STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ZachCasisbeast
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-2317
JUDGE. HON. TaxesArentAwesome
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION Petitioner
DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The State of Ridgeway hereby files this brief of opposition to the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus submitted by Petitioner and urges the court to deny the aforementioned petition.
INTRODUCTION
On, or around, the 17th of February 2024 ZachCasisbeast (hereinafter the “petitioner”)
was arrested by iiSandwich_Lawz ( hereinafter the “respondent”) for failure to identify, contrary
to §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code. The petitioner makes two arguments in support
of their petition. First, the petitioner argues that the arrest was unlawful. Next, the petitioner
argues that the law is unconstitutionally vague. The State disagrees with both contentions.
ARGUMENT
1. PETITIONER'S ARREST WAS LAWFUL
a. Governing Offense
The law in question here is §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code. Petitioner
mistakenly reads the law as stating if they fail to present a county issued identification to a
“peace officer that has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime has, is or is about to take
place.” See Petition at 2. Based upon that reading of the law, Petitioner concludes that their arrest
is unlawful.
Petitioner conveniently excludes the rest of the criminal statute, however. The law goes
on to criminalize “Failing to present identification to a peace officer after having being lawfully
detained.” §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code. It is this sentence of the criminal offense
that the petitioner was arrested under, not the previous one. Whether or not Petitioner
intentionally excluded this from his petition hoping it would go unnoticed or simply did not read
the whole offense is irrelevant for our purposes here.
b. Petitioner Violated §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code
When one is stopped at a police checkpoint, they are lawfully detained. A “Fourth
Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.” Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (internal quotations omitted); also see United States v.
Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 453, at 556 (1976) (“It is agreed that checkpoint stops are ‘seizures'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597
(1989) (Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied ” (emphasis in original)).
Despite being lawfully detained, Petitioner refused to identify himself. See Petitioner
Exhibit 1, 2:17-3:15. The officer asked him multiple times to no avail. Id. Therefore, Petitioner
“fail[ed] to present identification to a peace officer after having being lawfully detained” in
violation of §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code.
c. Petitioner Must Be Denied With Respect to Petitioner’s First Argument
When deciding if a petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted, this court must
first decide “whether the police were legally entitled to make that arrest.” In Re Zachisbeast,
RSC-CV-367. An officer is entitled to make an arrest when: “the police either had a judicial
warrant ordering an arrest, or the police had probable cause that a crime was committed.” Id.
Clearly the officer, who was present at the scene, had probable cause that a crime was
committed. Petitioner committed the offense right there in front of him, as shown in Petitioner’s
Exhibit 1. Therefore, we must now turn to the second prong of the habeas test.
“Having established that the arrest was legally justified, we next ask whether the
petitioner is actually innocent.” In Re Zachisbeast, supra. In order to succeed on this prong of the
test, Petitioner must “establish facts that make the prospect of a hypothetical conviction on the
charges virtually impossible.” Id. Indeed, they must do so such that “a reasonable and
well-informed jury could not convict the petitioner in a hypothetical trial if they were aware of
those facts, and those facts were admissible evidence.” Id.
As Petitioner’s own evidence shows, he patently violated the law. He refused to present
identification after being lawfully detained at a checkpoint. That is the plain text of the law. As
such, it would be absurd to claim that a reasonable and well-informed jury wouldn’t be able to
convict the petitioner in a hypothetical trial. Petitioner’s own evidence makes his guilt clear.
2. PETITIONER CANNOT BRING A FACIAL CHALLENGE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW AT ISSUE
a. Habeas Corpus Proceedings are Inappropriate Forums to Challenge the
Facial Constitutionality of Laws
Petitioner lodges a claim against the facial Constitutionality of the criminal statute at
issue. But habeas corpus proceedings are inappropriate forums to lodge these types of claims.
Most notably, the Senate spoke clearly when it limited the relief available to habeas
petitioners to “only...immediate release from prison or detainment...[and]...expungement of
record.” 1 R. Stat. § 136. A finding that a statute is unconstitutional is unsupported by the
explicit language of the legislature with regard to the relief allowed in habeas cases. But if the
court found that either of the laws were facially unconstitutional, it is duty bound to enjoin their
enforcement. That type of equitable authority falls outside the narrow remedial allowances given
to this court in these types of cases.
Indeed, this court is bound by the precedent of the Ridgeway Superior Court in
HolyRomanRyan v. V_15K, in which the judge ruled that “The government's assertion that
Habeas Corpus Proceedings Are Inappropriate Forums To Challenge The Facial Constitutionality
Of Laws.'is also correct.” Record at 7/23/2022, 11:04:38 AM in HolyRomanRyan v. V_15K,
RSC-CV-513 (internal quotations omitted).
b. Petitioner Lacks Standing to Challenge the Facial Constitutionality of §2.05
A litigant's ability to challenge the constitutionality of a law is limited to the extent that it
“has an adverse impact on his own rights.” County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 US 140
(1979). He, consequently, “does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if
applied to third parties in hypothetical situations.” Id. Petitioner here lodges a facial
constitutionality challenge to the criminal statutes in question on the basis that the statute, on
their face, are impermissibly vague. Petitioner is asking this court to say that each and every
application of the law, both to his case and beyond it, is unconstitutional. In making such a claim,
he has an exceedingly heavy burden—one that they cannot surmount.
At a minimum, in order to challenge the vagueness of a law, the Petitioner must allege
that he did not know he was violating the law. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489 (1982). Petitioner can
only fairly challenge the vagueness of the law if he himself did not know that their conduct was
offending the law. If he knew their conduct was unlawful and the law inherently was not vague
in its application to them, they lack a standing to bring a facial challenge to the law.
Of course, Petitioners here make no allegation that they were unaware of the law's
application, nor that they did not know their conduct was a transgression of the law. Because
Petitioner’s fail to allege that the application of the law to the conduct they engaged in was not
clearly proscribed in the statute, they cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as it applies to
others.
c. Petitioner Challenges the Wrong Part of §2.05
Petitioner’s claim that the provision under which he was arrested is unconstitutionally
vague is irrelevant to the case. As stated above, Petitioner misrepresents (either intentionally or
unintentionally) the sentence of §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code that he was arrested
under.
He claims that “failing to present a county issued identification or giving fictitious
information to a peace officer that has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime has, is or is
about to take place” is unconstitutionally vague. §2.05 of the Ridgeway State Criminal Code.
However, Petitioner was arrested under a different provision of §2.05 of the Ridgeway State
Criminal Code, which criminalizes “failing to present identification to a peace officer after
having been lawfully detained.” Id.
It is well established that a litigant can only challenge the constitutionality of laws if they
“ha[ve] an adverse impact on his own rights.” Allen, supra. Since the piece of the law he is
challenging has no adverse impact on his own rights, he cannot bring a challenge to it. Moreover,
such a challenge is irrelevant to the present habeas proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's arrest was lawful and Petitioner cannot bring a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of law. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be
denied.
/s/ EffortlessBrit
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
/s/ totoro987123
Deputy Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Co-Counsel of Record
Dated: February 22nd, 2024
