STATE OF RIDGEWAY
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-942
JUDGE. HON. koala4life
Hon. insertreality
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO QUASH
Plaintiff
v.
SNIIPERACE
Defendant
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO QUASH
The State of Ridgeway hereby submits the following response to the Defendant’s motion
to quash Exhibit D from the State’s discovery. The Defendant argues that because he was never
read his Miranda rights, a conversation between him and Detective Marinify is inadmissible. The
basis for the Defendant’s motion is fundamentally erroneous. The Defendant further moves, upon
the allegation that such evidence is inadmissible and illegally obtained, to disquality Detective
Marinify from testifying, alleging his testimony is now tainted and biased.
ARGUMENTS
1. A READING OF MIRANDA RIGHTS IS ONLY REQUIRED IN THE CONTEXT
OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION, WHICH THIS CONVERSATION WAS
NOT
The now-famous Miranda warning is only required before a “custodial interrogation.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that “Our holding will be spelled out
with some specificity in the pages which follow, but, briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.”) Unless and until an individual is subject to such a
custodial interrogation, Miranda does not apply. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-1
(1980).
Whether an individual is "in custody" is determined by ascertaining whether that
individual is "subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). The ultimate
question is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."
Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138. "Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what
were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances,
would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave." Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 112-15, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383).
From examining the conversation in question between the Defendant and Detective
Marinify, it becomes clear that the Defendant was not “in custody”; thus, the circumstances
necessary to require a Miranda warning are not present. First, this conversation occurred over
Discord. The Defendant was not restrained nor held in custody in any sense of the word. In fact,
the defendant was free to terminate the conversation at any time. Moreover, the Detective began
the conversation by asking the Defendant “Would you be available for the interview some time
tomorrow?,” giving the Defendant the opportunity to decline. See Exhibit D. This same trend
continues throughout the conversation, which remains casual. There is no coercion and the
Defendant is, once again, free to terminate the conversation at any time. Under the Yarborough
test, this court cannot conclude that the Defendant was “in custody” and somehow restricted
from terminating the conversation. No reasonable person would conclude that. Therefore, a
reading of Miranda rights was not required and the motion to quash the conversation should be
denied.
2. SINCE NO READING OF MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS REQUIRED, DETECTIVE
MARINIFY MUST NOT BE DISQUALIFIED FROM TESTIFYING
The Defendant’s motion to disqualify Detective Marinify is predicated on the idea that he
violated the Defendant’s rights by not reading him his Miranda rights. However, because
Detective Marinify was not required to do this (as we have shown) the basis to disqualify him as
a witness crumbles.
The credibility, impartiality, and reliability of the Detective are no longer in question.
Even if they were, those would not create a basis to disqualify the Detective as a witness. Cross
examination exists for the very purpose of challenging the credibility, impartiality, and reliability
of witnesses. Moreover, because the Detective in no way violated the rights of the Defendant,
there is no conceivable basis upon which to disqualify him from testifying.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should deny the motion to quash Exhibit D and to
disqualify Detective Marinify from testifying.
/s/ totoro987123
Position
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: 03/21/23
