STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Mrpop1034 )
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-2352
JUDGE. HON. koala4Iife
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff
v.
Azap634 & Impediage,
in their quasi-official capacities
Defendants
MOTION TO DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway, on behalf of defendants Azap634 and Impediage (herein
collectively “Defendants”), respectfully submits this motion to dismiss. This motion to dismiss
shall serve as a response to the plaintiff’s civil complaint, as is permitted by Rid R. Civ. P. 12.
ARGUMENT
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When faced with a motion to dismiss, this court must “assume the veracity” of
well-pleaded allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009). Allegations are “well-pleaded”
when the “factual allegations … raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
US 544, 555 (2007). If these factual allegations, assumed as true, do not support a claim for
relief, the suit must be dismissed.
2. SUIT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE OFFICERS DID NOT ENGAGE IN
OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT
Regardless of whether the court construes Plaintiff’s Official Misconduct claim as
alleging that officers knowingly exceeded their lawful authority or that they refrained from a
duty imposed by law, the suit stems from an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment rights by
Defendants. By refusing to provide him access to his lawyer and continuing to question him,
Plaintiff argues that his Fifth Amendment rights under Edwards v. Arizona were violated. See
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
To protect the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,
the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the police must terminate interrogation of
an accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 474 (1966). The Court reinforced the protections of Miranda in Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484–485 (1981), which held that once the accused requests counsel, officials may
not reinitiate questioning “until counsel has been made available” to him. Defendants have not
violated either Miranda or Edwards. Both cases prohibit testimony obtained after counsel has
been requested from being admissible, a protection meant to safeguard a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights. However, neither case says that continuing questioning is a Fifth
Amendment violation in and of itself.
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), requires that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 (emphases added). In
accordance with Chavez v. Martinez, Plaintiff cannot argue that his Fifth Amendment rights were
violated “since Plaintiff was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal case.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003). According to
the Court, a “criminal case” at the very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings. Ibid.
(citing Blyew v. United States, 13 Wall. 581, 595 (1872)). “Statements compelled by police
interrogations of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, see Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936), but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the
Self–Incrimination Clause occurs.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (citing United States v.
Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (“The privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although
conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a
constitutional violation occurs only at trial” (emphases added; citations omitted)); Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (describing the Fifth Amendment as a “‘trial right’”); id., at
705, 113 S.Ct. 1745 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing “true
Fifth Amendment claims” as “the extraction and use of compelled testimony” (emphasis
altered))).
Here, as in Chavez, Plaintiff “was never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Self–Incrimination Clause because his statements were never
admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case. Nor was he ever placed under oath and
exposed to ‘the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.’” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)) (some internal quotations omitted).
Consequently, “[t]he text of the Self–Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the… view that
the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the Constitution.” Ibid.
Accordingly, “a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one
has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770.
“In the Fifth Amendment context, we have created prophylactic rules designed to
safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self–Incrimination Clause.” Ibid. (citing,
e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S., at 444 (describing the “procedural safeguards” required by Miranda as
“not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but ... measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected” to “provide practical reinforcement for the
right”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, (stating that “[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule ...
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself”)).
“Rules designed to safeguard a constitutional right, however, do not extend the scope of the
constitutional right itself, just as violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate
the constitutional rights of any person.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772.
As the Court held, “the absence of a ‘criminal case’ in which [Plaintiff] was compelled to
be a ‘witness’ against himself defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim. The Ninth Circuit's view
that mere compulsion violates the Self–Incrimination Clause finds no support in the text of the
Fifth Amendment and is irreconcilable with our case law.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772-3 (internal
citations omitted).
Because the Defendants violated no right of the Plaintiff, they neither exceeded their
lawful authority nor refrained from doing a duty imposed by law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the suit be dismissed.
/s/ totoro987123
Deputy Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: March 10th, 2024
