IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ZACHCASISBEAST,
Petitioner
v.
IISANDWICH_LAWZ
Respondent.
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Case No. RSC-CV-2317
Memorandum Opinion & Order
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner ZACHCASISBEAST who brings this Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus seeking expungement of arrest and removal of all records of the arrest from their
personal record. On review of the substance of the Petition, it is ordered that the Petition is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was driving their Blue Tremor Sport on Alderpoint Drive towards the City of
Palmer when they encountered a police checkpoint established by the local police department.
Respondent, a police officer for the City of Palmer, was operating the checkpoint when Petitioner
had driven up towards it. With the manner that the checkpoint was established, many barriers
obstructed the roadway in a manner that held all cars within the immediate presence of law
enforcement who were operating the checkpoint.
Respondent approached the window of Petitioner’s vehicle and asked them for
identification in the form of their username. Petitioner refused to answer the question or provide
any identification to Petitioner or any of the other officers that were present at the checkpoint. At
this point, they were not suspected or being investigated for any crime. Further, they noted that
Petitioner already knew their username from past interactions they had both had together.
Regardless, Petitioner was arrested and charged with violating R.C.C. §2.05 which criminalizes
“[f]ailing to present identification to a peace officer after having being lawfully detained.”
Petitioner soonafter filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to request expungement of
the arrest and release from detention under 1 R. Stat. § 2212. Petitioner’s claim is that the statute
they were charged with is facially unconstitutional under the vagueness doctrine and that their
actions were insufficient to meet the requirements to be charged for that statute because they
were not suspected of a crime at the time of detention. Respondent noted that the statute only
requires a subject to be “lawfully detained” for identification to be compelled, and further that
proceedings for Habeas Corpus are inappropriate for raising claims of the constitutionality of a
statute.
LEGAL FINDINGS
I. Appropriateness of Forum
It is first important to address whether the main claims can even be heard in proceedings
for habeas corpus. Respondent correctly notes that the relief available in these proceedings is
limited, principally, to “expungement of record.” 1 R. Stat. § 2212(i)(2). “As in any case of
statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. And where the
statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” Time2Fly v. ToxicCooling,
RSC-CM-2319 (2024) (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The statutory language in this case is clear in its
restriction on the forms of relief applicable to this type of proceeding, the Court may only give
relief in the form of expungement or release from detention. All other forms of judgment cannot
be entered in this matter.
Comparatively, the procedural adventure of petitioning for habeas corpus is severely
limited to that of a civil action for deprivation of rights or for official misconduct. See 1 R. Stat.
§ 2211. In these proceedings, a petitioner only needs to present their petition while the
respondent must brief and provide an affidavit swearing to the events that led to the detention. A
hearing is only required “if the Court finds absolutely necessary for the responsible consideration
of the Petition.” 1 R. Stat. § 2211(ix). In a traditional civil action, there exists much more
avenues for both parties to compete and present their arguments than do in a proceeding for
habeas corpus. Consequently, this straightjacket on the Court’s abilities in proceedings for habeas
corpus is necessary so as to avoid circumventing the traditional methods of seeking judgment in
favor of an avenue least conductive for the assurance of justice.
Our review is limited only to the application of law to the detention made on Petitioner in
their specific incident. All other forms of review are inappropriate for these proceedings.
However, this does not entirely preclude Petitioner’s claim on the analysis of the statute they
were charged under. To be clear, this Court cannot review the facial constitutionality of the
statute under which Petitioner was charged under but we can review it for offense contravening
against our constitutional authorities under the specific circumstances which Petitioner suffered
under. Afterall, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). For us to blind ourselves to the claims
of constitutionality of Respondent’s actions would be to abandon this duty.
II. Application of R.C.C. §2.05 and the Fourth Amendment
Petitioner was not accused of any crime at the time of their arrest that may have
warranted further investigation into their character for criminal offenses. The statute that they are
charged under is written for crime-fighting purposes to allow officers to investigate and question
suspects in the performance of their official duties so as to combat crime. This is evident in the
first provision of the statute which employs a compelled duty to identify if there is “reasonable
articulable suspicion that a crime has, is or is about to take place.” R.C.C. § 2.05. “But even
assuming that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from
an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
The general principle for any search, seizure, or other intrusion to the papers of a person
is that “the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). It is the duty of the Court to “evaluate the search or seizure under
traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300
(1999) (citations omitted). It is in this balancing test that we must examine Petitioner’s arrest and
all others similarly affected for a random stop for identification.
In Fourth Amendment context, a compelling state interest means “an interest which
appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors which
show the search to be relatively intrusive on a genuine expectation of privacy.” Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). Respondent pointed towards Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990) as a justification for the detention at the
checkpoint. This is correct — the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the state interest
in preventing DUI accidents was sufficiently compelling enough to justify minute detention at a
checkpoint for purposes of combating those traffic fatalities. In that application, the state interest
was beyond that of normal law enforcement and moreso involved in the general welfare of the
community. These “particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on
“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
313 (1997) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 619 (1989)).
Today’s case does not meet that hurdle. The statute, as past mentioned, is a crime-fighting
tool in the arsenal of weapons for law enforcement officers to conduct their duties in a manner
most conducive to combating crime rates in a city through field investigations and temporary
detention of suspects based on on-the-spot observations. Though it is in the general interest of
the community to have a well-oiled crime fighting police force able to protect them from
dangerous suspects, it is also within their interest and the balancing of the nation’s history that
their protections and sanctity from intrusion is maintained from an overbearing police force.
The application of R.C.C. § 2.05 on Petitioner was not only inappropriate given the
statute’s intent of use in crime fighting investigations, of which Petitioner was not subject to, but
it is also irreconcilable with the protections of the Fourth Amendment for reasonable searches
and seizures. To clarify, the Court is not striking down the statute or making any other
declarations that are typically reserved for a traditional civil action, but merely interpreting the
Fourth Amendment’s jurisprudence on the arrest that Petitioner now seeks to justify. To that,
there exists but one answer.
CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Palmer, Ridgeway
County, this 26th day of February 2024 that, for the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
/s/ TaxesArentAwesome
TaxesArentAwesome
Superior Court Judge
