RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
YASSEN28, SOUKABLET,
JAMESGARDAI
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY NATIONAL GUARD;
CONSTANTLYVERBAL, in their
official capacity as Captain of the
Ridgeway National Guard;
BOHBAZINGA, in their official
capacity as Adjutant General of the
Ridgeway National Guard,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-AD-619
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
DDDISMISS
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
For the second time, the Defense comes before this court and moves to dismiss this suit
on the basis of “factual arguments [that] are inappropriate in a motion to dismiss.” Denial of
Motion to Dismiss at 2. They attempt to paint the Plaintiff as someone grasping for straws in the
form of a civil complaint, but in making purely factual submissions to this court time and time
again in an effort to have this textbook civil claim dismissed, they are the ones who shoot arrows
into the dark and hope they land. In the interest of justice, and on a plain application of the law,
this court should hold that they completely missed their target.
Dismissal motions require a bit more than rhetorical flourish, extended metaphors, and
flashy buzz-words. Indeed, the legal argument has to be sound too. Defendants misunderstand
this rudimentary concept to the same extent that they misunderstand the law. The motion should
be denied.
ARGUMENTS
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR CLAIMS FOR UNFAIR HIRING
PRACTICES.
The Defense argues that a claim for unfair hiring practices is barred by sovereign
immunity. “The government is immune from all suits except those in this section, and in later
laws in which liability is explicitly created.” Rid. Civil Claims Act § 2.1 (2022). Subsection 2.8
explicitly creates liability on the Government’s behalf by allowing injured parties to “petition the
courts” for review of purportedly illegal conduct. The Rid. Administrative Procedure Act
“explicitly create[es],” Rid. Civil Claims Act § 2.1, liability on the government's behalf, the
claim is not barred by sovereign immunity.
When faced with a motion to dismiss, this court must “assume the veracity” of
well-pleaded allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009). Allegations are “well-pleaded”
when the “factual allegations … raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
US 544 (2007). If these factual allegations, assumed as true, create liability as to the cause of
action, the motion to dismiss dies. The Plaintiff’s allegations allege a systematic rights violation.
See Paragraph 25-26 Civil Complaint. Defendant’s arguments largely center around the fact that
the Plaintiff allegedly does not have evidence. But the argument that we cannot prove our factual
allegations is one for trial. This court, at this juncture, cannot say that the Plaintiff does not have
sufficient evidence to support the claims. If our allegations, taken as true, create a cause of
action, the inquiry ends.
The Defendant half-heartedly argues that this claim is barred by sovereign immunity. And
in order to substantiate this submission, they attempt to make a purely factual argument positing
that the Plaintiff lacks evidence. Both of these submissions are meritless. The Defendants’
motion to dismiss, once again, “submits that factual arguments are inappropriate in a motion to
dismiss.” Denial of Motion to Dismiss, Yassen28, et al. v. National Guard, et al., RSC-AD-619.
Plaintiff presents a cognizable claim ripe for adjudication. As this court held the first time the
Defense moved to dismiss, “plaintiff has plead enough facts which, if true, shows concrete and
non-hypothetical injury traceable to the defendants’ policies, orders, procedures, or directives.”
Id. This court has already found that Plaintiff’s have articulated a cause of action. The Defense
submits the same motion, with different words, asking the court to overturn its previous decision.
II. DEFENDANTS’ FACTUAL ARGUMENTS DO NOT SURVIVE MUSTER.
Defendant next argues that our allegations cannot pinpoint a specific policy used to
violate Plaintiff’s rights as to count 2 and 3. It is true that we cannot read the title, allege the date,
or articulate the file size of the policy that the National Guard uses. But this amorphous
requirement that the allegations must specifically state every minute detail of the National
Guard’s policies—even when those very policies are enveloped in secrecy—is not found
anywhere in the law. The basis of the Defense’s argument is that we lack sufficient evidence to
believe our own allegations. This is a clear-cut factual argument. Time and time again the
Defense has “submit[ed] … factual arguments are inappropriate in a motion to dismiss.” Id. We
allege that the National Guard’s procedure regarding background checks strips individuals of
their legal right. That allegation is enough to sustain a cause of action for this claim. The
Defendant attempts to suggest that we are shooting arrows into the dark, and that we don’t
actually know our claims are true. If that were the case, we would not have spent the time,
energy, and money to present a losing and baseless allegation in this court. We know our
allegations are true, that's why we brought the claim. Their argument that we can’t prove this
through evidence is one made for trial, not before it.
It’s important, as well, to take a step back and look at the broader implications of this
argument. Defense says that because we can’t cite the specific name of the policy, and simply
allege that a procedure exists, that it is insufficient to state a claim. But as this court is
well-aware, the National Guard is extremely secretive about its hiring practices. It was
profoundly unwilling to give information even to this court. If the Defenses’ argument were
accepted, it would mean that no Plaintiff would ever have any claim in this court for systematic
rights violations so long as the National Guard—or any agency—is persistent enough in their
refusal to give them information. That would be an intolerable state of the law. But that’s
precisely why this court was given the power to “subpoena sensitive … procedure[s].” Civil
Claims Act, § 2.1(a)(iii). The Senate had the foresight to know that instead of denying
procedures exist, agencies, like the National Guard here, would hide behind the fact that litigants
don’t have access to them. That’s precisely what the National Guard is attempting to do here. It
would be an injustice to sustain this criminal strategy.
Defendants try to suggest to the court that we are grasping at straws. But in making a
purely factual argument in a dismissal motion that isn’t rooted in any law, procedure, or rule,
they’re the ones shooting arrows into the dark and praying that they land. Their extended fish
metaphor is as spineless as their arguments. The motion should be denied.
Dated: August 16, 2022 Respectfully submitted.
STICKZA
Advocate
10 000
HOLYROMANRYAN
Advocate
10 000
ALEXJCABOT
Advocate
10 000
