RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
XJVMMA,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CM-821
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant in the above entitled matter hereby moves to dismiss the indictment in
accordance with Rid. R. Crim. P. 13.
ARGUMENT
The grand jury which produced the Defendant’s indictment was impaneled in a way
contrary to the rules of criminal procedure, and as consequence, thwarted the Defendant’s due
process rights. This case should be dismissed.
I. THE UNLAWFULLY CONSTITUTED GRAND JURY IS AN AFFRONT TO THE
DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A LEGITIMATE GRAND JURY.
Rid. R. Crim. P. 5(a) specifies that “Jurors for grand juries may only be selected from a
pool of licensed attorneys serving within the state.” In this case, none of the jurors selected were
licensed attorneys. In fact, each of them was selected from a pool of law enforcement officers.
When a grand jury is unlawfully constituted, the indictment that it produces is
illegitimate. That is true because when the indictment that is produced exists outside of the
confines of the rules of criminal procedure, it means that the indictment is not sanctioned by the
rules. It has no basis in the rules or the law. It can hardly be called an indictment.
The indictment by an unlawfully impaneled grand jury prejudices the Defendant’s right to
a legitimate grand jury. Jemma, as a law enforcement officer, “enjoy[s] the right to be charged by
grand jury indictment.” Rid. Const. Art. I § VII. But when a grand jury is illegitimately
impaneled, and then illegitimately indicted, the Defendant is not adequately protected in her right
to a grand jury. In other words, if the Defendant were to be convicted as a result of this trial, she
would have never had enjoyed her right to a grand jury. That’s because a grand jury that is
impaneled in such a manner that is inconsistent with the rules is no grand jury at all. This court
should dismiss the indictment because it stands to contravene the defendant’s explicit right to a
grand jury indictment when she is charged with a crime.
In Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 363 (1956), the Supreme Court decided
whether or not a grand jury indictment could be dismissed on the basis that hearsay was
presented to the grand jury. They decided that the answer was no and concluded that “[a]n
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn
by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.” Ibid.,
at 363. This means, conversely, that an indictment returned by an illegally constituted grand jury
is not valid on its face and cannot stand trial on its merits when someone is entitled to a grand
jury.
In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254 (1986), the Supreme Court held that it was unlawful
for a grand jury to exclude members of a defendant’s race. On the basis of this holding—that a
grand jury was unlawfully constituted—they set aside the Defendant’s conviction despite
overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
The composition of this grand jury was in explicit violation of the rules. The indictment
that came from it must therefore be dismissed.
II. THE COMPOSITION OF THE GRAND JURY VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT’S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The prejudice to the Defendant’s right is further complicated by who actually constituted
the grand jury—law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers are the individuals that work
directly with the State to prosecute certain individuals. In fact, law enforcement officers are the
State. They are virtually indistinguishable from prosecutors in purpose, and only in function are
they materially different. The common-law understanding of a “grand jury” as used in the State’s
constitution is a jury that is used as a fair and impartial way to safeguard against the State’s
potential abuse of the levels of criminal prosecutions. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
343 (1974). And indeed, as was the holding in In re Murchison., 349 U. S. 133 (1955), “A fair1
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In this case, the Supreme Court held
that it was a violation for a single judge to serve as an entire grand jury because it was an affront
to the rules of due process. Such is the case here. Not only is this grand jury unlawfully
constituted, but it is constituted with a group of individuals who have a tangible interest in the
outcome of the case as a result of their positions as law enforcement officers. The composition of
this grand jury prejudices the Defendant’s right to due process of law because it ignores the rules
that govern grand jury procedures and constitutes a jury that is biased in favor of the State.
1 Where words are used plainly by the legislature and maintain a substantive common-law understanding, the
common-law definition is understood to govern. See State of Ridgeway v. Lx1nas III, 1 Rid. ____ (2022) (Injecting
common-law understandings of the word “injunction” into Section 2.1 of the Civil Claims Act).
Indeed, the individuals occupying the jury seats in this case, are the State. The indictment should
be dismissed in light of this reprehensible reality.
CONCLUSION
Because the Defendant’s rights to due process of law and to a grand jury indictment have
been violated, the indictment should be dismissed.
Respectfully Submitted.
CLIFFORD2
Counsel
10 000
Dated: 12/2/2022
APPENDIX
A:
Siteowner, the individual responsible for creating the grand juries, admitting
that they are no longer constituted by attorneys.
B:
DavidLClarke, a magistrate judge, admitting that the grand juries are
composed of law enforcement officers.
C:
D:
