IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway,
v.
DEVPEDIA, NICESKULL309, and
PEBLITOO
Defendant(s).
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Case No. RSC-CM-2131
Memorandum Opinion & Order
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants DEVPEDIA, NICESKULL309, and PEBLITOO who
motion for dismissal with prejudice of the aforementioned case against them on an argument of a
violation of speedy trial. On review of oral arguments held in the Palmer Courthouse on
February 10th, 2024, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
In this matter, the Government filed charges against all three named Defendants on
October 23, 2024, charging them with an assorted number of violent crimes related to actions
taken by a criminal syndicate organization that operates within the Ridgeway area. Probable
cause was established by this Court two days following the introduction of the Criminal
Information. Soonafter, the Court issued summons seeking the presence of all Defendants in this
action. The Government served all summoned individuals.
Within that time, the State of Ridgeway experienced an unnatural event that would
suspend all game operations because of copyright-related issues between members of the original
founding development team which required the game to be closed while ongoing legal
discussions were pursued on the assertion of intellectual property rights related to the Ridgeway
County game. All departments suspended their operations and general morale within the player
community was at an all-time low as the opposing evil empire to Ridgeway had remained
unscathed by the legal procession.
The Defendant failed to appear and the Government had made notice of that to the Court
on November 27. After that, the events regarding the development studio’s intellectual property
issue had transpired and the game was taken offline. Operations resumed around late December
of that year. The Court would resume this case on January 18th and continue attempting to
ascertain the presence of all three Defendants. Permission for proceedings in absentia was
allowed on February 9 by the Court, in which a court-appointed attorney would represent the
interests of the Defendants.
On that same day, the court-appointed attorney moved for dismissal on the grounds that
the delay between October 23 and February 9 was a violation of speedy trial and that the rights
of the Defendants would be prejudiced by a severe burden of locating witnesses from before the
temporary closure of Ridgeway County, among other arguments. The Court held a hearing on
February 10 between the Government and the court-appointed attorney on the question of a
speedy trial violation. Their arguments are summarized as follows.
The Government asserted that the delay was not severe enough to be considered a
violation of speedy trial because the delay was related to the Court attempting to locate the
presence of the Defendants and was therefore necessary for the administration of justice. Further,
the Government argued that the invocation of speedy trial came after the violation instead of
putting the Court on notice that they requested a speedy trial to take importance over other
matters. Defense countered that the Government should have sought proceedings in absentia in
October if they had difficulties locating the presence of the Defendants. Additionally, they
argued that the delay was because of the unnatural shutdown of Ridgeway County furthered by a
lack of court staff to assist in the summoning of the Defendants. Lastly, they pointed out that the
right to speedy trial was invoked as soon as the Court appointed an attorney to represent the
interests of the Defendants and so the right should still be examined for violation.
LEGAL FINDINGS
In our jurisdiction, the legal concept of speedy trial has very little statutory or historical
grounds. Though our own State Constitution requires that each criminal defendent be given a
“speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country, when so required,” this Court has very
rarely applied this principle on our cases given the amatuer nature of our legal system. Rid.
Const. art. I, sec. VI. In the absence of statutorily-created barriers or other concrete procedures
that can assist us in reading this claim, this Court must default to other jurisdictions to guide our
judgments. See State of Ridgeway v. Lx1nas III, 1 Rid. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 3). Namely,
this clause invokes a protection given by our Federal Constitution that requires that “the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Furthermore, the
Defendants invoked the Sixth Amendment in their arguments, which leads the Court to draw
from the jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment.
I. Ridgeway Jurisprudence on Speedy Trial Protections
Before taking on the journey of federal protections of the Sixth Amendment, it is
important to first dispel the supposed jurisprudence that we have in our State regarding a claim
of speedy trial. During a recess of the hearing for the motion this opinion is written for, the Court
was made aware of past precedent by this Court adopting a ridgid test with set parameters of how
long a case must proceed in a given time. Looking towards the federal protections of the Sixth
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the “right of a speedy trial is necessarily
relative” and that it “is consistent with delays and depends on circumstances.” Beavers v.
Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1904). There are times where an accused is best served by delay, and
othertimes where they are not. To adopt an inflexible test blind to the circumstances of delay is
inappropriate and a view that the Court will not voluntarily espouse.
To be clear, this ruling does not determine that a rigid test of precision and inflexibility is
necessarily incompatible with the Sixth Amendment or with our own state protections, but rather
that it is not a requirement that comes by its nature. It is entirely within the legislature’s authority
to prescribe these rules if it is within their agenda. Additionally, it is within the authority of our
State Supreme Court to prescribe a rigid test by adoption of procedural rule. In fact, the
court-appointed attorney for the Defendants made a statement of advocacy calling for the
legislature to look towards this type of protection afforded by statute. The Court will not engage
in legislative advoacy itself but will note that statutory speedy trial limitations as rigid as
mentioned would not be incompatible with this ruling.
II. Adoption of the Barker Test
Instead of a rigid test, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “balancing test [that]
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1971). In Barker, the Court identified four factors that weigh into a speedy
trial: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.” Id. This is the test most appropriate for maintaining the protections
afforded through speedy trial, while hesitating from using the pen of the legislature to draw up a
test of obscure standing. It is for that reason that the Court chooses to adopt the Barker test for
the remainder of the opinion.
III. Application of Barker to This Case
Our next examination is on the application of the Barker test on this case, which is a
point that both parties of the case have presented differing assertions and interpretations on the
delay caused in this case. First, this Court notes that both parties agreed that the delay was absurd
and unnatural to the progression of the administration of justice, but both sides differ on how to
interpret the delay itself and whether it is excusable because it was unnatural or if it is best
resolved with dismissal because it was unnatural. Both arguments are reviewed below but first
begins the fatal flaw to the Defendants’ argument.
Both parties mainly prioritized on the second prong, whether the reason for the delay was
excusable for the administration of justice and maintenance of due process. The Government
asserted that the delay was caused by summons issues and that the trial could not continue
without their presence. The court-appointed attorney argued that the Government should have
sought proceedings in absentia and that delay was of choice. Further, they argued that the delay
was caused by the death of the game and standstill in court administration, not by a lack of
presence of the Defendants.
Regardless of either interpretation, both reasons are absolutely necessary for the
administration of justice to be conducted with the most benefit to the rights of the defendant. It is
important to note that the concept of proceedings in absentia in the context of an American
criminal trial is strictly a creation of the Roblox platform because of the nature of in-game
constraints. The practice of conducting a hearing in absentia itself is rooted in practice but not
law. In light of this, the decision of proceeding in absentia is within the authority and discretion
of the judge presiding over any given case. The fatal flaw strikes here that it is not an undue
burden for a court to wait for the presence of a defendant, whether it be because of death of a
game causing a lack of court administration to be able to summon the defendant or because an
inability to locate a defendant.
It is important to note that “speedy trial provision has no application until the putative
defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused.’” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313
(1971). Defendants were not held under any incapacitation or other form of penalty until the
arrest warrant was served and the proceedings in absentia continued, which occurred after the
delay happened. The appropriate understanding is that the delay was done before the Defendants
had become properly accused and faced incapacitation from the Government. Prejudice to the
defendant remains largely minimal before the stage of criminal proceedings where a defendant
must be summoned, as they aren’t necessarily accused but the Government is preparing its
accusation to begin proceedings. For speedy trial to attach, there must be charge and arrest. Id, at
319. To that, the present claim of speedy trial suffers a fatal flaw.
Under the assertion by the Defendants’ reading of the Sixth Amendment, a real-life
accused could dodge all criminal liabilities by successfully eluding capture and arrest until
speedy trial compelled dismissal. Applying that standard to our administration, a judge that, in
their own discretion, felt strongly against proceedings in absentia would also allow for total
evasion of criminal liability. This view cannot stand in practice and a clear answer stands —
proceedings in absentia is not a required remedy to avoid a claim of speedy trial and is, has
always been in practice, a permission at the total discretion of the judge presiding.
Lastly, both parties argued on whether the Defendants’ invocation of speedy trial was
appropriate after the delay had happened. It is noted that many other states use this methodology
of invocation regarding the speedy trial protection, but many reject it as well. In our current case,
we are not statutorily bound to require that a criminal defendant invoke their right at the
beginning of trial — so we are allowed to either part or side with it here.
The decision today is to part from that requirement and find that it is incompatible with
other similar protections afforded. The U.S. Supreme Court similarly reasoned that “[s]uch an
approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this
Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights.” Barker, supra at 525. To assume that
the right to speedy trial is waived until invoked is inappropriate for the basis of constitutional
protections, that a person doesn’t have a right until they claim it with the Government. Further,
this approach remains inconsistent with the historical traditions of the Sixth Amendment. To that
end, it is undeniable that the Defendants’ invocation in this case was correctly manuevered —
albeit it must be rejected for the reasons previously stated.
CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Palmer, Ridgeway
County, this 11th day of February 2024 that, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.
/s/ TaxesArentAwesome
TaxesArentAwesome
Superior Court Judge
