Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY STATE OF RIDGEWAY, Plaintiff, vs. BILLSCIORTINO, Defendant. Case No. RSC-CM-876 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER The Court is asked to deliberate on the singular charge of Second Degree Murder despite the affidavit submitted to the Court also highlighting probable cause in relation to an Unlawful Discharge offense. Throughout the trial both parties zealously advocated their position however the evidence in relation to that being used to charge the defendant does not automatically paint a picture of murder. It is an inference from the prosecution’s evidence that the complainant was in fact engaged in vehicular assault against another person before the arrival of the defendant on the scene and the evidence looks cut just in that fashion. The good faith nature of evidence submitted to the court and the work of the complainant in such – this is something the Court seems to be prima facie. See Rid. R. Evid. 9(c). The State has had no problem in proving the actus rea of the defendant through supporting witness testimony, the provided video exhibits and through the State’s advocacy. However, the Court makes the determination that the State has failed to meet the burden of proof through their failure to mention even once the mental state of the defendant. It is the Court’s contention that the defendant more likely than not believed their conduct to be defensive rather than offensive and witnesses have been unable to suggest otherwise other than indicating that an illicit act had occurred. The mentes reae of the defendant has therefore not been satisfied to bring forth a conviction under either prongs of the Second Degree Murder statute. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States notes that any attempt to dissolve or lower this standard through the de 1 facto or de jure removal of a mens rea standard is “generally disfavoured” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). While there is a standard of understanding of their conduct being wrongful there is not a standard for the defendant to deduct what specific offense they have committed rather – their offense is in bad faith. That is something the State has been unable to touch on here and it is for the simple reason that “[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) that the defendant cannot be convicted today. Most likely the defendant would have understood his actions to have been disproportionate to the annoyance that being blocked in by the complainant and a conviction for Unlawful Discharge as recalled in the affidavit would’ve arguably been more fitting. But alas he is only tried on the singular charge of Second Degree Murder. THEREFORE, on the sole count contained in the Information the Court finds as follows: - 3 R.C.C. § 10 – SECOND DEGREE MURDER the Court finds the defendant NOT GUILTY as referenced in the Information SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED. At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 11th day of February, 2023. __________________________________ HON. ALEX J. CABOT SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE -2-

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