STATE OF RIDGEWAY
EPIDERMISGUPTA69
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-841
JUDGE. HON. koala4life
MOTION TO VACATE AND DISMISS
Plaintiff
v.
BETATHEWOLFGAMER
Defendant
MOTION TO VACATE AND DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway, on behalf of defendant BetaTheWolfGamer, respectfully submits
the following motion to vacate and dismiss. The State submitted a motion to dismiss the second
cause of action in this matter on the grounds that the Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently state a
claim. This court denied that motion. We file the following motion, requesting this court vacate
the portion of that decision finding that a pleading of requisite culpability was not required and
dismiss the second cause of action. The state submits that its first motion to dismiss poorly
articulated the State’s position in the matter and likely contributed to the court reaching an
erroneous ruling on the matter. The State requests that you consider this motion in full and give it
due consideration.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On or about the 1st of January, 2023, Defendant BetaTheWolfGamer took the Plaintiff
into custody at his third floor apartment. The Defendant then brought the Plaintiff down to the
first floor, intending to take him to be booked. However, while the defendant was seemingly
typing, both the Plaintiff and Defendant were gunned down and killed by a third-party.
1
The Plaintiff filed a civil complaint for Official Misconduct against the defendant
alleging that the Defendant failed to uphold his alleged duty to protect the Plaintiff, who was in
the Defendant’s custody, from harm.
ARGUMENT
1. PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROTECT CLAIM EMANATES FROM THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
“When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general wellbeing.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. DSS, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)
(internal citations omitted). Indeed, the DeShaney Court goes on to say that “The rationale for
this principle is simple enough: when the State, by the affirmative exercise of its power, so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same
time fails to provide for his basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety -- it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney, supra, 200 (internal citations omitted).
This case law — establishing a constitutional duty for state officials to provide reasonable safety
to those in their custody — creates the backbone of failure to protect claims, including the
Plaintiff’s own.
For incarcerated individuals, these failures to protect claims emanate from the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). However, “[c]laims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in
custody are governed by by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause, which applies to claims by convicted
prisoners.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Also see:
2
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400-01 (2015); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16
(1979); Mills v. Fenger, 216 F. App’x 7 (2nd Cir 2006); Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920
(8th Cir. 1998); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2001).
Indeed, since the Plaintiff had yet to be convicted of any crime, his right to be protected
by government officials who take him into custody is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. His failure to protect claim is, therefore, a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process claim.
“Nevertheless, the analysis required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by
the Eighth Amendment… is the same.” Council v. Sutton, 366 F. App’x 31 (11th Cir. 2010). Also
see Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that “[p]retrial detainees are
protected analogously under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
In his response to the State’s original motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff argued that the
relevant standards, which we shall discuss soon, only applied to pretrial detainees and those
convicted of a crime, groups in which they claim they do not fall. However, this matter is firmly
grounded in a Fourteenth Amendment analysis since that amendment protects the rights of those
taken into custody by the government who have not been convicted of a crime. Indeed, the duty
of officers to care for the general well being of those they take into custody is “extended to
arrested persons and pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2001) (Also see Cottrell, supra, 1490).
Thus, when evaluating the Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim, this court must do so under
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence regarding failure to protect claims. Indeed, if the
Fourteenth Amendment did not govern, the Plaintiff’s right to reasonable protection when taken
into custody would not exist.
3
2. FAILURE TO PROTECT VIOLATIONS REQUIRE REQUISITE CULPABILITY
“The idea that conditional tort claims impose state of mind requirements comes from the
from the tort concept of ‘duty.’” Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing and
quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause, for
example, imposes a duty not to purposefully discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or
national origin. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty
not to act with deliberate indifference towards the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1220 (9th Cir. 2011).
For the Defendant to have actually breached his duty to the Plaintiff, the Defendant must
have acted with the requisite culpability; otherwise, there simply was no violation of the
Constitution (and the duty it imposes on officers to protect those they take into custody) under
which to bring suit. Indeed, an “official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind to violate
the constitutional standard.” Thompson v. Lengerich, No. 18-1257 (10th Cir. 2019). Also see
Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2014); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir.
2006).
As the Kingsley court articulated, the “defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing,
or possibly a reckless state of mind. That is because, as we have stated, ‘liability for negligently
inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.’ County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 849 (1998) (emphasis added). See also Daniels v. Williams,
474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986) (‘Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to
deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property’).”
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, supra.
Therefore, it is clear that for a constitutional violation to have occurred — for the
Defendant to have breached his duty to protect the Plaintiff — requisite culpability must exist.
4
a. SECTION 1983 AS AN ANALOGY FOR OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT
The Official Misconduct statute itself imposes no state of mind requirement. Rather, it
creates liability for any public servant who “refrains from performing a duty which is imposed
upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.” 1 R. Stat. § 3114. However, as
stated above, to actually “refrain” from performing this duty requires that the public servant
acted with requisite culpability. Indeed, no constitutional violation occurs unless the public
servant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Thompson, supra. Without it, this duty was not
breached.
42 U.S. Code § 1983 is analogous to Official Misconduct at the federal level, stating that
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable…” 42 U.S. Code §
1983. Section 1983 essentially serves as a catch-all for seeking redress for constitutional
violations at the federal level, including failure to protect claims like the one raised here.
Similarly to Official Misconduct, it does not require any culpable state of mind either. Therefore,
at least for the issues presented in this motion, it’s an insightful analogy.
The United States Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the principle that Section
1893 “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of
the underlying constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). However,
while the plaintiffs need only prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right, for that
right to actually be violated, requisite culpability is required. Thompson, supra. Therefore, the
requisite mental state for individual liability will change with the constitutional provision at
issue. Alliance v. Ray, supra. Also see. Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343 (6th Cir 1996).
5
Our Official Misconduct statute necessarily functions the same. While not requiring any
additional state of mind requirement, it does require that the officer breached a “duty which is
imposed upon him by law.” However, as discussed ad nauseam that breach can only have
occurred if the officer acted with the requisite state of mind. Thompson, supra; Danser, supra;
Salahuddin, supra. Let us now look at what that standard is.
b. CULPABILITY STANDARD IN FAILURE TO PROTECT CASES
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, all failure
to protect claims for individuals who had not been convicted of a crime were evaluated under a
subjective deliberate indifference standard. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court had held that
failure-to-protect claims must show that the official was deliberately indifferent to the risk posed
to someone in custody. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). However, in Kingsley, the
Supreme Court created an objective — rather than subjective — standard for pretrial detainee
abuse of force claims. See Kingsley, supra. However, the court did not address if this standard
extended to other Fourteenth Amendment claims, such as failure to protect claims. Consequently,
there is a post-Kingsley circuit split as to what culpability standard — objective or subjective
deliberate indifference — to apply to these claims. This court need not resolve this circuit split
because, as this motion shall demonstrate, the Plaintiff fails under both.
i. SUBJECTIVE STANDARD
The Fifth Circuit, for example, applies the subjective deliberate indifference standard to
post-Kingsley failure to protect claims. The Fifth Circuit held that, while officials have a duty to
protect those in their custody from violence at the hands of another, “not every injury suffered by
one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for [officials]
responsible for the victim's safety.” Leal v. Wiles, No. 16-51410 (5th Cir. May. 8, 2018) (internal
quotations omitted). Indeed, the court held that an official must have a sufficiently culpable
6
mind, and the measure of that culpability is the standard of subjective deliberate indifference
enunciated in Farmer.
The Fifth Circuit went on to state that an “official acts with deliberate indifference only if
he subjectively knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety. That is, the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference… Deliberate indifference is an
extremely high standard to meet. The standard requires a showing of more than negligence or
even gross negligence. Consequently, actions and decisions by officials that are merely inept,
erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference." Leal, supra
(internal quotations omitted).
While the State does not believe that this court needs to resolve the circuit split in this
case, if it decides to do so, we urge it to apply the subjective deliberate indifference standard.
ii. OBJECTIVE STANDARD
On the other side of the circuit split, the Ninth Circuit has extended the objective standard
from Kingsley to failure to protect claims in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th
Cir. 2016) (en banc). Owing to the difficulty of applying Kingsley’s first prong to failure to
protect cases, the Ninth Circuit rephrased it to better apply to the failure-to-protect context. The
Ninth Circuit stated that an official may be liable for failing to protect a pretrial detainee when
he, first, makes “an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the
[individual] [is] confined” and the condition “put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering
serious harm.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. Second, the plaintiff must show that the official “did not
take reasonable available measures to abate that risk.” Ibid. Finally, the officers, by not taking
reasonable measures to abate that risk, must have caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
7
The Second Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in this approach, ruling: “Therefore, to
establish a claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the pretrial detainee must prove that the defendant-official
acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable
care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the
defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
health or safety. In other words, the ‘subjective prong’ (or ‘mens rea prong’) of a deliberate
indifference claim is defined objectively.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017).
iii. THIS COURT NEED NOT RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT;
PLAINTIFF FAILS BOTH STANDARDS
This court need not resolve the circuit split here, because under either standard, the
Plaintiff’s claim fails. If we first look at the objective test articulated by the Ninth Circuit, we see
that the Plaintiff fails under the first prong because the Defendant did not intentionally put the
Plaintiff in harm's way. Plaintiff also fails under the second prong, because the Defendant took
all reasonable steps to abate risk and was simply performing his normal duties; it is outside of his
control if he is ambushed. Finally, Plaintiff also fails the third prong because not only did the
officer make all possible efforts to abate the risk, but the Defendant’s actions did not cause the
Plaintiff’s injuries. Indeed, a third-party decided to ambush the two. Having not passed a single
prong of the tripartite objective test established by the Ninth Circuit, it’s clear that this claim
fails. The same is true under the test established by a Second Circuit. Nothing in the Plaintiff’s
complaint indicates that the Defendant “recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate
the risk” Darnell v. Pineiro, supra. Furthermore, nothing in the complaint indicates that the
“defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
health or safety.” Darnell v. Pineiro, supra. Indeed, this was a random attack in which the
8
Defendant himself was killed. Therefore, under both the Ninth and Second Circuit objective
standards (which create objective tests for the otherwise subjective “mens rea prong”), the
Plaintiff’s claim fails.
Under the subjective deliberate indifference standard, the Plaintiff’s case is even more
flawed. Indeed, under this standard an officer must know of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s
safety and disregard it. Leal, supra. Given that the Defendant did not know of this impending
attack (and the Plaintiff does not allege that he did), this claim clearly fails the deliberate
indifference test. The Defendant did not even know that the risk existed. Indeed, “Insomuch as
deliberate indifference requires a greater degree of culpability than negligence, it certainly
requires a greater degree of culpability than simply failing to adequately protect a detainee while
exerting one's best efforts to do so.” Cabaniss v. City of Riverside, 231 F. App’x 407 (6th Cir.
2007). Indeed, “Officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable for failure-to-protect
claims.” Travillion v. Wetzel, No. 17-3248 (3rd Cir. April 8, 2019). Nothing in the Plaintiff’s
complaint indicates that the Defendant acted in a way that was unreasonable.
3. THIS COURT MUST DISMISS THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
In xLaZerify v. StudsPerSecond, 1 Rid. ___ (2023), the Supreme Court of Ridgeway
stated the federal pleadings standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 govern complaints filed in Ridgeway. When weighing a
motion to dismiss, this court must “assume the veracity” of well-pleaded allegations. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, supra. However, these “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. Even if all the facts of the civil
complaint were taken as true, it would not be enough for this complaint to follow through and
continue in this court. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 664 (2009) (Holding that claims can be
dismissed if the facts pleaded do not entitle the Plaintiff to relief).
9
Plaintiff’s allegations here fail to make their claim “plausible on its face” xLaZerify v.
StudsPerSecond, supra (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, at 570). Indeed, as shown in the previous
section, under either the subjective deliberate indifference standard or the objective standard,
Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient enough to create liability for the Defendant.
Consequently, this court must dismiss this cause of action.
In Michelson v. Coon, the Fourth Circuit dealt with this same issue. Without taking a
stance in the circuit split, they found that because the Plaintiff’s allegation did not plausibly
satisfy either the subjective or objective standards, his case must be dismissed. Michelson v.
Coon, No. 20-6480 (4th Cir. Jul. 15, 2021) (stating that “We need not resolve [the circuit split]
here because, even if a purely objective standard applies to a pretrial detainee's failure to protect
claim, Michelson failed to state such a claim against Coon.” The court went on to say, “we
further conclude that he failed to state a claim for relief for failure to protect against the
remaining defendants. We therefore affirm the district court's [order to dismiss].”). This court
must similarly dismiss.
4. THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE ITS PREVIOUS RULING
In response to the State’s previous motion to dismiss, the court held that pleading facts
sufficient to establish culpability or a state of mind was not necessary. While the state submits its
previous motion was not as strong as it could have been, this motion to dismiss certainly proves
that requisite culpability is required. Thus, we urge the court to vacate its previous ruling.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this court dismiss the second cause of
action and vacate the portion of its previous ruling finding that a pleading of sufficient
culpability is not required.
10
totoro987123
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: 02/05/2023
11
