ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
EPIDERMISGUPTA69,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CETHAL, in his official capacity as a State
Trooper for the Ridgeway State Police,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-860
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ORDER
The Court is presented with the allegations incorporated in the Complaint by the
plaintiff that in summary allege the defendant subjected the plaintiff to an unlawful search
and seizure amounting to the tort of Official Misconduct. Throughout the trial the plaintiff
has continually stated that such seizure was in contravention to the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. However, with the plaintiff admitting on the stand and further
corroborated by other witnesses at trial he had committed an Unlawful Display offense
necessitating a discretionary intervention by Trooper Cethal (hereinafter ‘defendant’).
Therefore, the issue does not lie with the seizure of such a weapon that was handled illicitly
by the plaintiff but whether or not he was deprived of due process through such a matter and
whether this was tantamount to retaliatory constitutional conduct.
As a result, a plaintiff must “establish a ‘causal connection’ between the government
defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury.’ Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006). It is not enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory
motive and that the plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause the injury.” Nieves v.
Bartlett, 587 U.S. ___ (2019) (slip op. at 5) (Quoting Hartman, ibid). While the defendant
commented in the commission of the confiscation of the weapon that “(this is retaliation for
slander)” plaintiff has simply failed to address this issue sufficiently. Instead he has chosen to
argue that the confiscation of the weapon was illegal for multi-faceted reasons – many of
which are not contained in the Complaint and seem rather spontaneous. Throughout the case
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the plaintiff has allowed “legal conclusion[s] couched as [a] factual allegation” to infuse into
his arguments making this much harder to decipher. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). The repeated fact that plaintiff holds a RFLID is simply irrelevant to this case as his
weapon was not confiscated for Unlawful Possession but rather Unlawful Display.
There is little room to argue that the defendant was not justified in confiscating the
weapon – officers are afforded discretion within the law and therefore may exercise such
accordingly. The Supreme Court decided that a search and seizure “in which a reasonably
prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety
or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person
believed by him to be armed and dangerous” Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Therefore, the issue of the weapon being seized unlawfully is held to be plausible by
the Court and we will instead analyse whether (1) the seizure was in response to
constitutionally protected speech in a retaliatory fashion and (2) the prerequisites for the
seizure of a constitutionally guaranteed item – the Court finds that both were respected by the
defendant. In constitutional challenges against searches and seizures, “[t]he test for probable
cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification,’” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S.
___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 5) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)) for
“[f]inely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt…have no place in the
[probable-cause] decision.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). Instead, we turn to
the totality of the circumstances. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. 237, 243 (2013); Pringle,
540 U. S., at 371; Gates, 462 U.S., at 232; Brinegar, 338 U. S., at 176. The totality of the
circumstances here indicate that (1) there was probable cause to initiate discretion (2) there
was a public danger posed by such conduct and (3) defendant had statutory discretion to
protect the public interest and protect such interest against illicit actions. When the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled that the existence of probable cause to arrest defeats a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim the Court can readily infer that such applies to these
circumstances. Nieves, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op. at 16). Through such pronged analysis the
Court is satisfied that the prerequisites for seizure were present here.
As the Supreme Court recognised “. . . the right [to bear arms] is not a right to keep
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008). The legislature and the political
process has decided that it is in the best interests of justice and the equitable protection of its
citizenry that Unlawful Display is an offense that puts others in an unreasonable way of
harm. Defendant has therefore been empowered–as an agent of the State–to enforce the law
properly and equally with a discretionary function to confiscate, fine or arrest violators of the
law. It is for the reason that “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt” Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 844 (1992)) that the Court follows stare decisis
throughout this decision today in rejecting the claim that the plaintiff was unlawfully
deprived of his arms by the defendant. The simple fact of the case is that the plaintiff
engaged in illicit conduct, that conduct in turn created a probable cause for the defendant to
act on – and act on he did. The Court must ask themselves this question to decide whether or
not this was retaliatory or a deprivation of sound constitutional rights law – would this have
occurred without the illicit act by the plaintiff. The answer is no and therefore the Court must
decide in favor of the defendant. If the action is illicit under the law it is impossible to argue
that the defendant was “knowing” that his actions were wrong and further it would be an
abuse of discretion to argue that an officer would risk prosecution for enforcing the law.
THEREFORE, the Court finds the defendant NOT LIABLE on the singular tort of
OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 13th day of February, 2023.
__________________________________
HON. ALEX J. CABOT
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
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