STATE OF RIDGEWAY
EPIDERMISGUPTA69
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DOCKET NO. RSC-Cv-841
JUDGE. HON. koala4life
Plaintiff
v.
BETATHEWOLFGAMER
Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway, on behalf of defendant BetaTheWolfGamer, hereby submits the
following motion to dismiss the above-titled matter. This court should dismiss the complaint
against the defendant because the facts of the cause of action do not fit the cause of action
alleged.
ARGUMENT
In order to be found liable of official misconduct, a plaintiff must either show that (1) the
defendant is an “individual who is a public servant and commits an act relating to his office but
constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is
unauthorized” or (2) that the defendant “refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon
him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.” See 1 R. Stat. § 3114.
In his civil complaint, the Plaintiff lays out the claim that the defendant allegedly
unlawfully trespassed onto the Plaintiffs property to arrest the Plaintiff without legal justification
to do so. However, when laying out their official misconduct cause of action, Plaintiffs seek to
prove the defendant liable under the second part of the misconduct tort (the part about refraining
from performing a lawfully imposed duty). See Plaintiff’s civil complaint at 2. Plaintiff’s counsel
confirmed that they were, in fact, adopting this stance on the record.
The facts, however, do not support the legal claims of the Plaintiff. Indeed, the
defendant’s conduct, if any, ought to be challenged under the first part of the misconduct tort —
the unauthorized exercise of official functions section. The conduct that the Plaintiff’s challenge
was an affirmative action taken by the defendant, rather than an idle non-execution of lawfully
imposed duties. Yet, the Plaintiff claims it falls under the latter. What the Plaintiff is trying to do
here is nothing short of bypassing the requirement to show the defendant acted “knowing that
such act is unauthorized” present in the first part of the cause of action. Indeed, by attempting to
move a claim which would ordinarily and reasonably fall under the first part of the tort to the
second, the Plaintiff seeks to subvert the requirement and get an easier standard.
However, this court is unable to interpret the second part of the statute to include the type
of conduct that the defendant is accused of. If the court were to allow this claim to proceed under
the second part of the misconduct court, every lawyer would simply file their misconduct claims
under the second part since it would be easier to prove. Clearly that is not what the Senate
intended when it wrote the law. Indeed, it separated the two sections of the misconduct tort for a
reason and to delineate between two different types of conduct. The senate clearly intended for
state officials to be liable for their affirmative conduct if and only if they knowingly exceeded
their authority.
“[C]ourts should, to the extent possible, read statutes so that ‘no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) (quoting
TRW Inc. v. Andrews , 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001)) .If this court
were to allow the Plaintiff’s claim to proceed under this section of the misconduct tort, it would
be effectively rendering the first part to be superfluous and insignificant — it would not longer
serve a purpose. Indeed, “and where another interpretation is wholly permissible, we would be
reluctant to give a statute that construction which makes it wholly redundant.” Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945).
Under the Surplusage Canon of statutory construction, “no provision should needlessly
be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no
consequence.” Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 2022 (2022) (internal quotations
omitted). Yet, that is exactly what the Plaintiffs want this court to do. They want this court to
allow their claim, which should fall under the first part of the misconduct tort, to proceed under
the second, lest they have to prove the defendant knowingly exceeded his authority. Not only
would this needlessly give “an interpretation that causes [the second part of the tort] to
duplicate” the first, but it also would strip the first of any and all of its consequences. This court
cannot and should not interpret the alleged actions of the defendant to fall under the second part
of misconduct tort (the idle non-execution of lawfully imposed duties part).
If all the facts of the civil complaint were taken as true, it would not be enough for this
complaint to follow through and continue in this court. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 664
(2009) (Holding that claims can be dismissed if the facts pleaded do not entitle the Plaintiff to
relief). Allegations are “well-pleaded” when the “factual allegations … raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007). However, as stated above, the facts do not
fit the cause of action that the Plaintiffs advance. Even if this court took all of the Plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true, they cannot reasonably be interpreted to fall under the second part of
the misconduct tort. Therefore, the facts do not raise the right to relief above the speculative
level. Thus, this court must dismiss this claim because it is not plausible on its face.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should dismiss the above-titled civil complaint
because the factual allegations made do not support the cause of action alleged.
/s/ totoro987123
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: 01/16/2023
