IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
BRXKEN_NOOB
Plaintiff,
v.
COLINTHEGREATEST
Defendant.
___________________________/
CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 01-2024-CV-002273
PRESIDING: SPECIAL MASTER
TURNTABLE5000
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendant, colinthegreatest’s Motion for Pro-
tective Order. Brxken_noob (“Plaintiff”) entered a Civil Complaint against Defendant
colinthegreatest on February 10, 2024, and Plaintiff’s Counsel, perhcSIXTY, served Complaint
upon Defendant on the same date. The Court permitted a period of five days, not including the
date of service, for the entry of an answer to the Complaint. On February 15, 2024, Defendant
submitted an answer to the Complaint. Plaintiff notified the court that a subpoena would be nec-
essary to require the attendance of qLostful, a deputy of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office.
Witness then appeared before the court and Plaintiff indicated his wish to depose the witness.
Defendant submitted a Motion for Protective Order shortly thereafter to limit the scope of inquiries
at the deposition. Based on the undersigned reasons, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Ridgeway. Defendant is a resident of the State of
Ridgeway. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that on February 9, 2024, he was present at the Gas
Station adjacent to Oakland. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant was transported by Deputy
qLostFul of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office (“RCSO”). Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant
obstructed traffic, impersonated an officer, and stayed on the roof of Plaintiff’s vehicle where after
being ordered to “stop” by Defendant, Plaintiff’s vehicle was shot at and destroyed by Defendant.
Plaintiff submitted the Complaint before the Court, alleging a claim of battery, assault, and
false imprisonment. Falcon sought that this Court award actual and compensatory damages. This
Court granted summons, to which Defendant arrived promptly upon service of the complaint and
summons. After the Defendant’s appearance, an answer to the Complaint was submitted.
During pre-trial and discovery proceedings, Plaintiff maintained that Deputy qLostFul of
the RCSO (“Witness” or “Deponent”) was not compliant, and the court issued a subpoena com-
pelling their attendance and cooperation for this matter. Plaintiff notified Defendant of his inten-
tions to depose Witness. Defendant then submitted a Motion for Protective Order to limit the scope
of inquiry during the deposition. Plaintiff waived their response to said motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
In this matter, the court must consider the language regarding protective orders to deter-
mine the appropriate legal standard. Rule 19(c) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure reads as
follows:
“Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court, as the case may be, where the deposition
is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]”
Similarly, the federal rules prescribe that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Due to the clear mirroring of these rules, this court will “rely on
federal precedent to guide its interpretation.” Lazerify v. StudsPerSecond, 1 Rid. 101, 104 (2023);
see also Titanic v. Nev, 1 Rid. 80, 84 (2023).
Issuances of protective orders fall squarely within this court’s ambit. See Seattle Times Co.
v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). Movant must demonstrate that “good cause” is present. Only
then will a protective order be issued to protect a person or party. See Rid. R. Civ. P. 19(c); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Good cause” is present when justice requires the protection of “a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” Ibid. It has
often been described as a “mutable standard,” one that is “liberal [. . .] but not so elastic as to be
devoid of substance.” Compania Interamericana v. Compania Dominicana, 88 F.3d 948, 951
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989)). It is “a uniquely flexible
and capacious concept, meaning simply a legally sufficient reason.” Polansky v. Executive Health
Resources, 17 F.4th 376, 387 (3rd Cir. 2021); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 101 (4th pocket ed.
2011). For these reasons, it is “not a difficulty standard to meet.” Hall v. Secretary of Health, Ed.
and Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979).
In the context of a protective order, Movant is required to demonstrate “particular and spe-
cific demonstration of fact[s], as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements[.]” 8
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2035 at 265 (1970). These statements “must
show that ‘specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.’” Ground Zero
Ctr. for Nonviolent Action, Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 860 F.3d 1244, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citing Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir.
2002)). Absent these showings, a protective order will not be issued.
Protective orders may take several forms as prescribed by Rule 19(c) of the Ridgeway
Rules of Civil Procedure; Movant specifically requests the fourth form which authorizes “that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain mat-
ters[.]” The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain one clause that is somewhat similar to Rule
19(c) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure: “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or lim-
iting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). How-
ever, several states contain rules that are exactly the same as Rule 19(c) of the Ridgeway Rules of
Civil Procedure.1 Due to these similarities, the court will consider the interpretations of other ju-
risdictions in a manner that best balances the limitations of ROBLOX with the intricacies of the
State of Ridgeway and its laws. See State v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. 46, 51 (2022) (Lx1nas III) (deferring
to the Supreme Court of Vermont because of an in-game state provision that has been “derived
from a provision of a real-life state”).
The court will scrutinize each protective order in a unique manner dependent upon what is
being requested. Indeed, “[t]he decision as to the type and scope of any protective order rests
within the sound discretion of the trial judge and must be determined on a case by case basis.”
FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For example, a protective order seeking
prohibition against a deposition is rarely granted, whereas protective orders that seek to protect
confidential settlement agreements are frequently granted. Compare Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593
F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) (“It is very unusual for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition
altogether and absent extraordinary circumstances, such an order would likely be in error.”) with
Phillips, 307 F.3d. at 1212 (“Most significantly, courts have granted protective orders to protect
confidential settlement agreements.”). The court must “balance the right to discovery with the need
to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’” Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 902 (6th Cir. 2012) (cit-
ing Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998)).
III. ANALYSIS
First, the court must determine if good cause is present in the motion. If this is answered
in the affirmative, then the inquiry may continue. If it is not present, then the inquiry ends there.
Movant alleges that Deponent is “at risk of suffering undue burden by being compelled to provide
testimony at their deposition for what they have not witnessed.” Defendant’s Motion for Protective
Order, at ¶ 3. As such, Movant asks for this court to enter a protective order which holds “that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain mat-
ters[.]” Rid. R. Civ. P. 19(c).
Deponent is being called as a lay witness as specified by the Petitioner on the record. A lay
witness’ testimony is limited to one that is: “(1) rationally based on the witness's perception; (2)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or in determining a fact in issue; and
(3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 43.”
Rid. R. Evid. 42(a – c). If Deponent cannot give testimony because he did not perceive it, Defend-
ant is perfectly capable of lodging an objection. Objections, while not typically ruled upon at a
deposition, may still be made pursuant to Rule 23(b) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure.
Protective orders which seek to limit the scope of inquiry generally bring particular facts that
demonstrate an imminent harm. Movant claims that Deponent will suffer an “undue burden,” how-
ever, this is simply not the case.
Movant has not adequately demonstrated that Deponent will be subject to “specific preju-
dice or harm [. . .] if no protective order is granted.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210-1211. Simply
because Petitioner may ask a question that is subject to an objection does not generate to an “undue
burden” being placed upon Deponent. If that were to be the case, no witness would ever be called
to testify in a court of law, or be subject to a deposition.
1 See Ala. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Ark. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 26(c); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c); Mass. R.
Civ. P. 26(c); Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.03(a); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.03; Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(7); N. H. Civ. P. 29; Miss. R.
Civ. P. 26(d).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order to
Limit the Scope of Inquiries at Deposition.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Milton, Ridgeway
County, Ridgeway, this 24th day of February 2024.
TURNTABLE5000
SPECIAL MASTER
Copies to: Plaintiff / Defendant
perhcSIXTY / Derogatoryyy
