STATE OF RIDGEWAY
NEVPLAYSGAMES ET AL.,
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-743
PRESIDING JUDGE: HON. ALEXJCABOT
RESPONSE TO PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
Plaintiff
v.
LARGETITANIC2,
Defendant
RESPONSE TO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The Defendant submits this response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
ARGUMENT
I. THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SATISFY THE PRONGS REQUIRED
We agree that the Winter standard as mentioned by the Plaintiff is the correct standard to
adopt, but this case does not satisfy the requirements set forth by Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). This case set the precedent of the following prongs
needing to be satisfied by the Plaintiff: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that they
are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of
equities tip in their favor; and (4) that an injunction is of the public's interest.
A. The Plaintiff is Not Likely to Succeed on The Merits
The MSA is a reasonable exercise of the state's power to protect its own interests and
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. This is supported by the case of Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., where the Supreme Court held that "the appropriate inquiry is
whether the government has a 'substantial interest' in achieving its goal, and whether the means
chosen are 'narrowly tailored' to achieve that end." It is argued that the MSA is a reasonable
exercise of the state's power to protect its own interests because it specifically targets individuals
who hold office in hostile foreign powers and prohibits them from certain activities that could
potentially harm the interests of the state. This is a legitimate and rational goal, and the means
chosen by the state to achieve this goal are narrowly tailored to do so.
For example, the MSA prohibits individuals who hold office in hostile foreign powers
from being discharged from any government agency without the order of the Governor. This is a
reasonable means of protecting the state's interests because it prevents individuals who may be
hostile to the state from gaining access to sensitive information or positions of power within the
government. Additionally, the MSA prohibits individuals who hold office in hostile foreign
powers from being given an adverse hiring decision if they apply for a job with the National
Guard. This is a reasonable means of protecting the state's interests because it prevents
individuals who may be hostile to the state from gaining access to sensitive information or
positions of power within the National Guard.
Furthermore, the MSA disqualifies individuals who hold office in hostile foreign powers
from holding office within the State. This is a reasonable means of protecting the state's interests
because it prevents individuals who may be hostile to the state from gaining access to positions
of power or influence within the state government. In addition, the Plaintiff’s have demonstrated
no injury, and have failed to present any evidence that they would sustain injury based on their
first cause of action.
Overall, the provisions of the MSA are narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate goal
of protecting the state's interests from individuals who hold office in hostile foreign powers. This
is a reasonable exercise of the state's power to protect its own interests, and does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
B. A Preliminary Injunction is Not in The Public’s Interest
With heightened security measures from deliberate attacks from a hostile foreign nation,
why should we welcome those with open arms into our border, granted the same liberties and
rights as those attempting to diminish the primary objective of our state, freedom and equality.
We have recently seen an uptick in cyber attacks being committed on our State perpetrated by a
hostile foreign nation and its constituents in order to derail our progress and set us back. “[The]
First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such
circumstances to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). From this previous holding, we can see the
Supreme Court has restricted certain constitutional rights in efforts to promote national security,
and it is applicable in this scenario as well. In addition “[The] principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
C. The Plaintiffs Employment is Not in Jeopardy
The meaning of the terms “public office” and “office of trust or profit” have been clearly
defined by the United States Supreme Court and clearly established by the framers of the United
States Constitution. Article 2 § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution states that: "[The
President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments." Following that the term “office of trust or profit” is synonymous with
that of “office” or “office under the United States”, we can then apply such logic to the laws and
constitution of the State of Ridgeway, modeled after the United States and Vermont constitutions
and laws of various jurisdictions which all rely on these definitions of various ways of describing
public office.
After the signing of the Modified Sedition Act, Governor largeTitanic2, pursuant to
section 3.1.(e)(i) of the same, published EO 3-01 listing the offices in Pauljkl’s United States of
America and Boulder County, Colorado which disqualify individuals from holding employment
in a State of Ridgeway government employer. With the definitions previously defined, it is clear
that neither Plaintiff holds such office that would disqualify them from holding employment in a
State of Ridgeway government agency after a review of their employment in the aforementioned
foreign entities and a cross-check with the Governor’s list of incompatible offices, of which
Plaintiffs hold none.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ employment in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office is not in
jeopardy as they claim and they are not liable for discharge under Modified Sedition Act §
1.3(a). Plaintiffs are also both employed in the Boulder County Transit Service which is not
considered to make the employment of Plaintiffs a security risk to the State of Ridgeway based
on their employment in both Ridgeway and Boulder County. Bus drivers do not pose a threat to
the State of Ridgeway.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we urge this court to deny this Motion for Preliminary Injunction
due to the heightened security risk and cyber attacks that faced our state, in addition to the
Plaintiff being unlikely to succeed on the merits.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/RyanJSyndicate
RyanJSyndicate
Solicitor General; Office of the Solicitor
General
R.W. Bar #18106
