STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ECTOPLEX,
Defendant.
DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-944
Dated February 19, 2023
CHAMBERS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TONY GIORDANO
Hon. Tony Giordano, Magistrate Judge of the Superior Court for the State of Ridgeway:
ORDER ON THE MOTION TO DROP THE CHARGE OF ARMED ROBBERY
I.
It is the hope of the defense to have the armed robbery (see Title 4, Section 06 of
the Ridgeway State Criminal Code) is quite clear in its reading. It so much says, “[t]he
act of taking another person’s property that involves the use of a lethal weapon to
perpetrate violence or the threat of violence against that person.” Ibid.
Through a close reading of not only the statute, but the evidence submitted in the
Criminal Information document, there is reason for further evaluation of this charge to
remain and ultimately not be dismissed.
At 0:13 in Exhibit A1 of the submitted evidence in the Criminal Information
document—the defendant is seen allegedly killing an individual. At 0:16, he picks up a
box of ammunition from the corpse. “As in all statutory construction cases, [the Court]
begin[s] with the language of the statute. The first step ‘is to determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case.’ The inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is unambiguous and
‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U. S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmLwfI9hq1E
In this case, it is imperative to remember that understanding it is the role of the
legislature to prescribe the penalizations for laws. It has been understood from the early
stages of American law. Chief Justice Marshall, as he oftentimes clarified the role of the
judiciary and how it is separate from the legislative’s duties, opined that “[t]he rule that
penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction
itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the
plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the
judicial department.” See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U. S. 76 (1820). He goes on to
remind us that “though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is
not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute... in their ordinary acceptation,
or in which the legislature has obviously used them.... The intention of the legislature is
to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction.” Supra., at 95. The defense then makes the attempt to
raise some level of ambiguity with the interpretation of this very clearly written statute.
“The rule of lenity [is] for resolving an ambiguity, not [creating one].... The rule comes
into operation at the end of the process of interpreting what Congress has expressed, not
at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” See
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
I do not see how any limb of this statute is deemed ambiguous enough for the
charge to be dismissed. The statute is overall two-fold—both of which are tantamount.
First, there is “the act of taking another person’s property,” ibid. Second, there is the
“involves the use of a lethal weapon to perpetrate violence,” with there being the second
option of “the threat of violence against that person” as a contingency phrase.
The rule of lenity “applies only when a criminal statute contains a ‘grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty,’ and ‘only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived,’ [we] ‘can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.’” Ocasio v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8 (2016) (quoting Muscarello v. United States,
524 U. S. 125, 138-39 (1998)). “We have stated time and again that courts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 253-254 (1992). See also United States
v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241-242 (1989); Oneale v. Thornton, 6
Cranch 53, 68 (1810). It has been this way since the Marshall Court. There is much
reason to have dispute over the validity and efficacy of this charge. And there is no legal
or constitutional basis to dismiss the charge. Until it is proven that the charge does not
meet other standards within the realm of criminal law, then it is taken as a valid charge.
However, if it did not meet probable cause, then it would not have been accepted upon
the presentation of the criminal information document.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 19, 2023
Tony Giordano
Hon. Tony Giordano
Magistrate Judge
Superior Court for the State of Ridgeway
