes require, the court to manage the
parties — and when one of those parties is, in effect, another branch of the national government
or a state, concerns about separation of powers or federalism are heightened.” Id.
The court has the power to resolve the disputes of litigants, not the disputes of
non-parties. The wrongs this court may remedy are limited to those done to the plaintiff. Thus, in
accordance with Article IV of the Ridgeway Constitution, any injunction must be limited to
preventing the enforcement of the law against the plaintiff, not others.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction must be denied.
/s/ totoro987123
Deputy Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: February 28th, 2024
