IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HITHERWGUYS,
Plaintiff(s)
v.
THEBURNERPHONE,
Defendant.
and
State of Ridgeway
Defendant-Intervenor.
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Case No. RSC-CV-2305
Memorandum Opinion & Order
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant THEBURNERPHONE and Defendant-Intervenor State of
Ridgeway who brings this Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”). On review of the substance of
briefs submitted by both parties, it is ordered that the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff HITHERWGUYS alleges that they were driving near Palmer Avenue when they
encountered a number of law enforcement who were actively investigating a stopped vehicle
under suspicion of an unrelated crime. During that time, law enforcement had positioned their
vehicles in a manner that obstructed all lanes of traffic in the direction that Plaintiff was going
towards. No vehicles were allowed to pass as law enforcement continued their field
investigation. A law enforcement officer approached Plaintiff’s vehicle and told them to “just
turn” with little indication as to where they were directing Plaintiff to proceed. Plaintiff then
alleges that Defendant THEBURNERPHONE “physically removed the Plaintiff from their
vehicle against their will and without any legal basis for such action” and that it was “almost
immediately” after their initial direction by the first law enforcement officer.
Plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating R.V.C. § 7.08 which criminalizes
“driving the opposite way which traffic is directed to follow” by Defendant. Plaintiff filed this
civil action against the individual and quasi-official capacity of Defendant, seeking remedies
under 1 R. Stat. § 3114 for Official Misconduct and 1 R. Stat. § 3104 for False Imprisonment.
The Government intervened under 1 R. Stat. § 3208 as to Count One and also decided to defend
the Defendant under 1 R. Stat. § 3114(iv) as to Count Two of the civil complaint. The
Government filed a motion to dismiss arguing that their intervention allows them to invoke
Sovereign Immunity under 1 R. Stat. § 3203 so as to foreclose Count One and that Plaintiff
failed to state a well-pleaded claim that, even with all facts in their complaint taken at face value,
would be insufficient to succeed on 1 R. Stat. § 3104.
LEGAL FINDINGS
I. Sovereign Immunity & Count One
“The government shall be immune from all claims except those in this section, and later
laws in which liability is explicitly created against the government.” 1 R. Stat. § 3203. Our form
of sovereign immunity operates similar to that of the United States’ immunity, whereby “the
United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). “Absent a
waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). These are the boundaries that the Court operates under when
weighing any claim of sovereign immunity invoked by the State Government.
The first inquiry is whether a defendant being sued was acting in their official capacity
and under the protection of the Government. When a person is sued for actions taken “as an
agent of the government,” the case “shall be construed as [..] against the government.” 1 R. Stat.
§ 3205. In the case before the Court, Defendant THEBURNERPHONE was sued for actions that
they had taken incident to their duties as a State Trooper with the Ridgeway State Police, making
them an agent of the government. In light of this, causes of action for private capacity suits are
beyond the scope of Defendant’s actions — they must be taken for liabilities specifically created
against the government.
Aside from an explicit statutory waiver, the Government may waive their sovereign
immunity under two specific instances — for cases taken in a quasi-official capacity or for
actions “not in line with the laws, directives, orders, policies, or standard operating procedures of
the government and its agencies.” 1 R. Stat. § 3114(vi); 1 R. Stat. § 3209. The most applicable
provision to this case is the latter waiver, where the Government may refuse to defend an officer
if their conduct was egregiously incompatible with the standard of practice that a reasonable
agent of the government would practice. In that waiver, the “agent shall be liable for the
equitable offenses in his individual capacity, and the government shall cease to be a party and
have interest in the case.” 1 R. Stat. § 3213.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action is pursued under 1 R. Stat. § 3104 for False Imprisonment,
which is a tort that falls outside the waiver under 1 R. Stat. § 3203. Without any liability
specifically created against the government, this tort is inappropriate and cannot be pursued in
the current case. The Government has made clear that they do not intend to waive their sovereign
immunity in this case and that they will defend the officer under the authority of the government.
The only conclusion is that it must be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Failure to State Claim and Count Two
A complaint may be accepted if it has “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This rule mimics the similar authority
for the federal courts when examining a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As a general principle, the
Court looks towards federal precedents when our legal structures align. largeTitanic2 v.
Nevplaysgames 6 REXIS 13, 1 REXIS 1091 (Slip Opinion). With this, we look towards
precedents in the federal courts regarding the examination of where a motion to dismiss for
failing to state a claim may succeed.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). With the first cause of action dismissed, review is
limited to whether there exists sufficient factual matter to plausibly claim action on the second
cause of action, which is pursued under 1 R. Stat. § 3114 for Official Misconduct. There are four
requirements that are necessary for a type of claim for Official Misconduct of which Plaintiff
seeks, that the Defendant: (1) is a public servant; (2) commits an act relating to his office; (3) that
such act constitutes anunauthorized exercise of his official functions; (4) and that they know that
such act is unauthorized.
Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor both argue that the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s
complaint is insufficient to plausibly demonstrate the fourth ground required for a claim of
Official Misconduct. The Court is inclined to agree. The State Senate made clear their intentions
in providing liability for only those who knowingly act against the duties of their office — that
this cause of action is meant to punish the most egregious violators of the public trust, not the
minute mistakes which have other venues of rectification for their wrongs. This provision serves
as the separation between punishment for mistake and punishment for malice. Absent this
provision, Plaintiff’s complaint could likely succeed against a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff past asserted on the record that Defendant’s training as a law enforcement officer
should have made them know that their actions were contradictory to standard practice, therefore
their actions were knowingly done. This argument is only feasible for incidents of extreme
reckless disregard where a reasonable officer in the same situation, given the same set of facts,
would not have acted in a similar fashion. Where an officer acts so negligent so as to depart from
what is reasonably called upon by their training, their actions are negligent and must be done
with knowledge given that no other person would likely do the same except under extreme
recklessness or incompetence.
Defendant’s actions do not fit under this veil. Whether or not they lacked cause to
effectuate the arrest which Plaintiff now seeks action on is irrelevant and can be questioned
through other venues — such as seeking a writ for habeas corpus. The question for the civil
action before us is whether Defendant arrested the Plaintiff knowing that they had no probable
cause. This is an assertion unsupported by the current alleged factual assertions and Plaintiff
cannot make any inferences that may lead them to believe that Defendant knew they were
making an arrest without probable cause.
The only two conclusions that can be drawn in this case is (1) that there does not exist
sufficient assertion to plausibly demonstrate that Defendant knowingly arrested Plaintiff without
probable cause or (2) if, none exists because Defendant did not knowingly make an arrest
without probable cause, that this cause of action is inappropriate and reserved for punishment of
the most evil of public officers, not for mistakes of law. Either conclusion leads to the same path
on this motion.
CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Palmer, Ridgeway
County, this 2nd day of March 2024 that, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendant and
Defendant-Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
/s/ TaxesArentAwesome
TaxesArentAwesome
Superior Court Judge
