Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT NEVPLAYSGAMES and THEAVENGERNICK, on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF RIDGEWAY; largeTitanic2 in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Ridgeway, Defendant. Case No. RSC-CV-798 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff NevPlaysGames and TheAvengerNick (collectively “Plaintiffs”) on behalf of all others similarly situated, hereby file this response in opposition to Defendant’s Rid. Civ. R. P. 2(b)(2) motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs respectfully move that this Court deny defendant’s motion, and states as follows: RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS A motion to dismiss is a legal pleading that is filed to the Court to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint. The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not to evaluate the factual merits of the case. It is improper for factual arguments to be presented in the format of a motion to dismiss, and should instead be presented in the appropriate climate that can be deemed acceptable by this Court. The standard in which the Court evaluates a Motion to Dismiss is whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. This standard is solely based upon the principle that pleadings should be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purposes of the motion. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The exclusive purpose of the aforementioned standard is to prevent dismissal of a case at the pleading stage unless it is clear that the plaintiff has no legal basis for their claims. It is not the role of the Court to make factual determinations or weigh the evidence at this stage of the proceedings. Alternatively, the Court’s only task is to decide whether the complaint sets forth a legally cognizable claim for relief. In contrast, factual arguments seek to challenge the truth, or accuracy of the facts alleged in the complaint. For instance, a defendant may argue that the plaintiff's factual allegations are false, or that there is other evidence that contradicts the plaintiff's claims. These arguments are inappropriate in a motion to dismiss because they go beyond the legal sufficiency of the complaint and attempt to dispute the factual merits of the case. In the case of Conley v. Gibson, the United States Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. In other words, the Court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and must consider them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This means that the Court should not consider factual arguments presented by the defendant in a motion to dismiss, as these arguments could potentially be misleading or one-sided. Additionally, in the case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears that the plaintiff has failed to plead a plausible claim for relief. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff's factual allegations must be accepted as true and that the Court should not consider factual arguments presented by the defendant in a motion to dismiss. It is crucial to argue that the defendant's factual allegations should be disregarded and that the Court should focus on the legal arguments presented in the motion to dismiss. The Court should only consider the factual allegations in the context of the legal arguments, and should not make any decisions based solely on the factual allegations presented in the motion to dismiss. This approach will ensure that the Court is able to make a fair and just decision, and will also ensure that the plaintiff is afforded their right to due process. Therefore, weighing the factual arguments presented would depart from the very intention that a motion to dismiss serves the purpose of. This Court should accordingly rule that the arguments presented in the Defendant’s motion to dismiss were the improper forum to challenge the merits of the case, and ought not be granted. ARGUMENT A. A MOTION TO DISMISS IS AN INAPPROPRIATE MEDIUM TO FURTHER FACTUAL ARGUMENTS It is long ruled within the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway that factual arguments are not the appropriate forum to address the merits of a case. The defendant’s motion to dismiss has been similarly moved in previous cases, where such motions have demonstrated a pattern of factual arguments, contrary to providing legal arguments to challenge the sufficiency of the case. The Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway has previously ruled upon a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that contained factual arguments, holding that “factual assertions are not appropriate in a motion to dismiss[...][t]he only relevant question is whether all properly pleaded facts[...]give rise to the cause of action.” See BattalionGavin v. GlenMcDeer, RSC-CV-743 (2022); see also Yassen28, et al. v. Ridgeway National Guard, et al., RSC-AD-619 (2022) (reaffirming the pellucid principle that factual arguments are not appropriate in the forum of a motion to dismiss.) These concerns are not only substantiated by our state-level trial court, these concerns are also addressed within the Circuit Courts of the United States. The Circuit Courts’ has previously held that the “[A]rguments based on the moving parties’ assertions of fact are inapt on a motion to dismiss.” Building & Construction Trades Council v. Downtown Development, Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 155 (2d Cir. 2006). In that case, the Circuit Court concluded that the Petitioner adequately alleged a claim upon which relief can be granted in its first cause of action. Furthermore, the 1st Circuit has held consistent with the ruling in Council, ruling that the Court “must deny a motion to dismiss if the motion relies on disputed facts.” United States v. Stepanets, 879 F.3d 367, 372 (1st Cir. 2018). Departing from the usual practice of our state-level courts, and the predominant Circuit Courts’ of the United States would be a dangerous and consequential holding that changes the framework of commonly ruled precedent. B. ORDINARY MEANING The Modified Sedition Act enacts several dubious, and ambiguous terms that are not defined within the act itself. When a statute contains a term that is not defined, the court must rely on the ordinary meaning of the term in order to determine the intent of the statute. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States when they ruled that when a word is not defined by statute, “we [commonly] construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (words not defined in statute should be given ordinary or common meaning); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1267, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010); Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 1182 (2011); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S.Ct. 788, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 (1995). Plaintiff argues that the term “Public Office,” as used within the Modified Sedition Act is ambiguous, and is not defined in the statute. Public office is defined as “[A]n office created by a constitution or legislative act, having a definite tenure, and involving the power to carry out some governmental function.” (“Public Office,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary). In construing this definition to the use of the term “Public Office” in the Modified Sedition Act, we must conclude that public office constitutes any office in which an individual withholds governmental duties. It would be irresponsible to make an attempt to construe this term that went unanswered within the Modified Sedition Act. Plaintiff, who is the Director of the Boulder County Transit Authority (hereinafter “BCTA”), is forbidden from holding any public office solely due to his departmental leadership of the BCTA. Specifically, we refer to Subsection 1.4(f), in which it states that: “All persons who directly lead a department, agency, or other governmental organization in a hostile foreign power shall be forever disqualified from holding an office of trust or profit in the State of Ridgeway.” In applying the ordinary meaning of Public Office as approached in the Modified Sedition Act, we must conclude that the Plaintiff’s employment in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office is considered an employment in a Public Office, be it so provided that the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office does in-fact carry out “some governmental functions.” (“Public Office”). In addressing the second ambiguous term, we refer to the Modified Sedition Act’s use of the term “Sergeants (or its equivalents).” When looking into the definition of a Sergeant, we must conclude that a sergeant is an individual who “[e]nforces the judgments[...][and] the commands of one in authority.” (“Sergeant,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Plaintiff, who enforces the judgements and the commands of authority as Director of the Boulder County Transit Authority, meets the provided threshold as the equivalent to a Sergeant, and their duties. Whereas we must apply the ordinary meaning to the use of this term, the Modified Sedition Act further jeopardizes the Plaintiff’s employment in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff, who is a Sergeant of the RCSO meets the criteria of what the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines as the equivalent to a Sergeant. Therefore, the Plaintiff is in a liable position to be terminated from the RCSO for his simple position as the equivalent of a Sergeant in Pauljkl’s United States of America, and Boulder County. Therefore, this Court must find that the Plaintiff is not only in jeopardy in regard to his employment, but is also defined by ordinary meaning to be the “equivalents” to the position. Therefore, this court must accordingly apply the ordinary meaning to the use of Public Office which went undefined in the Modified Sedition Act. The ambiguities of which this term carries is consequential, and only further affirms the plaintiff's argument. This Court should deny the Motion to Dismiss. CONCLUSION Defendant’s motion should be denied, as Defendant’s argument directly argues their basis against the merits of the case, contrary to challenging the legal sufficiency; a commonly barred practice within the Courts. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully moves that this court deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Respectfully Submitted. STICKZA Managing Partner COHN, CICERO, & GOODRICH, LLC Suite 3B, Palmer Apartments Palmer, RW 33328 D: stick#0677 E: [email protected] TURNTABLE5000 Counsel 10 000 HOLYROMANRYAN Advocate 10 000 Counsel of Record

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