STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-841
JUDGE. HON. koala4life
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff
v.
BetaTheWolfGamer
Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway, on behalf of defendant BetaTheWolfGamer, respectfully submits
this motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action in the above-titled matter.
ARGUMENT
1. PLEADING STANDARD
Title III, Rule 8 of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure is virtually identical to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). Both of these rules state that
a civil complaint must contain a “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” See both Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
(8)(a)(2).
The Supreme Court of Ridgeway has long held that when a provision from our own
constitution, law, or rule has “obviously been derived from a provision of a real-life”
constitution, law, or rule, this Court should adopt existing interpretations of the provision. See
Largetitanic2 v. Nevplaysgames, 1 Rid. ___ (2023) and State v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. ___ (2022)
(Lx1nas III).
Therefore, this court must evaluate the sufficiency of a pleading under the standard for
federal civil complaints as set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Allegations are “well-pleaded” when the “factual allegations … raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. If these factual allegations, assumed as true, do not
support a claim for relief, the suit must be dismissed.
2. THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS INSUFFICIENTLY PLEADED
The Plaintiff claims in their amended civil complaint that the defendant, as one of their
duties, has the responsibility to patrol “the streets of the State and ensure general order and
tranquility and provide assistance where necessary” pursuant to Incorporation of Ridgeway
County §1.2(a). See amended civil complaint at 2. Plaintiff goes on to claim that the defendant is
liable for official misconduct because he “violated this duty as the general order and tranquility
of the area was disputed as a result of the Defendant's conduct,” and that such a disruption was
an “unauthorized exercise of [his] office,” Ibid at 2 and 3. Plaintiff also states that the defendant
is liable for official misconduct because he allegedly “refrained from upholding the general
peace and tranquility of the area, a duty imposed upon him by law, through the trespass of the
Plaintiff's property.” Ibid.
This court cannot interpret this first cause of action as challenging the defendant’s alleged
trespass itself, since that conduct is challenged in the amended complaint’s third cause of action.
Therefore, this cause of action specifically challenges the defendant’s alleged excess of his duty
to “patrol the streets of the State and ensure general order and tranquility and provide assistance
where necessary” as well as his failure to uphold the same. Ibid at 2.
However, this claim is simply not plausible on its face, as required by the pleading
standard outlined in section 1 of this motion. Even if this court were to assume all the factual
allegations of the amended complaint to be true, they do not “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. Indeed, if this court were to accept the
plaintiff's argument, then members of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office would be forbidden
from doing anything beyond simply patrolling the streets, which clearly does not make sense.
Furthermore, the nature of law enforcement is fundamentally disruptive, since criminals often do
not comply willingly with law enforcement officers. However, plaintiffs suggest that if a law
enforcement officer disrupts the “general peace and tranquility of the area,” then they have both
exceeded their authority and failed to uphold their duty to protect the general peace. If the court
accepted this interpretation, then members of the Ridgeway County Sheriff's Office would be
liable for official misconduct simply for performing their lawful functions.
Indeed, there is no plausible way that law enforcement officers can be found liable for
official misconduct if their actions result in a disturbance to the “general order and tranquility of
the area.” That allegation is wholly without merit. Thus, since this claim is not plausible on its
face, this court must dismiss the first cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 664 (2009)
(Holding that claims must be dismissed if the facts pleaded do not entitle the Plaintiff to relief).
3. THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IS INSUFFICIENTLY PLEADED
The Plaintiff claims “it is a clearly inherent duty of all Law Enforcement Officers to
protect the life of a detained individual, for by detaining said individual, they create a special
relationship.” See amended civil complaint at 3. Plaintiffs go on to claim that because the
Plaintiff died in the Defendant’s custody, the “Defendant has refrained from performing a duty
that is clearly inherent [in] his office” and is liable for official misconduct. Ibid.
Even if this court were to assume all alleged facts as true, this claim is not plausible on its
face. In evaluating claims related to the duty of officers to protect detainees, “the overwhelming
weight of authority among the circuits is to the effect that the deliberate indifference standard
applies to pretrial detainees.” Garbowski v. Jackson City Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386
(5th Cir. 1995) (Citing Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(failure to protect pretrial detainee from rape), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074, 112 S.Ct. 972, 117
L.Ed.2d 137 (1992)) (placement of suicidal and mentally disturbed pretrial detainees in safety
cells); Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1185-94 (11th Cir. 1994)
(complaint by juvenile detainee regarding medical care and protection from sexual assault);
Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978, 980 (10th Cir. 1994) (medical care); Whitnack v. Douglas
County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994) (deliberate indifference standard applied to all
conditions-of-confinement cases); Massey v. Rufo, 14 F.3d 44, 1994 WL 12326, [*]1, 3 n. 1
(table), 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 6202, at [*]2 n. 1 (1st Cir. Jan. 14, 1994) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 1873 n. 16, Elliott v.
Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 10 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1991) (medical care)); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d
176, 188 (3d Cir. 1993) (nonmedical conditions of confinement); Gray v. Farley, 13 F.3d 142,
146 (4th Cir. 1993) (medical care); Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346, 348-49 (7th Cir.
1988) (failure to protect pretrial detainee from assaults from other inmates); Molton v. City of
Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988) (medical care), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068, 109
S.Ct. 1345, 103 L.Ed.2d 814 (1989)).
Indeed, it is abundantly clear that when one makes a claim that an officer failed to protect
a detainee from harm, they must prove that the officer acted with deliberate indifference. An
“official acts with deliberate indifference where he or she knows of a substantial risk of serious
harm to the detainee, and disregards that risk.” Baughman v. State, No. 17-20435 (5th Circuit
2019). Indeed, “When officers are not ‘subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm,’
it ‘cannot be shown that they acted with deliberate indifference.’” McGaw v. Sevier County, No.
16-6729 (6th Cir. October 31, 2017) (citing Ruiz-Bueno v. Scott, 639 F. App'x 354, 361 (6th Cir.
2016)).
The Plaintiff makes no allegation that the Defendant acted with deliberate indifference
nor that the Defendant had knowledge of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the Plaintiff
when he detained him. McGaw v. Sevier County, supra. “While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
supra. Absent any facts (or even legal conclusions) to support the claim that the officer acted
with deliberate indifference, this second cause of action must be dismissed.
Furthermore, in order to be liable for official misconduct, the Plaintiff must prove the
existence of some mens rea. However, they have alleged no facts nor legal conclusions to
support the existence of mens rea with respect to this cause of action. Indeed, the officer himself
was shot and killed by the same assailant that killed the Plaintiff. Even if we assume all the
Plaintiffs allegations are true, the claim is not plausible since there is no basis to plausibly
believe that the defendant possessed the necessary mens rea to act. Thus, this court must dismiss
the second cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 664 (2009) (Holding that claims must be
dismissed if the facts pleaded do not entitle the Plaintiff to relief).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Ridgeway respectfully requests that this court
dismiss the first and second causes of action in the above-titled suit.
totoro987123
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: 01/29/2023
