IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY, Case No. RSC-CV-899
Plaintiff,
vs.
PROCEED101,
Defendant.
____________________________________________________________________________
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
TO VACATE CONVICITON
____________________________________________________________________________
Defendant, Proceed101, respectfully moves the Court pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 30(b) for postconviction
relief to vacate his criminal convictions. The Defendant is requesting an order vacating the judgment of his
convictions and a new trial. In support of his motion, the Defendant alleges the following:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2023, the Defendant was arraigned on multiple criminal charges, including second-degree
murder and assault with a deadly weapon, arising out of an incident that occurred in December of the year
before. The Defendant was assigned a public defender and pleaded not guilty to all charges.
At trial, the Defendant’s counsel “denied that [Defendant] was acting out of his own volition and propos[ed]
that [alleged victim] induced [Defendant] to commit the offences for which he is charged.” State of
Ridgeway v. Proceed101, RSC-CV-899, reasons for judgement of the Honorable Judge KOALA4IIFE.
Trial counsel further argued that “the government failed to prove that the circumstances surrounding the
incident to [sic] give rise to guilty intent.” Ibid.
On March 7, 2023, the Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon,
and vandalism. Ibid. That same day, Defendant was granted leave to move a postconviction relief motion.
ARGUMENT
The Defendant argues that an undisclosed conflict of interest resulted in trial counsel engaging in ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of a criminal defendant’s right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
This matter arises before this court as “fact-specific claim[s] of ineffective legal assistance cannot be raised
initially on direct review of a criminal conviction, but must originally be presented to the district court."
U.S. v. Hunnewell, 891 F.2d 955, (1st Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Costa, 890 F.2d 480, 482-83, (1st
Cir. 1989); United States v. Carter, 815 F.2d 827, 829 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d
449, 457 (1st Cir. 1983).
A. PRECEDENT ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
The State of Ridgeway affords all criminal defendants the right to public representation when unable to
afford or retain private representation. See Rid. Judiciary Act, sec. 5(a). In legislating this right, the State
recognized that a fair trial involves adequate legal representation presenting evidence to an impartial
tribunal as the basis of the adversarial system courts operate within. This adversarial system places
significant emphasis on the right to counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)
Access to an attorney's expertise and knowledge is crucial to providing criminal defendants with the
necessary resources and ensuring they receive an opportunity to defend themselves.
Courts after courts have long held "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
Ibid., quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). As the United States Supreme Court has further
admonished, “[i]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants
cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). There
is no clear definition of what actions constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, doing so would “inevitably
restrict the independence and latitude counsel must have in making tactical and strategic decisions." United
States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 310 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079, 112 S. Ct. 986.
Broadly speaking, challenges to effective legal assistance can be categorized into two categories. The first
is state or judicial restrictions that prevent competent assistance of counsel. The state, in its role as the
prosecutorial instrument, holds a vested interest in ensuring the conviction of criminal defendants. Where
the state engages in conduct that directly or indirectly impacts effective assistance, the defendant is denied
a right to a fair trial. This interference categorization also applies to judicial actions. In Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), a trial judge “order preventing ... the defendant in a federal criminal prosecution
... from consulting his counsel ‘about anything’ during a 17-hour overnight recess in the trial between his
direct- and cross-examination ... deprive[d] petitioner of his right to the assistance of counsel.”
The second category is conduct by defense counsel that creates a deprivation of effective assistance. There
is no doubt that a legal representative’s inability to provide competent, not overly effective, representation
violates a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). The basis of
this motion treads on this second aspect of challenges to effective assistance of counsel.
B. INEFFECTIVENESS OF APPOINTED COUNSEL RESULTING FROM CONFLICT
In this criminal matter, Defendant was accused of committing murder against the alleged victim. The Court,
on its own motion, appointed Arthur Chen as the Defendant’s counsel on January 31, 2023. During
discovery, the prosecution entered into evidence a video showing what the State believed was Defendant
engaging in “second-degree murder.” See Discovery and Witness List for the Government in Proceed101.
Also provided by the prosecution was an interview with an exculpatory witness, named TrumpTheBuilder,
present during the alleged incident. In his interview with police, Mr. Builder alleged:
“I was a victim of the [alleged victim] stalking me and continuously hitting my car into walls.
I was saved by the glorious [Defendant] who pulled the good samaritan act and saved me … [The alleged victim] is
a well-known instigator, [the Defendant] is a hero.
[The alleged victim] also threatened me and [the Defendant] to shoot us whenever he saw us which is why our
reactions were so swift, we feared for our lego lives.” Ibid.
At trial, Mr. Chen argued that the “[Defendant] was acting out of his own volition and proposes that [alleged
victim] induced [Defendant] to commit the offences for which he is charged ... [Mr. Chen] argue[d] that
the government failed to prove … the circumstances surrounding the incident.” State of Ridgeway v.
Proceed101, RSC-CV-899, reasons for judgement of the Honorable Judge KOALA4IIFE. If defense
counsel truly attempted to show that circumstances not included in prosecution’s video evidence proved
the Defendant’s innocence, there was a clear path to examining the exculpatory witness before the court.
However, defense counsel did not—and the reason for this is an undisclosed conflict of interest that the
Defendant and this trial court were unaware of during trial.
It was on January 31 that Mr. Chen was appointed as the Defendant’s counsel. On February 1, Mr. Chen
filed a civil case submission against Mr. TrumpTheBuilder that was later dismissed for failure to submit a
claim.
On February 5, two days before obtaining access to the prosecution’s discovery and witness list which
included the potentially exonerating witness statement, Mr. Chen filed another civil complaint for wrongful
death against Mr. Builder. See Arthur_Chen v. TrumpTheBuilder, RSC-CV-915. Mr. Chen, by the time he
was before a judge in civil court, was fully aware that the witness involved in this very incident was
someone that he was actively suing.
The Defendant would only later learn postconviction that because of this civil action, Mr. Chen failed to
adequately investigate the facts when he refused to reach out to Mr. Builder or call him as a witness. This
conflict of interest constitutes clear ineffective assistance of counsel.
C. APPLICATION OF LAW TO COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
As a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims operate within the two-pronged Strickland test
that requires showing “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... [and
a] demonstration of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, internal quotes omitted. Under this
judicially established test, “judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” Ibid.
However, there are exceptions to this rule—specifically circumstances of magnitude “where assistance of
counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162 (2002). A defendant’s attorney representing or engaging in conflicts of interest may constitute
circumstances of magnitude that forgoes a criminal defendant’s requirement to show defense counsel’s
inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict. Ibid, citing United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648 (1984). As such, to succeed on the merits, the Defendant in this matter need only show that “a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation." Ibid.
If this Court were to consider the facts, an actual conflict of interest existed. Mr. Chen, Defendant’s
appointed counsel, was actively suing a key exculpatory witness. A witness who informed investigators
that the Defendant acted in self-defense when he used deadly force against the alleged victim. Because of
this conflict with the witness, Mr. Chen made no attempt to contact him or investigate his claims further. It
is worth noting that defense counsel later argued during the trial that a set of circumstances not included in
the prosecution video proved the Defendant’s innocence. The exculpatory witness that Mr. Chen had a
conflict with could have sustained this argument.
Whether defense counsel would have succeeded in arguing self-defense with this exculpatory witness is
irrelevant. What is clearly shown is that Mr. Chen's conflict of interest “actually affected the adequacy of
[Defendant’s] representation.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). An adequate showing of a conflict
of interest resulting in inadequate representation, as shown here, results in court-issued relief. Ibid, at 446,
citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully moves this court to enter an order reversing conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
Proceed101
