IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
GMUEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVOHATELIFE,
Defendants.
___________________________/
CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 01-2024-CV-002311-F017
JUDGE: HON. ENFORCEMENTBEYOND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on February 23, 2024 before the Court upon the
Defendant, StevoHateLife’s Motion to Dismiss. Upon consideration of all matters of record, the
Court finds and concludes that the Defendant’s Motion must be DENIED, for the reasons
explained therein.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Ridgeway who alleges that he suffered a breach of
contract and fraud at the hands of the Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant entered a verbal
agreement with them which would result in the exchange of money for the sale and claim of a
property. Plaintiff alleges that after receiving a counteroffer from Defendant and agreeing to this
counteroffer, Plaintiff remitted payment as a term to the verbal agreement, after which Defendant
acknowledged payment and left the game without releasing control of the property sought to be
purchased. Defendant has moved to dismiss the Plaintiff, arguing that the Plaintiff has not met
the standard for civil fraud by failing to demonstrate the Defendant had knowingly
misrepresented facts, that the alleged verbal agreement lacked mutual assent, and that
assumption of risk is applicable in such a manner that liberates the Defendant of all liability in
the matter.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
In order for a civil complaint to survive scrutiny, it must remain plausible on its face. See
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007). This standard has been applicable in the
State of Ridgeway since the creation of the state’s legal system. A claim which lacks sufficient
facts alleged to allow for a court of law to reasonably infer that a defendant is liable for the
claims alleged before it, must also be dismissed by such court. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662,
664 (2009). Both of these are binding federal precedents which are relevant given the statutes
and rules that exist to govern civil proceedings in Ridgeway. Defendant argues that if all facts of
the civil complaint presented by Plaintiff were presumed truthful, they would not be sufficient to
entitle Plaintiff to relief. The Court disagrees with this view.
a. Scrutiny Standard for Civil Fraud
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim of civil fraud would not survive scrutiny
because Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that Defendant knowingly misrepresented facts. It has
been previously held by the federal courts that claims of fraud must display a party has
knowingly made an untrue statement of fact with a clear intent to deceive another, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, resulting in another party to act in a manner that is detrimental to
their own position. See Clemmons v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
21589. Although this decision is persuasive, as opposed to binding, the Court agrees with the
10th Circuit’s decision. A civil fraud requires that a person knowingly deceive another through
an untrue statement of fact, knowingly and willfully making that statement of fact, with the
intent to secure an unlawful or unfair gain, or to deprive a party of a legal right.
Defendant follows his argument by arguing that Plaintiff does not fulfill the scrutiny
standard set in Clemmons when their sole allegation in favor of civil fraud was that Defendant
left the game before vacating the property as allegedly agreed upon. Plaintiff argued that the civil
complaint alleges that Defendant entered the agreement, acknowledged that Plaintiff had carried
out terms of the agreement pertaining to payment and that he had received funds in his alternate
account, and only then did he allegedly leave the game, as opposed to vacating the property so
that Plaintiff could take ownership and possession as outlined in the alleged agreement. At face
value, the agreement to vacate the property in exchange for compensation, without intent to
fulfill the terms, fulfills the first requirement of a civil fraud, whereas the failure to meet the
terms of the agreement after receiving the agreed upon compensation would satisfy the
requirement for a party to deprive another of a legal right, which in this case is property.
Defendant attacks the facial plausibility of the complaint. For a complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss, the claims alleged must be facially plausible, and such a requirement is only
met when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Defendant questions whether deviation from the terms of an unenforceable
contract constitutes civil fraud, to which the Court would say that whether such a contract were
enforceable or not, it wouldn’t necessarily qualify as civil fraud, unless it met the two
requirements for a civil fraud. In this matter, an untrue statement of fact is alleged, and a
deprivation of a legal right is alleged, thus the claim is facially plausible. The enforceability of
the agreement is addressed separately.
b. Mutual Assent
Second, Defendant argues that the agreement between both parties lacked mutual assent,
thus it would make it unenforceable. Defendant argues that to reply “k” would be insufficient in
an offer to establish an understanding of the terms for a verbal contract, and that he was never
influenced to the sale of his home. For a contract to be valid, a meeting of the minds must take
place. See Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564, 579 (1891). Yet in matters of
fraudulent inducement, that is, in matters where “a party to a contract was induced to enter into
that contract by fraud of the other party.”, the Court observes there is deviation. See 48 Am. Jur.
Proof of Facts 3d 329. “Because such fraud negates the ‘meeting of the minds’ required in a
contract, the defrauded party has the right to avoid the contract or seek damages, depending upon
the specific circumstances and the election of the defrauded party.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant misrepresents the mutual assent argument and omits
information. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made an offer that established a contract by saying
that Plaintiff would transfer funds, he would release his claim to the property, and Plaintiff would
purchase it quickly. Plaintiff alleges that before the transfer of funds was made, they asked
whether Defendant agreed to give them the property after the transfer of funds, to which
Defendant allegedly agreed and provided instructions as to where to send funds. The funds
themselves meet the requirement of consideration, which is required in simple contracts in order
to be enforceable. Plaintiff alleges that on more than one occasion, opportunity existed for
Defendant to exit the contract and he did not do so. To the opposite, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant reaffirmed the contract by providing instructions to Plaintiff to send a friend to an
ATM to deposit funds to his alleged alternate account so that he may vacate his claim on the
property.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff, noting that in this simple contract, an offer is made by
Defendant, consideration exists in the form of the monetary transaction, and acceptance clearly
existed in Plaintiff okaying the contract and taking clear measures to fulfill the contract, while
also having allegedly verified that Defendant agreed, to which they received a confirmation. It
could not be construed by any reasonable party that an agreement did not exist, a meeting of the
minds had indeed taken place up until the point of the alleged failure to meet the terms. As such,
the Court believes that the contract would be enforceable and that the requirements for a simple
and verbal agreement were met.
c. Assumption of Risk
Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff assumed all risk in the matter as Plaintiff
approached Defendant first, and Defendant was not aware of the intention to offer compensation
for his property. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not a real-estate professional and that they
lacked the consultation of one at the time of the offer. Plaintiff retorts this argument by noting
that an assumption of risk is a defense from negligence, and not a defense of a breach of contract,
Plaintiff further argued that Defendant had misrepresented their intent to comply with the
agreement and had done so for personal gain. In addressing the matter of assumption of risk as a
defense of negligence, the Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Ridgeway contract law is presently dependent upon common law as both parties have
noted, no case law exists in the field of contract law within Ridgeway. The Court then looks
towards the precedents and interpretations of other states as persuasive opinions that may
influence this Court’s decision. Defendant’s motion suggests the application of a Maryland
precedent which establishes a standard in close relation to those used by federal district courts to
determine whether an assumption of risk exists. See ADM P'ship v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 702
A.2d 730, 734 (1997). Plaintiff contends that this decision is reference to a negligence defense,
and that an assumption of risk itself is a negligence defense. The Court will agree that such is
true, precedent brought by Defendant was relevant to a personal injury proceeding where
Plaintiff knew or should have known that the area in which they were walking had an increased
risk for injury.
An assumption of risk is a defense in a tort action, based on negligence or a willful and
wanton misconduct. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts §68 (5th ed. 1984). The
keyword in this interpretation of contract law is negligence, which is not alleged by any party in
this proceeding. Regardless, the Court examines the succeeding arguments made by Defendant.
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff knew when he approached Defendant that he was neither an
attorney nor a realtor and that Plaintiff himself did not have such representation, and that to
proceed without such representation would be to willfully understand inherent risks and enter
into what Defendant perceives to be a faulty agreement.
According to Keeton, “It is here that there is the greatest misapprehension and confusion
as to assumption of risk, and its most frequent misapplications. It is not true that in any case
where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known danger he necessarily consents to any further
negligence of the defendant. A pedestrian who walks across the street in the middle of a block,
through a stream of traffic traveling at excessive speed, cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be found to consent that the drivers shall not use care to watch for him and avoid running him
down.” Id. Similarly, a buyer cannot be expected to waive all liability and vacate any expectation
that a purchaser acts in good-faith. A plaintiff can expose himself to the risk of future harm, even
in a negligence defense, and yet not relieve the defendant of a duty to act with reasonable care.
Id. Yet this isn’t a negligence defense, it is a defense that the contract made is unenforceable,
which this Court has already addressed in a preceding paragraph, making it all the less applicable
in this controversy.
Lastly, the absence of an attorney or realtor could not possibly be interpreted to be an
assumption of risk on the part of any person entering into a contract with another person.
Plaintiff argued during oral arguments that such implementation of a standard would void
liability even in private sales of property, which are still a common process in the real world, this
Court would agree. Notwithstanding, no licensing board, licensing examination, or realty law
exists in the State of Ridgeway, and as such, any “realtor” could hardly be considered a
professional, there are no qualifications or base requirements to even serve in that position.
Taking all of this in mind, applying Maryland’s precedent is entirely inappropriate in this matter
because assumption of risk simply isn’t applicable to this defense.
III. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Milton, Ridgeway
County, Ridgeway, this 24th day of February, 2024.
ENFORCEMENTBEYOND
CHIEF JUSTICE
Copies to: Plaintiff / Defendant
Derogatoryyy, Attorney for the Plaintiff
notsfeelings, Attorney for the Plaintiff
stickza, Attorney for the Defendant
