RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
XJVMMA,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CM-821
MOTION TO DISMISS
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant in the above entitled matter hereby moves to dismiss the indictment in
accordance with Rid. R. Crim. P. 13.
ARGUMENT
When the State filled the grand jury with law enforcement officers, it empowered itself to
determine whether it had probable cause. This calculated maneuver, which made law
enforcement officers the ones who double-checked the work of a prosecutor, thwarted the
Defendant’s due process right to a fair and impartial grand jury. The grand jury that was
constituted shared the interest of the prosecutor and was, by extension, biased against the
Defendant. Even if the court doesn’t believe that actual bias was present, the appearance of
unfairness is enough to dismiss the indictment on due process grounds. The Due Process clause
doesn’t make room for the State to be members of the jury and the prosecutor. This court should
dismiss the indictment accordingly.
I. A GRAND JURY COMPRISED SOLELY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
PREJUDICES THE DEFENDANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The grand jury that indicted the Defendant in this case was composed of entirely law
enforcement officers. See State’s Discovery at 2. The consequences of this move are grave. It
means that the State empowered itself to review itself…impartially. There can be no independent
review of the facts when the State is both the prosecutor and the adjudicator. As a result, the
Defendant’s right to a grand jury was plainly violated.
The common-law understanding of a “grand jury” as used in the State’s constitution is a
jury that is used as a fair and impartial way to safeguard against the State’s potential abuse of the
levels of criminal prosecutions. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974).
Additionally, grand juries are supposed to be “a body truly representative of the community.”
Smith v. Texas, 311 US 128 (1940). Construing the Constitutional right of Article I, § VII
through the lens of federal common law is correct in this context. When the Senate drafted the
words “grand jury” in our Constitution, they did so against the backdrop of common-law
understanding. In other words, the common-law informed the framers' understanding of the
words that they wrote. In these scenarios, where words with a firm basis in the common-law are
invoked by the legislature, they are understood by the common-law that shapes their definition.
See State of Ridgeway v. Lx1nas III, 1 Rid. ____ (2022) (Injecting common-law understandings
of the word “injunction” into Section 2.1 of the Civil Claims Act).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that when a grand jury is constituted in a way
that precludes the Defendant from having a fair hearing, it violates the Defendant’s due process
rights.
Most notably, in Smith v. Texas, 311 US 128 (1940), the Supreme Court overturned a
conviction on the basis that the accused’s grand jury was constructed using racial discrimination,
and as such, did not fairly “represent[] the community.” While the facts of this case do not match
the facts of the current case, the principles track onto it. Where a grand jury is constituted in such
a way that prejudices the Defendant’s right to have a fair and impartial jury, it is at tension with
the Defendant’s due process rights. Similarly, in Peters v. Kiff, 407 US 493 (1972), the Court
held that even though a defendant did not belong to the group discriminated against in grand jury
selection, there nevertheless was a due process injury to the Defendant when the grand jury did
not “represent[] a fair cross-section of the community.” Williams v. Florida, 399 US 78 (1970)
(emphasis added). This decision was predicated on the basis that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process.” Peters v. Kiff, 407 US 493 (1972) (quoting, In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). The Court cogently held “if a State chooses, quite apart from
constitutional compulsion, to use a grand or petit jury, due process imposes limitations on the
composition of that jury.” Ibid., at 501.
In each of these cases, the court held that when a grand jury is incapable of rendering a
fair decision, it flagrantly violates the Defendant’s right to due process of law. Indeed, “it was
well established that the Due Process Clause protects a defendant from jurors who are actually
incapable of rendering an impartial verdict, based on the evidence and the law.” Ibid.
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS NO ACTUAL BIAS, THE APPEARENCE OF IT
IS ENOUGH TO WARRANT DISMISSAL.
“[D]ue process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of
bias.” Ibid., at 502. It was the Court’s holding as well in In re Murchison, supra, that “[f]airness
of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” 349 U. S., at 136. This is a
principle re-affirmed time and time again. In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) the Court held
that a judge cannot, in accordance with due process, try a case that he has a financial interest in
as a precaution in the event that he acts on it. And in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965),
the Court held that a jury could not, in accordance with due process, try a case after it had been
placed in the custody of the prosecution’s principal witness because they could have been
influenced by the association. Appearance and possibility of bias is enough to dismiss the
indictment in light of the Defendant’s due process right. The Kiff, supra, case invoked this
rationale as a supporting basis to dismiss the indictment of a grand jury. There is an
overwhelming appearance of bias by the very nature of the fact that the prosecutors and jury
members share a job with the same purpose, and often work together to execute that purpose.
Law enforcement officers are indistinguishable in purpose from State prosecutors. Both
have an unwavering interest in putting bad guys in jail. The grand jury that was constituted to
serve as a way to double check the prosecutor’s allegations cannot do so fairly when it shares the
prosecutor’s interest. Even if this court doesn’t believe that the grand jury acted in a biased way,
the appearance and possibility of that bias is enough to dismiss the indictment on due process
grounds.
Respectfully Submitted.
CLIFFORD2
Counsel
10 000
TURTABLE5000
Counsel
10 000
Dated: 12/27/2022
