RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
NEVPLAYSGAMES and
THEAVENGERNICK
Plaintiffs
v. DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-798
STATE OF RIDGEWAY and
LARGETITANIC2
in his official capacity as
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
RIDGEWAY
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On November 28th, 2022, the Governor of the State of Ridgeway, largeTitanic2, signed
the Modified Sedition Act into law after its passage in the Senate1 to combat treasonous and
seditious activity in the State of Ridgeway by foreign actors, especially those swearing allegiance
to Pauljkl’s United States of America and Boulder County, Colorado. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the
State of Ridgeway from enforcing the Modified Sedition Act for alleged unconstitutional
provisions within the act in addition to requesting that this court declare the act unconstitutional
in its entirety. Plaintiff claims that they are involved with Pauljkl’s United States of America and
thus are ineligible to petition for expungements of their criminal records in accordance with the
Modified Sedition Act § 2.1(c,d).
Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a civil action in this court2 seeking redress against these
provisions. The State maintains that no right of the Plaintiff has been infringed upon, and that
expungements are a privilege afforded by the government, not a right of its citizens.
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues in their complaint that they face termination as a result of their
involvement with sanctioned foreign entities in accordance with the provisions of the Modified
Sedition Act. The State disagrees with this interpretation of the Modified Sedition Act and it is
clear based on the applicable law and relevant judicial opinions that Plaintiff’s job is not in
jeopardy due to their standing in both the State of Ridgeway and Pauljkl’s United States of
America or Boulder County, Colorado. Plaintiffs also do not hold any form of public office in
2Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
1Modified Sedition Act
either Pauljkl’s United States of America or Boulder County, Colorado, exempting them from the
provisions of the Modified Sedition Act which they bring suit over.
They resultantly do not have any standing to sue the State of Ridgeway or Governor
largeTitanic2 over the provisions of the Modified Sedition Act because they do not face any
injury, past, present, or future, on account of the provisions of the Modified Sedition Act and
their employment in the listed foreign entities. This case should therefore be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I. EXPUNGEMENTS ARE A PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
TO ITS CITIZENS, NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
In Plaintiffs’ amended civil complaint, they argue that the provision of the Modified
Sedition Act prohibiting those holding public office in Pauljkl’s United States of America or
Boulder County, Colorado are ineligible to petition for criminal records expungement,
subsequently limiting the rights of Plaintiffs to seek redress in the courts of the State of
Ridgeway. We disagree. A reading of the Constitution of the State of Ridgeway and the
Constitution of the United States will show that no right to expungement exists, even that no
mention of expungements exists in either document except within Ridgeway’s constitution
merely empowering the Superior Court to hear expungement petitions.
The document establishing expungements in the State of Ridgeway is found within the
Judiciary Act § 43. Through this act, the State Senate passed a law to allow expungements of
criminal records and imposed requirements on who many petition for an expungement of their
records, some restrictions being that petitioners are “in good standing with the community” in
addition to requirements to not have accrued any additional records within a given timeframe.
(Id.) The State Senate executed their legislative power pursuant to Article II § II of the state
constitution in deciding on these requirements for expungement and did the exact same in their
passage of the Modified Sedition Act, imposing additional requirements on petitioners seeking
expungement in exactly the same way they did when originally passing the Judiciary Act and its
requirements for petitioners.
Plaintiffs claim that “access to the courts is universal, and must not be disallowed to any
person,” citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) in support. A reading of the opinion
in this case makes it clear that Plaintiffs’ arguments are wholly erroneous and unsupported.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that “We do not decide that access for all
individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment… this right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment
of a fundamental human relationship.” (Id.) Appellants in this case brought suit against the State
of Connecticut arguing that their petition for divorce was unconstitutionally denied due to their
nonpayment of court fees relating to the filing of their petition. The Court held that Appellant’s
right to petition for divorce could not be denied unless the State could provide a justification
3Judiciary Act
showing otherwise; “Drawing upon the principles established by the cases just canvassed, we
conclude that the State's refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole means in
Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages, and, in the
absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due
process.” (Id.) (Emphasis added)
The holding in Boddie is explicitly clear that it does not extend in scope or enforcement
beyond the disillusionment of marriages and does not guarantee a universal right for access to
the courts, as Plaintiffs claim. Furthermore, the State of Ridgeway has clear and sufficient
justification to bar such access to the courts, disregarding the narrowly tailored ruling of the
Supreme Court, by virtue of having a vested interest in preventing and punishing seditionists and
traitors within its borders, seeking to ensure that its employees, sworn to protect the State, are
unwavering in that commitment without serious conflicts rising out of allegiance to a foreign
entity that would preclude them from being fully dedicated to the State of Ridgeway, the oath
they swore to, and the duties they promised to fulfill.
In the words of Goku from Dragon Ball Z, to go even further beyond, the Supreme Court
continued in their ruling to opine that “Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no
more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests
in court. For both groups, this process is not only the paramount dispute settlement
technique, but, in fact, the only available one. In this posture, we think that this appeal is
properly to be resolved in light of the principles enunciated in our due process decisions that
delimit rights of defendants compelled to litigate their differences in the judicial forum.” (Id.)
(Emphasis added). Plaintiffs in this case have an actual method of resolving any dispute they
might have with their criminal records by petitioning the court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus via
Judiciary Act § 2.5; petitions for expungement fail to meet the definition of what would be
considered a dispute.
II. PLAINTIFFS STILL HAVE MEANS OF REDRESS IN STATE COURTS FOR
REMOVING ENTRIES ON THEIR CRIMINAL RECORD
While Plaintiffs in their amended filing claim that their right to seek redress in the
Superior Court is greatly infringed upon, the reality could not be further from that claim. By
definition, expungements are not a form of redress, therefore Plaintiffs are not enjoined from
seeking redress in the courts by the provisions of the Modified Sedition Act. Redress
fundamentally is the pursuit of a legal remedy for a wrong, a definition that an expungement
petition does not meet. Such petitions are inherently not a form of redress, rather acting similarly
to that of a pardon whereby a petitioner seeks forgiveness for their misgivings and criminal
actions so that their lives are not affected by their criminal record.
Looking at Judiciary § Act 2.5, Plaintiffs still have the means of challenging arrests that
they believe to be contrary to Ridgeway and the United States Constitutions and any applicable
law by petitioning for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, a petition in no way enjoined by the Modified
Sedition Act. As Plaintiffs mention in their amended complaint, the 14th amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees equal protection under the law. Plaintiffs’ access to the
courts is not abridged by the Modified Sedition Act, they are not barred from filing any form of
case or petition as the law permits. The Modified Sedition Act merely imposes additional
requirements akin to that already mandated, such as having no new entries on a criminal record
for a prescribed amount of time. Whether or not Plaintiffs meet those requirements is entirely up
to their own actions and their ability to petition for expungement is not infringed by the Modified
Sedition Act. Only the outcome of the petition is in question, as it would be for any new
requirements the State Senate decides to set. The equal protections clause of the 14th amendment
and the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution are clearly upheld.
III. PLAINTIFFS’ EMPLOYMENT IN THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY IS NOT IN
JEOPARDY
The meaning of the terms “public office” and “office of trust or profit” have been clearly
defined by the United States Supreme Court and clearly established by the framers of the United
States Constitution. Article 2 § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution states that:
"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think
proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
The definition of an “Officer of the United States” has been interpreted to mean that of
“any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Plaintiffs are both members of the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office and can be considered “inferior Officers” for the intents and purposes of Article
2 § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution, they are not “Officers of the United States”. Id. The
document at issue here is not the United States Constitution though, but rather the Modified
Sedition Act. The Act interchangeably uses the terms “public office”, “office of trust or profit”,
or simply “office”. All of these terms are used contextually in similar manners, for example, in
section 1.4(a) it states “There shall be a database maintained by the Secretary of State containing
all persons who have been disqualified from office pursuant to this legislation”, section 1.4(e)
states “All persons who hold a cabinet position in a hostile foreign power shall be forever
disqualified from holding an office of trust or profit in the State of Ridgeway”, section 1.3(a)
states “A person may be generally discharged from any government agency if they hold any
office in a hostile foreign power, and that department head or the Governor finds their continued
employment to be a security risk”, and section 2.1(c) states “All persons who petition for an
expungement, and hold public office in Pauljkl’s United States of America shall be denied”
(emphases added). None of these terms are formally defined in the State of Ridgeway, either in
statute or case law. We should then look to their conventional definitions for clarity.
It should be noted that the term “office of trust or profit” as established in the United
States Constitution refers to any individual considered an “officer of the United States” and is no
more expansive in scope of who is considered to be an “officer of trust or profit” than an “officer
of the United States” and was thought to be considered to have the same meaning as simply
“office” or “officer”, a synonymous relationship that Virginia Governor Peyton Randolph
identified when the Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution was being debated at
the Virginia ratifying convention:
“restrains any persons in office from accepting of any present or emolument, title or
office, from any foreign prince or state. This restriction is provided to prevent
corruption. All men have a natural inherent right of receiving emoluments from any
one, unless they be restrained by the regulations of the community. An accident
which actually happened, operated in producing the restriction. A box was presented
to our ambassador by the king of our allies. It was thought proper, in order to exclude
corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or
holding any emoluments from foreign states. I believe, that if at that moment, when
we were in harmony with the King of France, we had supposed that he was corrupting
our ambassador, it might have disturbed that confidence, and diminished that mutual
friendship, which contributed to carry us through the war”
3 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 327 (rev. ed. 1966)
(emphases added) (footnote omitted) (“Records”).
Following that the term “office of trust or profit” is synonymous with that of “office” or
“office under the United States”, we can then apply such logic to the laws and constitution of the
State of Ridgeway, modeled after the United States and Vermont constitutions and laws of
various jurisdictions which all rely on these definitions of various ways of describing public
office.
After the signing of the Modified Sedition Act, Governor largeTitanic2, pursuant to
section 3.1.(e)(i) of the same, published EO 3-01 listing the offices in Pauljkl’s United States of
America and Boulder County, Colorado which disqualify individuals from holding employment
in a State of Ridgeway government employer4. With the definitions previously defined, it is clear
that neither Plaintiff holds such office that would disqualify them from holding employment in a
State of Ridgeway government agency after a review of their employment in the aforementioned
foreign entities and a cross-check with the Governor’s list of incompatible offices, of which
Plaintiffs hold none5,6.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ employment in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office is not in
jeopardy as they claim and they are not liable for discharge under Modified Sedition Act §
1.3(a). Plaintiffs are also both employed in the Boulder County Transit Service which is not
6Plaintiff TheAvengerNick’s Roblox Profile
5Plaintiff NevPlaysGames’ Roblox Profile
4EO 3-01 - Incompatible Offices under the Modified Sedition Act
considered to make the employment of Plaintiffs a security risk to the State of Ridgeway based
on their employment in both Ridgeway and Boulder County. Bus drivers do not pose a threat to
the State of Ridgeway.
IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DENIAL OF EXPUNGEMENT PETITIONS
Neither Plaintiff holds relevant office in either Pauljkl’s United States of America or
Boulder County, Colorado that would serve as factors that would cause any expungement
petition they would file to be denied according to Modified Sedition Act § 2.1(c,d). As
previously stated, by virtue of Plaintiffs’ offices in Boulder County, Colorado, the provisions of
the Modified Sedition Act, and a cross-check with the Governor’s list of incompatible offices in
EO 3-01, Plaintiffs are not considered to hold public office in Boulder County, Colorado. Any
expungement petition they might then file in the Superior Court of Ridgeway would not be
denied in accordance with Modified Sedition Act § 2.1(d) as they meet the requirements for
expungement as set by the State Senate. Neither Plaintiff holds public office in Pauljkl’s United
States of America.
As Plaintiff’s only cause of action is an alleged deprivation of their 14th amendment
rights as a result of their belief that their expungement petitions would be denied, their cause of
action falls flat after a simple review of the applicable law as they are not bound by the
provisions of the Modified Sedition Act with regards to any expungement petitions they might
file. They thus do not have standing to sue the State of Ridgeway or Governor largeTitanic2 over
said provisions because they have not, do not, and will not face injury from them due to the
Plaintiffs not holding the applicable offices that might cause their future expungement petitions
to be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs’ case in its entirety
with prejudice for lack of standing.
Date: December 9th, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
TECHIEY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Government Annex, 2nd Floor
Palmer, RW 33328
RSB 17140
COUNSEL OF RECORD
RYAN J. SYNDICATE
SOLICITOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Government Annex, 2nd Floor
Palmer, RW 33328
RSB 18106
TOTORO987123
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Government Annex, 2nd Floor
Palmer, RW 33328
RSB 17148
