RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
State of Ridgwau,
Plaintiff,
v.
iamthebestlaith15
Accused.
Case No. RSC-CM-
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
The starting place for any Court when interpreting a statute is the plain text. .R. Dickerson v.
New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983). The text of the First Degree Murder in
relevant part is as follows: “committing murder of a peace officer or civil department employee
discharging a lawful duty, with the knowledge of the person being a peace officer or civil
department agent,” Rid. Crim. Code §3.09. And though this statute might, at first analysis, be
clear, it is not. In order for one to be guilty of murder, one must murder. This, of course, makes
the statute circular. And while circularity may not be fatal to a statute, it forces this Court to
embark on an analysis into the intended meaning of the word “murder.”
1. THE HISTORICAL RECORD REFLECTS THE TRUE DEFINITION
In analysing any given statute, a Court must attempt to ascertain the intent of the
legislative body when the drafting of the statute was done. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144
U.S. 47, 59 (1892). This is however no easy task as the legislature has not provided an official
notice of its intent. Further, the statute in question was not drafted at a time when there was an
active legislature. Instead, it was drafted by the Developer Oversight and grandfathered in as
legislation at the beginning of the State. The only notable change to the statute is the expansion
of its scope by the legislature in the Fire Department Establishment Act (Pub. L. 3-02). This
change, however, did nothing to the statute that would help this Court ascertain the definition of
the word murder, for the amended part is independent of the verb. Therefore, absent clear
legislative intent this Court must defer to the plain text of the statute. United States v. James,
478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986). This brings this Court back to the original question: what does it mean
to murder? And because we cannot analyse the statutory intent, it is best to look at the historical
record.
The historical record is important because “the common law still remains the basis of the
criminal law of nearly all American jurisdictions,” Ronald H. Maudsley, Developments in the
English Law of Homicide, 14 U. Miami L. Rev. 355 (1960). Further, the historical record is
important because whenever there may be doubt on the meaning of a word, a court ought to
consider the ordinary meaning of the word in question. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42
(1979) (words not defined in statute should be given ordinary or common meaning). And a good
indicator of the meaning of a word is its common-law meaning. Johnson v. United States, 559
U.S. 133, 139 (2010) (“a common-law term of art should be given its established common-law
meaning.”). The facial value of these authorities alone foreclose the notion that “murder” can be
defined simply as the killing of another individual because at the common-law,“murder” is the
killing of another with malice aforethought—the proper term for that is homicide.
But if the authority of both Perrin and Johnson are not conclusive, look also to the history
and development of the criminality of action of homicide. Indeed, as far back as the high middle
ages a distinction between the intentional and the accidental killing of another was recognized.
Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74 Mich. L. Rev.
413, 416. Even after the reforms of Henry II, the difference between felonious and non-felonious
homicide was recognized, with the non-felonious kind being further subdivided into justified and
excusable. Id., at 419. All of this is to say that even in its infancy, English royal law recognized
that some killings were murderous and others were not, and there is no good reason why our
legislature did not intend to. Further look to the colonial-era American law which has so often
been used as authority. The Pennsylvania Act of 1794 defined two sets of homicides that have
been considered as of a first degree: those homicides that were premeditated and deliberate and
those occurring in the commission of certain felonies. Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 704. This is a far cry from the
proposed definition by the State. It is in fact words apart. Consider one scholar’s definition of
murder which is “is the unlawful killing of one person by another with malice aforethought,”
Howard J. Curtis, Malice Aforethought, In Definition of Murder, 19 Yale L. J. 639 (1910). To
suggest that “murder” means the same as killing is incongruous with hundreds of years of
precedent, many of which are not listed here.
2. CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT THIS TRUE
DEFINITION
Let’s now look to other statutes that cover similar issues. Every statute that covers
homicide does so without utilising the term “murder.” Voluntary Manslaughter for instance is
defined as “The act of causing death of an individual while in the heat of passion,” Rid. Crim.
Code §3.07. Involuntary Manslaughter is much the same with the only difference being an
element of gross negligence and recklessness substituted for the heat of passion. Consider even
the charge of Attempted Murder which is defined as, “The act of attempting to kill another
individual,” Id., at §3.08. Every other statute beyond First Degree Murder utilises an alternative
to simply “murder.” This is important because when interpreting the meaning of a word, a Court
must avoid assigning different words the same meanings, lest redundancy occurs. Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995). If this Court were to accept the definition of murder as
homicide, it would be doing just that. It would take a well-settled meaning and reduce it to a
shell of its past self. It would make other statutes simply redundant.
But finally, also consider the concept of lenity: the idea that “penal laws should be
construed strictly,” The Adventure, 1 F. Cas. 202, 204 (No. 93) (CC Va. 1812) (Marshall, C. J.).
Utilising the concept of statutory lenity, the definition of murder cannot be construed so liberally
as to include all killings. Consider a relatively applicable authority. In United States v.
Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820).
However, due to the rule of lenity the statute could not have been interpreted to cover the sailor’s
conduct because “penal laws are to be construed strictly,” 5 Wheat., at 95. As Justice Gorsuch
put it, “where uncertainty exists, the law gives way to liberty,” Wooden v. United States, 595
U.S. __, __ (Gorsuch, J. concurring in judgement (slip op. at 7).
CONCLUSION
Just as all roads lead to Rome, so too do all methods of statutory interpretation lead to
one conclusion: that murder cannot simply mean the killing of another. Any decision otherwise
would ignore the historical record, the canon against redundancy and the rule of lenity.
THEREFORE, this Court ought to interpret the statute as not giving rise to criminal
liability, simply for the killing of an officer of the law.
Respectfully Submitted,
HolyRomanRyan
Public Defender
State Bar No. 17105
Brotheman
Attorney at law
State Bar No. 17138
Counsel for Accused
