IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
FALCON_2S
Plaintiff,
v.
ORBXS, GGUTSLASHER,
HAUNNTINGS
Defendants.
___________________________/
CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 01-2024-CV-002264
JUDGE: HON. TURNTABLE5000
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendants, Orbxs and Ggutslasher’s Motion
for Dismissal with Prejudice. Falcon_2s (“Falcon”) entered a Civil Complaint against Defendants
Orbxs, Ggutslasher, and Haunntings and Process Server Just_Dapper of DorkJacob Law, PLLC.,
served Defendant on February 12, 2024. The Court permitted a period of five days, not including
the date of service, for the entry of an answer to the Complaint. On February 16, 2024, Defendants
submitted an answer to the Complaint. Therein, Defendants alleged that the Plaintiff failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion is DE-
NIED, for the reasons explained therein.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Ridgeway. Defendants are residents of the State of
Ridgeway. Falcon alleges in his Complaint that on February 3, 2024, he was stopped at a red light
adjacent to the Palmer Police Department building. Falcon then alleges that he was shot and killed
by Ggutslasher, one of three individuals present at the scene, who then jointly fired upon and
destroyed Falcon’s vehicle with the aid of Orbxs and Haunntings.
Falcon submitted the Complaint before the Court, alleging a claim of wrongful death
against Ggutslasher, and a claim of trespass to chattels to all named Defendants. Falcon sought
that this Court award actual and compensatory damages, as well as declaratory relief. This Court
granted summons, to which one Defendant (Ggutslasher) subsequently appeared on. Two other
Defendants currently remain unaccounted for and are not present for the proceedings. Counselor
Stickza appeared on the behalf of Ggutslasher and Orbxs.
Shortly after the Counselor’s appearance, an answer to the Complaint was submitted.
Therein remained an affirmative defense claiming that the court ought to dismiss the Complaint
for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A hearing on the Motion for Dismissal
with prejudice was scheduled for later that day when both parties made their appearances. During
the hearing, Plaintiff conceded a primary point that made up the bulk of Defendants’ argument as
to why dismissal should be entered. Plaintiff then asked for leave to amend Complaint.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
In this matter, the court must consider two different legal issues in order to properly adju-
dicate this matter: (1) whether the complaint is facially plausible and has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted; and (2) whether Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his Complaint or
whether the action should be dismissed with or without prejudice.
First, according to Ridgeway Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(5), parties may move to dis-
miss an action if the Complaint “[f]ail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”
Furthermore, in order for a Complaint to survive a motion to dismiss based on Rid. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(5), it must contain both: “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself enti-
tled.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
The abovementioned subsection of the Ridgeway “is copied verbatim from Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Lazerify v. StudsPerSecond, 1 Rid. 101, 104 n. 2 (2023).
Due to the analogous nature of these subsections, the court has relied on and will continue to rely
on “federal precedent to guide its interpretation of relative issues.” Ibid. In order to survive a Rule
12(a)(5) dismissal motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Among these pleadings, the
general tenet that they are viewed as “true” for purposes of a motion to dismiss is not applicable
to “threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555. This tenet also does not apply to a legal conclusion that is “couched as
a factual allegation.” Ibid. Next, due to the non-uniformity of complaints across the judiciary, the
pleadings and their plausibility are to be viewed in proximity with the context; this requires the
“reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id., at 556. A claim is facially
plausible when facts are plead in a manner that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Lazerify, 1 Rid., at 105 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S., at 556). Plaintiff must tie in the facts to their alleged sustained injury in order for it to be
compliant with Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Supreme Court of Ridgeway has also clarified that “[a]t
the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may
suffice.” Lazerify, 1 Rid., at 107 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343 (1996)).
Second, when a trial court determines the correct degree to which a matter should be dis-
missed, whether it be with or without prejudice, such a determination squarely falls within the
ambit of that court. Some instances, as per the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, require that
certain matters be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Rid. R. Civ. P. 4(g). Generally, civil
complaints “should be rejected by a court” if they are facially insufficient or if the claims presented
do not entitle Plaintiff to relief. Lazerify, supra, at 110. A decision to dismiss with prejudice should
be reserved for instances where “there is something so gravely wrong with the plaintiff’s assertions
in their complaint that such a case should never return to the court.” Id., at 111. The court will
always have “the ability to utilize the findings of the Court [. . .] to come to a determination as to
how a faulty civil complaint should be handled in each case as it pertains to prejudice applied to
the dismissal.” Ibid; see also Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Conditionally, in circumstances where dismissal ought to be entered, the court may choose
to grant leave to amend the Complaint as it is “committed to the discretion of the trial court.”
General Elec. Co. v. Sargent Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990). Generally, “[t]he court
should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). As a cor-
ollary to this, leave to amend should very rarely be rejected; denial ought to be reserved for in-
stances where it is requested “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason,” including rea-
sons like:
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated fail-
ure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment,
etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure ought to be construed in a manner that “secure[s]
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Rid. R. Civ. P.
1(b). Judicial resources, although not as scarce as they are in real life, ought to be preserved in a
manner that enables this rule. By permitting amendments to Complaints when they are defective
and not beyond repair “conserves judicial resources and is consistent with our liberal system of
pleading.” Farmland Industries v. Morrison-Quirk Grain, 54 F.3d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing
Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1197 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1982)).
III. ANALYSIS
During the hearing on the Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice, Counselor for Defendants
argued that the Complaint did not adequately demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to relief and how
the facts plead align with the elements of the causes of action. Furthermore, Counselor for Defend-
ants added that “a mere formulaic recitation of elements of a cause of action will not do.” Lazerify,
supra, at 105 (quoting Twombly, supra, at 555). Shortly thereafter, Counselor for Plaintiff ap-
proached and conceded that Defendants’ argument was correct, however, insisted that leave to
amend or refile be granted. Because Plaintiff conceded their point on whether the Complaint was
facially plausible under the Twiqbal1 standard, this court will not consider that point with the ex-
ception of whether “there is something so gravely wrong with the plaintiff’s assertions in their
complaint that such a case should never return to the court.” Lazerify, supra, at 111. The court will
also consider whether dismissal should be entered without prejudice, or whether Plaintiff should
be granted leave to amend their complaint.
This court is armed with several options, and it is well within our ambit to consider whether
dismissal should even be entered in the first place. Plaintiff concedes that there is a defect in the
Complaint. Defendants maintain that dismissal ought to be entered as their client has incurred
heavy costs in legal fees and because a hearing on a Motion for Dismissal with prejudice is not the
appropriate forum to rectify errors. In this matter, we turn to the Lazerify Court where it was held
that there should be dire circumstances present in which “a dismissal with prejudice would neces-
sarily be warranted.” Lazerify, supra, at 110. For actions that only require “minor adjustments to
yield sound civil complaints,” dismissal without prejudice should be entered. Id., at 111. Defend-
ants’ argument is not compelling in the sense that dismissal with or without prejudice ought to be
entered. Dismissal without prejudice should be reserved for instances where there is “enough room
for the errors of the civil complaints to be corrected in a timely fashion before a case is refiled.”
Id., at 110-111. For matters where the Complaint can be corrected in an even shorter timeframe,
1 The “Twiqbal” standard refers to the portmanteau of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
the court should consider granting leave to remedy the defects in the Complaint. The defects do
not rise to a level where it would be futile to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Leave to
amend shall only be denied under a specific set of stringent circumstances which are not present
in this matter. See, e.g., Foman, supra, at 182. In order to promote the proper and economic usage
of scarce judicial resources, courts are given the authority to grant leave to prospective Plaintiffs.
In this matter, the defects can simply be corrected in a short time frame. For these reasons, in order
to ensure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,” leave
is granted to Plaintiff to amend their Complaint. Rid. R. Civ. P. 1(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal with Preju-
dice. The Court DECLINES to dismiss this matter without prejudice. The Court GRANTS Plain-
tiff leave to amend their Complaint. Plaintiff shall have a total of forty-eight (48) hours since the
conclusion of the hearing on the Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Milton, Ridgeway
County, Ridgeway, this 17th day of February 2024.
TURNTABLE5000
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies to: Plaintiff / Defendants
DorkJacob / Stickza
