RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
epidermisgupta69,
Plaintiff,
v.
BetaTheWolfGamer, in his INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY and QUASI-OFFICIAL
CAPACITY.
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-841
CIVIL COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, epidermisgupta69 (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), by and through their undersigned
counsel, files this action against the Defendant and alleges as follows—
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
1. Plaintiff, epidermisgupta69, is a citizen and resident of the State of Ridgeway.
2. Defendant, BetaTheWolfGamer, is a citizen and resident of the State of Ridgeway who is
employed within the County Sheriff’s Office and was on duty during the time of the
tortious actions, but is being sued in individual and quasi-official capacity.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
3. The Ridgeway State Constitution gives the Superior Court the ability to hear all cases and
or controversies. See Article V, Section 4.
4. Venue is proper as the tortious actions occurred within the County of Ridgeway.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
5. The Plaintiff owns a small apartment within the City of Palmer. The Plaintiff has worked
very hard to afford this property and expects a reasonable amount of privacy and
protection in that apartment.
6. On or about the 1st of January, 2023, the Plaintiff was present in his aforementioned
property, standing on his balcony.
7. While standing on his balcony the Plaintiff displayed his lawfully owned Cline 1711,
which he uses to defend himself.
8. The Plaintiff’s balcony was on the third floor of one of the Palmer Apartment Complex
buildings, and the Plaintiff’s firearm was not pointed towards any person or property. Nor
was the Plaintiff in the direct presence of another individual.
9. Ridgeway State Law does not recognize the mere brandishing of a firearm, while not in
the presence of another person as a crime.
10. Plaintiff, by standing on his third floor balcony, and outside the view of anyone in the
hallway or on other balconies, was fully within his right to brandish said firearm.
11. Defendant, however, barged into the Plaintiff’s private abode without proper justification
to do so.
12. Defendant, after trespassing onto the Plaintiff’s private property, detained the Plaintiff and
held him in custody for a period of five minutes.
13. During the custody it is only then that the Defendant recognized that he had probable
cause.
14. After holding the Plaintiff in custody in the third-floor hallway of one of the Palmer
Apartment Complex buildings, the Defendant brought the Plaintiff down to the first floor
and eventually outside the building entirely.
15. Defendant then sat in front of the building, seemingly typing. While this occurs, the
Plaintiff and the Defendant are gunned down by an individual with a firearm.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. 3101 - Trespassing)
15. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
16. Defendant entered the property of the Plaintiff in order to detain him for brandishing his
firearm, which the Plaintiff is legally allowed to do.
17. Defendant entered into the Plaintiff’s private property without legal authority or excuse
such as a warrant or consent, and therefore trespassed onto the property.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3114 - Official Misconduct )
18. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
19. The Defendant holds the position of Sergeant of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office’s
Patrol Unit A, which is a part of the Patrol Division.
20. The Patrol Division is tasked specifically with patrolling “the streets of the State and
ensure general order and tranquility and provide assistance where necessary.”
Incorporation of Ridgeway County §1.2(a).
21. The duties given to the Defendant are imposed by law, but through unlawfully trespassing
into the Plaintiff’s property, the Defendant failed to uphold these duties, constituting
concrete harm to the Plaintiff.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3115 - Deprivation of Rights)
22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
23. The Ridgeway State Constitution provides that “the people have a right to hold
themselves, their houses, papers, possessions, free from search or seizures.” See Article I,
Section VIII. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution also provides the
same protection.
24. The Supreme Court has held that “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013).
25. Absent exigent circumstances or consent, the police may not enter a private residence to
effect a search or seizure without a warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212
(1981)
26. This has been extended to protect individuals even when there is probable cause to suggest
that someone has committed a crime (which in a case such as this is specious). The rule is
that the police must first gain a warrant to intrude into a house. Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 587-590 (1980).
27. The Defendant lacked a warrant or consent to enter the Plaintiff’s apartment and thereby
violated his 4th Amendment and Section VIII rights to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and is the proximate cause of the violation of the Plaintiff’s rights.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3105 - False Imprisonment)
28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
29. Defendant after barging into the Plaintiff’s house, and chilling his rights, detained the
Plaintiff utilizing handcuffs.
30. The Plaintiff, because he had handcuffs on him and was grabbed by the Defendant, was
not allowed to move within the confines of his home of the hallway in which he was
detained.
31. The Plaintiff’s permissions were also restrained by the Defendant as a result of his
unlawful detention.
32. Defendant was the proximate cause of this restraint. Law Enforcement Officers are of
course given the ability to detain individuals, but this is only available when probable
cause exists, none existed in this case.
33. Therefore, the Defendant lacked legal authority and or justification to restrict the
Plaintiff’s permissions and ability to move.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3115 - Deprivation of Rights)
34. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
35. Brief investigatory stops are allowed by the 4th amendment and Section VIII without
probable cause, however extended detainments require probable cause. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975).
36. The Plaintiff was detained by the Defendant for around five minutes, or a twelfth of an
hour. The extended detainment of the Plaintiff required probable cause.
37. There was, however, no probable cause to suggest that the Plaintiff committed any crime;
for it is entirely lawful to brandish a firearm while not being in the direct presence of
another person.
38. The absence of probable cause makes the seizure of the Plaintiff unlawful. Therefore, the
Plaintiff’s Section VIII and Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Manuel v. Joliet, 580
U. S. 357, 367 (2017).
39. Defendant was the proximate cause of this deprivation.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3115 - Deprivation of Rights)
40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
41. The Defendant sought consent for a search during the detainment, but then utilized game
mechanics to override consent and search the Plaintiff.
42. In determining whether a search violated the fourth amendment, any Court must balance
the need to deal with breaches of public order, but also a citizen’s expectations and privacy
and personal security. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
43. The government in this case has little to no need to combat breaches of public order, for
none occurred. The Plaintiff’s need for privacy and security plainly outweigh the
government’s non-existent need. Moreover, there was a lack of probable cause to effect
the search.
44. Therefore, the Plaintiff was subject to a violation of his Fourth Amendment and Section
VIII rights, where the Defendant was the proximate cause of this violation.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3109 - Wrongful Death)
45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
46. Four and a half (4½) minutes into the detention of the Plaintiff, both the Defendant and
Plaintiff were shot and killed.
47. Because of the detention unlawfully imposed upon him by the Defendant, the Plaintiff was
unable to defend himself, and because of this the Plaintiff was killed.
48. The Defendant was the cause of this death as he failed to take proper precautions to ensure
the Plaintiff was safe.
49. The Defendant was also the cause of this death through the unlawful detainment of the
Plaintiff, for the Plaintiff was helpless to defend himself. If the Plaintiff was not detained,
he would not have been killed.
EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION
(1 R. Stat. §3115 - Deprivation of Rights)
50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as if being alleged in this action.
51. The words of the due process clause only impose a requirement on the government to
protect life when a “special relationship” exists.
52. Such is the case when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against
his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general wellbeing. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. DSS, 489
U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
53. The Plaintiff in these circumstances was held in custody against his will, and was killed
against his will during the detention. Therefore, his due process rights were plainly
violated as the State allowed him to be killed in its custody.
54. The Defendant was the proximate cause of this violation.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests the court grant the following relief in order to atone and
redress the injuries formerly alleged—
55. To declare that the Defendant is liable for the tort of trespass as alleged in the first cause of
action;
a. To award $1,000 dollars in statutorily allowed punitive damages for this first cause
of action;
56. To declare that the Defendant is liable for the tort of Official Misconduct as described in
the second cause of action;
a. To award $3,000 dollars in statutorily allowed punitive damages for this second
cause of action;
57. To declare that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s fourth amendment right as alleged in
the third cause of action;
a. To award $100 dollars in nominal damages;
b. To award punitive damages in the amount of $2,000 dollars to punish and deter
future egregious conduct;
58. To declare that the Defendant is liable for the tort of False Imprisonment as alleged in the
fourth cause of action;
a. To award statutorily allowed punitive damages in the amount of $2,500 dollars;
59. To declare that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s rights as alleged in the fifth cause of
action;
a. To award nominal damages in the amount of $100 dollars;
b. To award the Plaintiff punitive damages in the amount of $2,000 dollars to punish
and deter future heinous and unconstitutional conduct;
60. To declare that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s rights as alleged in the sixth cause of
action;
a. To award nominal damages in the amount of $100 dollars;
b. To award the Plaintiff punitive damages in the amount of $1,000 dollars to punish
and deter future unconstitutional conduct;
61. To declare that the Defendant is liable for the tort of Wrongful Death as alleged in the
seventh cause of action;
a. To award compensatory damages in the amount of $300 dollars to compensate for
the lost property;
b. To award statutorily allowed punitive damages in the amount of $2,000 dollars;
62. To declare that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s due process rights as alleged in the
eight cause of action;
a. To award normative damages in the amount of $100 dollars;
b. To award punitive damages in the amount of $2,500 dollars in order to punish the
Defendant for the atrocious, monstrous, and detestable actions, and to deter future
action of the same;
63. All fees related to litigation incurred by the Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
HolyRomanRyan
Attorney At Law
CoastBreeze
Attorney At Law
Counsel for Plaintiff
