ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BATTALIONGAVIN,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CM-971
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court has decided to dismiss the indictment against the defendant with prejudice
in response to the motion presented by the defense. However, this order will not encompass
nor analyze the deficiencies in the Grand Jury that the defense contends existed due to
direction from the Supreme Court.
I. The State’s inability to produce a sustainable indictment against the defendant
twice has prejudiced the defendant’s due process rights.
For the second time now the State has failed to produce an indictment against the
defendant that not only holds legal grounds but is sustainable for a prosecution. A dismissal
without prejudice will simply not remedy the due process rights violations experienced by
the defendant. It would leave the door wide open for the State to try defendants repeatedly
over and over in the hopes that their deficiencies would find refuge in a different judge’s
chambers who may be more lenient or less attentive. That is not in the principles of justice
nor the fair administration of such, and it the Court’s reasoning is not dissimilar to the
reasoning of why we have the double jeopardy doctrine – so that the State has an interest in
not only attentively and carefully administering justice but also preventing undue and
malicious prosecution as the “liberty of the individual [is] protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53 (1904) (citing
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 591 (1897)).
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This further ties into the idea that allowing the State to continually reconvene a grand
jury until a judge simply allows them to pursue such a prosecution also acts contrary to the
idea that large delays between trial and the crime in its first instance can prejudice the
defendant “in any number of ways.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 660 (1992). It is
because over time that the law “establish[es], at a minimum, that criminal defendants have
the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses
at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of
guilt.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 56 (1987). Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967) and this power
and ability to recall witnesses diminishes more often than not over time as expected over
ROBLOX as people may leave the community, have reduced contact with the defendant
and/or may simply fail to recall probative and useful facts in helping the court reach a
balanced and fair conclusion.
It is further because of the reason that defendant’s due process rights are violated
when the government (1) unduly fails to prosecute in a speedy manner and maintain the
availability of their witnesses for trial, (2) that the availability and ability of the defendant to
challenge witnesses diminishes over time more so over ROBLOX than real life and because
(3) it is more prejudicial to allow the government to refile and refile and refile until they hit
the jackpot. It is on a case by case basis that courts must act to preserve the rights of the
accused from undue prejudice and this serves to be a prime vehicle for that motive.
It is because of the “underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88
(1957); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,
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127–28 (1980). For a comprehensive effort to assess the purposes of application of the
clause, see Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT.
REV. 81. While this relates to the double jeopardy clause it nonetheless applies almost
directly here – the continued ability of the State “with all its resources and powers” should
not be encouraged nor permitted to refile their cases until they can get ‘their food to stick to
the wall’. They have had since January to not only file this case adequately after their
previous charging dilemma but to fix any erroneous attempts at redress – they have failed
here and quite miserably as a matter of fact. The defendant’s right to due process is so
‘‘valued’’ because he has a legitimate interest in completing the trial ‘‘once and for all’’ and
‘‘conclud[ing] his confrontation with society’’ United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486
(1971) (plurality opinion) so as to be spared the expense and ordeal of repeated trials, the
anxiety and insecurity of having to live with the possibility of conviction, and the possibility
that the prosecution may strengthen its case with each try as it learns more of the evidence
and of the nature of the defense see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503–05 (1978);
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35–36 (1978). See Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory
of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 86–97.
There is little doubt in the court’s mind that the defendant’s due process rights would
be jeopardized and inextricably violated by the State being permitted to reinitiate another
prosecution – especially on such high caliber offenses like Treason which carry a sentence of
life imprisonment. The “absence of [fundamental] fairness fatally infected the trial” Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) from the moment the State submitted the inadequate
indictment to the Court which not only summarily denied petitioner of his Sixth Amendment
right to be adequately informed of the offenses against him but inadvertently exonerated him
or at least juxtaposed the criminal offense laid against him. Lower courts are given much
deference in taking somewhat overly precarious precautions in relation to the defendant’s
right to due process enshrined in the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. This is seen
even when the appellate court deemed the judge’s actions precautious they nonetheless
affirmed judgment because it was done in the interests of the defendant and his constitutional
rights. See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). See also United States v. Tateo, 377
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U.S. 463 (1964); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483 (1971). The Court affirmed this
idea of prejudicial prosecution as “by using the same evidence in multiple trials the State
continued its relentless prosecutions until it got the result it wanted. It in effect tried the
accused for four murders three consecutive times, massing in each trial the horrible details of
each of the four deaths. This is an unseemly and oppressive use of a criminal trial that
violates the concept of due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever its
ultimate scope is taken to be.” Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). Therefore, a retrial on
an offense relating to a punishment that would carry life imprisonment for a second time on
seemingly little attempt at change by the State would further prejudice the defendant's right
to a fair trial and his due process rights.
II. The State’s inability to provide an adequately worded indictment informing the
defendant of the nature of his charges violates the Sixth Amendment.
“It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an
offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, ‘includes generic terms, it is not
sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the
definition; but it must state the species,—it must descend to particulars.’” United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 558. An indictment not framed to apprise the defendant "with
reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him . . . is defective, although it
may follow the language of the statute." United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, 362.
As the defense rightly points out Count 1 quite literally denotes that the defendant
was the “owner” of the document and therefore it would imply he personally owned it – not
the State. Simply because a privately created document is utilized by the State does not
immediately entail it to be State property, it would imply any motion for example I used as a
private attorney that the State then used in a petition for a Supreme Court writ would
automatically become custody of the State – removing any autonomy and agency from me
and my ownership of such. Even so, Count Two is the literal epitome of the undue burden
and prejudice exhibited by the State in both attempts to retry this case – it suggests that the
defendant engaged in the act of “Obstruction of Justice” through the mere deletion of
documents – not utilized in a criminal investigation but a handbook of which he supposedly
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owned and he supposedly created. While the State did not author the indictment – to the
knowledge of the court – they nonetheless were happy to proceed under its authority and
therefore must bear the burden of being either negligent in not ensuring that it was adequate
for prosecutorial purposes or malicious in knowingly proceeding in the hopes the court
would not act against such an indictment. If the contents of an information or indictment can
be copy and pasted almost verbatim in any other defendant’s charging document it is
insufficient to provide reasonable notice to the defendant in regards to the charges laid
against him by the State. Either way, the defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment
rights through the vague and inexplicit wording of the indictment on both counts which fails
to descend into particulars.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the court finds in favor of the defense motion and grants a dismissal
with prejudice following the finding that his rights have been unduly violated and would
undergo undue violation if a retrial were to occur yet again. THEREFORE, the above
captioned case is dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 13th day of March, 2023.
__________________________________
HON. ALEX J. CABOT
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
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