MAYFLOWER DISTRICT COURT
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-841
Plaintiff
v.
BetaTheWolfGamer
Defendant
RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby files this response to the motion to dismiss
submitted on the 16th January, 2023.
ARGUMENT
On the 16th of January, 2023, the Defendant, through governmental counsel, filed a motion to dismiss;
this motion is premised on the argument that “The facts…do not support the legal claims of the Plaintiff.” See
Motion to Dismiss at 1. The Defendant further extends this argument by arguing that the Plaintiff’s claims (that
the Defendant, through his action, refrained from conducting a duty that is imposed unto him by law, and is
therefore liable for the second part of the Official Misconduct tort) cannot be pleaded because it is an attempt at
“bypassing the requirement to show the Defendant acted “knowing that such an act is unauthorized.” Motion to
Dismiss at 1. This is, however, holistically incorrect. The Defendant was faced with choice A and choice B;
choice A is barging into the Plaintiff’s home without reason and choice B is refraining from doing so. The
Defendant chose choice A, but choice A was a violation of his official duties; choice B was not. By choosing
choice A, and not B, the Defendant “refrain[ed] from performing a duty which is imposed by law or is clearly
inherent in the nature of his office.” 1 R. Stat. 3114. This theory of liability is wholly permissible when
considering the statute in question.
It is true that Courts ought not to utilize a certain interpretation of a statute if it would make the statute
void, superfluous or insignificant. Motion to Dismiss at 2, and cases cited therein. And through this the
Defendant contends that “If this court were to allow the Plaintiff’s claim to proceed under this section of the
misconduct tort, it would be effectively rendering the first part to be superfluous and insignificant.” Id. But this
idea is patently incorrect when the merits are considered. To reject the Defendant’s argument would not render a
part of a statute insignificant and superfluous. This is because suits would still be allowed under the first part,
and indeed the concerns that “every lawyer would simply file their misconduct claims under the second part
since it would be easier to prove,” Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, are also unfounded. It is true of course that
pleading a failure to act, instead of bad faith, is easier; but just because something is easier, doesn’t diminish its
legal correctness. The only logical reason to accept this concern as well-founded would be to diminish liability
on behalf of the government, even when that liability is congruous with the plain text of the statute. If this is not
convincing enough, consider this: Accepting the Defendant’s reading and argument would do the exact thing the
Defendant seeks to do: it would render a statute inoperable and void. If the Defendant’s true concern in his
argument is to protect the operability of a statute, then he would realize that forcing Official Misconduct suits to
be pleaded under the first theory would render the second theory wholly inoperable.
Moreover, the Defendant also contends that “the senate clearly intended for state officials to be liable for
their affirmative conduct if and only if they knowingly exceeded their authority.” This is entirely incorrect. The
statute in question goes, in relevant part, as follows: “any individual who is a public servant and commits anact
[sic] … or refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the
nature of his office.” Id. When considering a statute a court must first start with the plain text of that statute. In
Re SteKing2008, 1 Rid. __, __. And if the text is unambiguous the court must end where it started—with the
text. The text of the statute is conclusive, for it contains the word “or.” The word “or” serves as a conjunction. It
joins two ideas in juxtaposition together. The statute affords those who wish to invoke it two options: a theory
of liability hinged upon bad faith or a theory of liability hinged upon negligence, there is no requirement to
plead one or the other in any given case. It is in this way that the Defendant’s claim falters, for just because the
alleged action was active, doesn’t mean that the resulting liability also need be active. If it were my duty to keep
a door closed, but then I open said door, my affirmative action would have resulted in me refraining from
conducting my duty. This is the exact theory in this case, one that is wholly permissible given the text and
context of the statute.
Finally, the Defense contends that “Even if this court took all of the Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,
they cannot reasonably be interpreted to fall under the second part of the misconduct tort.” Motion to Dismiss at
2. This, however, as described above is entirely correct. A court can reasonably infer liability from the pleaded
facts because when one is charged with a duty, but takes an action that contradicts that duty, one has refrained
from upholding that duty because of their active conduct.
CONCLUSION
When an actor who is given a duty to uphold the general peace and law of the land, violates this through
an intentional action, though the breach of duty may have been unintentional, a court can still find one liable for
the action under a theory of negligence—which is what is alleged. This is wholly permissible given the text and
context of the invoked tort. Therefore, the court ought to deny the Defendant’s motion.
Respectfully Submitted,
HolyRomanRyan
Counsel of Record
