Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY STATE OF RIDGEWAY, Plaintiff, v. PIRATEHOOKTAIL, Defendant. Case No. RSC-CM-762 MOTION TO DISMISS MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT Defendant PirateHookTail (“Defendant”) or (“Pirate”) seeks dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the Government struck a nuncupative immunity deal prior to the filing of this indictment. This deal, chiefly focusing on an exchange of testimony in the reciprocation of immunity, was promised by the Government in the matter of State of Ridgeway v. BattalionGavin, RSC-CM-750 (2022), via private direct-messages between the primary prosecutor and PirateHookTail. Although the case was dismissed due to a timing discrepancy of the State, the immunity agreement is still binding to the above-styled matter. In BattalionGavin, the Defendant in this case was an alleged victim, and thus the State sought his testimony. The above-titled proceedings were in the drafting stage to charge PirateHookTail for a separate event. The primary prosecutor in BattalionGavin, however, struck an oral promise with the Defendant ensuring that he would not be prosecuted in exchange for testimony. When such an agreement is made, the Government “[m]ust be held to the promises it made.” United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sonko, No. 18-4098, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 2018); United States v. Matthews, 404 F. App'x 749, 0 (4th Cir. 2010). Although this agreement was agreed upon orally between the primary prosecutor and the defendant, the agreement is still binding to these proceedings today. In the past, for example, the Courts have considered unwritten immunity agreements, ultimately declaring them to be viable in proceedings.. See, e.g., United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1320 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Heatley, 39 F.Supp.2d 287, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). This Court should follow correspondingly in those very steps of previous Courts, by recognizing the retroactive agreement regardless of the perception of the agreement on its face. In demonstrating whether the Court can determine if this is oral agreement is sufficeable as to past verbal agreements, the “[C]ourt must determine what the parties reasonably understood to be its terms, including intended remedies in the event of a breach.” United States v. Aluzzo, 943 F.Supp. 243, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In the aforementioned verbal agreement between DavidLClarke and PirateHookTail, it can be adequately demonstrated that: (1) The prosecutor and the defendant agreed upon the immunity conditions; and (2) The repercussions of breaching the conditions would follow a subsequent termination of the agreement. Further, the Court must be attentive to the fact that the state shoulders the “burden of any lack of clarity in [the] agreement, and [that] ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of [the] defendant.” U.S. v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d at 302 (citing Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1988)). The agreement in itself laid out that the State would give the defendant immunity if he “testif[ied] for court,” in BattalionGavin. This agreement, however, was never orally withdrawn between the primary prosecutor and the defendant. Therefore, even though BattalionGavin was dismissed, the immunity agreement was never abolished, nor rescinded by either party; thus binding that agreement to the above-titled proceedings. In cases similar to the above-styled matter, State Supreme Courts have held that “[W]hen a prosecutor makes an unconditional promise of non-prosecution,” and “when the defendant relies upon that guarantee to the detriment of his constitutional right not to testify,” “the principle of fundamental fairness that undergirds due process of law in our criminal justice system demands that the promise be enforced.” Commonwealth v. William Henry Cosby, Jr., 252 A.3d 1092 (2021). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further held that there is only “one remedy” to restore a defendant to the “status quo ante.” Holding that the defendant “must be discharged,” and “any future prosecution on the[] particular charges must be barred.” Ibid. The substantial likeness between the agreement made in BattalionGavin and Cosby are damning, and such are similar to the conditions laid out in both agreements. Therefore, it is indeed impermissible for the Government to prosecute the defendant, contravening upon a solidified immunity agreement settled in a prior case. This Court should uphold that today by dismissing the indictment in its entirety. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Mr. PirateHookTail respectfully requests the dismissal of the indictment in its entirety. Dated: November 24, 2022 Respectfully Submitted. STICKZA Managing Partner COHN, CICERO, & GOODRICH, LLC Suite 3B, Palmer Apartments Palmer, RW 33328 D: stick#0677 E: [email protected] Counsel for Defendant APPENDICES APPENDIX A - Immunity Agreement in Question https://prnt.sc/VjxCio7eM5Qa

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