STATE OF RIDGEWAY
REMOVELUNGS
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-678
Plaintiff
v.
PEAKEFFECT
Defendant
STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Comes now the State of Ridgeway moving for summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DETAINMENT PERFORMED BY THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
The detainment of plaintiff removelungs did not constitute false imprisonment and was performed in order to
secure the scene, preventing them from entering an active crime scene which resulted in a shootout and the
death of Mr. PeakEffect. As shown and declared by the defendant, they were investigating a crime scene and
were going to proceed and perform an investigative seizure on the potential items within the car, however, prior
to the latter, officers at the scene were ambushed by a shooter in the vehicle. The officer’s detainment of the
plaintiff is fully reasonable to prevent a crime from being committed, and to ensure the safety of the crime
scene; when officers have “reasonable suspicion that a person is committing a crime, the officer can detain the
person for a reasonable amount of time and in a reasonable manner in order to determine if a crime is being
committed.” Whipple v. Tropeano (W.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2013). See Also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Due to
the uncertainty from the officers regarding the plaintiff’s potential actions, the defendant opted to detain the
plaintiff for personal and crime scene integrity briefly. Shortly afterward, upon being asked if he would like to
process the plaintiff, the defendant released him due to being cleared from suspicion. “Officers may also use
handcuffs during a detention for officer safety, even where the person is not under arrest.” Devermont v. City of
San Diego, (S.D. Cal. Jun. 12, 2013), See Also United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981),
("Strong but reasonable measures to ensure the safety of the officers or the public can be taken without
necessarily compelling a finding that the suspect was in custody.") with custody being referred to as arrested. As
argued, the defendant’s actions were not a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the
defendant should not be found liable for it, the plaintiff chose to approach the officers and was lawfully detained
under reasonable suspicion until the defendant found nothing to be wary of.
II. SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION TO BE DISMISSED
Both second and third causes of action mentioned by the plaintiff in his complaint lack merit, and should be
dismissed. By lawfully detaining the plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment, both Official Misconduct and
Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law lack foundation, and hence relief should not be granted.
III. DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED AFFIRMATION TO FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
VIOLATION
When confronted by the plaintiff’s attorney prior to this civil matter, the defendant Mr. PeakEffect replied to the
allegations posed with a simple “Right” message, which, despite plaintiff’s efforts to interpret it as an
affirmation, it lacks to note that Mr. DorkJacob’s accusation is not being presented as a question to the
defendant. He, as an individual from the United Kingdom, is used to reply employing the aforementioned word,
which is not used as an indicator to affirm, but rather a short addition before replying. There is absolutely no
certainty he intended to affirm said allegations. Even if the language barriers between the United States and the
United Kingdom may be slim, there are still slight changes to their vocabulary, which can be extremely
prejudicial at times, which is certainly the case in this matter. "[a] language such as English itself is full of
dialectal variations in the form of British English and American English to name a few." Improved Search LLC
v. Aol, Inc. (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2017). We ask the court not to rule on this motion without considering this
ever-important factor, which appears to be vital in this matter.
Respectfully Submitted,
AZAD9L
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
